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This doctoral thesis is an organizational study that explores the institutional and 
organizational issues behind education inequality in Indonesia that has been 
perceived as taken-for-granted. By examining a case in which public organizations 
experienced and responded to an intra-institutional contradiction, i.e., conflicting 
institutional demands imposed by the same institutional actor, this work draws on 
and contributes to the institutional theory of organizations, commonly called 
organizational institutionalism. In doing so, this thesis answers the following two 
research problems:  
• How do public sector organizations respond to an intra-institutional 
contradiction?  
• How can both institution-level influences and organizational attributes 
explain the organizational responses? 
This monograph consists of 10 chapters, starting with the introduction 
outlining both the theoretical and empirical background of the study that are then 
elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Chapter 4 describes the methods 
employed in the study. Chapter 5 to 8 provides the empirical data describing the 
findings, followed by the discussions in Chapter 9 highlighting the study’s 
theoretical contributions. The thesis concludes with a chapter that presents the 
answers to the research questions, the limitations of the thesis, and suggestions for 
future studies. 
The introductory chapter outlines the study’s points of departure, 
highlighting the current discussions and theoretical gaps in organizational 
institutionalism studies. Based on the findings, the study’s essential contributions 
are briefly presented: (1) the empirical evidence of isomorphism occurring in the 
prevalent circumstance of institutional complexity; (2) the notion of stereotypical 
isomorphism reflecting a cognitive influence of the institution on organizations; 
(3) organizational perception management as a resistance strategy; and (4) the role 
of organizational attribute configurations with identity as the core element. The 
introduction links the study to the global, persistent issue of educational inequality 
in Indonesia, which was selected as the broader empirical context of the study. The 
case of public school responses to conflicting institutional demands related to 




selectivity versus the emerging institutional demand for inclusivity, provided 
theoretically relevant conditions and, therefore, was selected to further illuminate 
the research problems. 
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical survey that outlines existing knowledge of 
organizational responses to institutional complexity and their determinants. 
Furthermore, the review also identifies several possibilities when organizations 
experience an intra-institutional contradiction as a kind of institutional complexity. 
The possible institutional influences and the complexity level of the institutional 
contradiction are considered as institution-level determinants, whereas some 
relevant organizational attributes are considered as organization-level 
determinants. By taking an iterative approach, the concept of organizational 
perception management is woven into the theoretical review after the preliminary 
findings revealed organizational identity expression as one of the resistance tactics 
used by some of the observed organizations in responding to the emerging demand 
for inclusivity.  
Chapter 3 describes the empirical context of Indonesia’s education systems, 
which is, in general, characterized by both the educational tracking system and 
school differentiation at the senior secondary level. The merit admission system 
has long been the practical instrument of the tracking system—representing the 
institutionalized practice of selectivity in school admission—which has caused 
educational inequality in districts across the country. While international pressure 
from UNESCO’s “Education for All” (EFA) movement has strengthened the 
emerging institutional demand for inclusivity, Indonesian decentralization reform 
has led to variations in the implementation of inclusive education principles across 
the country. Nationally recognized as one with stronger commitments to 
improving vulnerable children’s access to education, the selected district provided 
a relevant case where the contradicting institutional demands coexisted. In the case 
city, the emerging demand manifested in the implementation of the three programs 
intended to increase the access of academically at-risk children to quality 
education. The different groups of vulnerable children included low-performing 
students from economically disadvantaged families (the Quota Program), students 
with disabilities (the Inclusion Program), and students from ethnic minorities sent 
from the most remote areas (the Affirmative Action Program). 
Chapter 4 sketches out the methods used in this thesis. A comparative 




address the research questions. Data collection consisted of in-person, semi-
structured interviews involving 155 informants from the schools (i.e., principal, 
vice-principals, teachers, and students) and the local office of education. The 
fieldwork, divided into two stages, was conducted throughout 2016. The 
exploratory stage captured the nature of the institutional contradiction, the initial 
information regarding the schools’ organizational attributes, and the broad 
strategies adopted by each school in responding to the institutional conflict. In the 
second stage, more informants in each school were interviewed to further 
understand the response strategies and the schools’ attributes influencing the 
strategy selection. The interviews were also supported by observations during the 
2016 school admission cycle and the use of secondary data.  
The analysis aimed to identify organizational response strategies, examine 
institution-level influences, and assess the role of organizational characteristic 
configurations. The analysis was carried out in two stages, first through a within-
case analysis and continued by a cross-case analysis. To assess the role of 
organizational attribute combinations, crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis 
(cs-QCA) was employed. The configurational analysis considered five 
dichotomous conditions already confirmed during the data collection (i.e., school 
status, power balance structure, identity, and decision-making mechanism) and a 
dichotomous outcome (i.e., a high or low resistance level). 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings from the schools’ responses to the 
intra-institutional contradiction—which formed interesting patterns. First, it 
demonstrates the homogeneity of school responses on both sides of the intra-
institutional contradiction, i.e., schools wish to comply with the long-
institutionalized practice of selectivity while simultaneously resisting the 
emerging demand for inclusivity. This pattern indicates isomorphism, 
characterized by compliance with one demand (while resisting the other) and 
convergent bundles of responses on both sides of the institutional conflict. These 
homogenous responses also suggest that an institutional influence for compliance 
played an essential role. The second finding showed high variation in the strategies 
of resistance to the Quota Program (an emerging demand with high specificity), 
while low variation was identified in the strategies of resistance to the Inclusion 
Program and the Affirmative Action Program (medium and low specificity levels, 
respectively). Therefore, these patterns show that the controversial institutional 




organization population. The high variation in resistance strategies specifically 
indicates that organization-level determinants played a role in specifying 
resistance levels in a particular circumstance, that is, when organizations faced a 
highly tight controversial demand. 
Chapter 6 provides more empirical evidence of the critical role institution-
level influences play. This chapter highlights stereotypical isomorphic influence, 
a cognitive mechanism through which a prevalent institutional logic affects 
organizational actors’ perception of the contradicting demands. As empirically 
found, the cognitive mechanism can shape the organizational actors’ beliefs and 
perceptions. The three identified perceptions included the glorification of the long-
institutionalized practice, skepticism towards the new demand’s prescriptions, and 
negative stereotypes about vulnerable children benefitting from the new demand.  
Chapter 6 also shows that the level of institutional contradiction complexity 
can provoke either homogenous or heterogeneous response strategies from 
organizations. The empirical case has illustrated how complexity levels, identified 
from the specificity of the controversial demand, played a critical role in 
determining the variability of resistance strategies. The new, controversial demand 
with tight prescriptions (or high specificity) stimulated internal conflicts amongst 
organizational actors. This internal conflict activated the role of power balance 
structure and other relevant organizational attributes in specifying organizational 
responses, enabling heterogeneity in resistance levels across the organizational 
population. In contrast, homogenous resistance strategies occur when 
organizations face a new, controversial demand with ambiguous prescriptions (or 
low specificity). This means that organizational actors can avoid such internal 
conflicts. The absence of such an internal conflict makes the role of power 
structures and other organizational attributes less relevant in specifying response 
strategies.  
Chapter 7 highlights four organizational attributes that play an essential role 
in determining resistance levels when facing a new, controversial institutional 
demand. The attributes include organizational identity, decision-making 
mechanisms, organizational status in the field, and power balance structure. The 
configurational analysis results show that organizational identity is the primary 
determinant. A strong identity resistor, characterized by both an identity unaligned 
with an institutional expectation and insiders’ convergent perceptions of 




institutional demand. However, a weak identity resistor is only a necessary 
condition for low-level resistance, and therefore needs to be combined with other 
relevant attributes (i.e., either with a command decision-making mechanism or 
peripheral organizational status). 
Chapter 8 focuses on the use of perception management as an identity-based 
response. It reflects, in particular, an empirically found resistance strategy that can 
be added to Oliver’s (1991) list. This strategy was adopted by organizations with 
a strong identity resistor to softly refuse the controversial institutional demand. 
Organizational identity is expressed to maintain or develop particular impressions 
that may attract outsiders’ interest to join the organization, particularly those 
compatible with the organization’s identity. However, the strategy is also 
simultaneously meant to deter unwanted outsiders, namely those who either do not 
align with or threaten the organization’s identity. For instance, when a school’s 
image caused a program’s target group to stay away from (or voluntarily not 
choosing) the school, the school adopting perception management could avoid 
direct rejection of the controversial demand while making it irrelevant for 
consideration. Moreover, the chapter reveals the mechanism of reciprocal identity-
image interrelationships in perception management, pointing out the processes in 
which the observed schools adopt a ‘soft-but-high-level’ resistance strategy when 
experiencing institutional complexity.  
Chapter 9 unpacks the empirical findings by connecting them to the current 
theoretical discussions of organizational institutionalism. As a result, it elaborates 
upon several theoretical contributions. First, the thesis highlights the nature of 
stereotypical isomorphic influences representing other symbolic and activity-
based carriers of an institution’s cultural-cognitive element. Second, the thesis also 
reveals the way in which the complexity of intra-institutional contradiction 
determines the variability of organizational resistance strategies. In doing so, it 
highlights the existence or absence of internal conflict between the proponents of 
each side of an institutional contradiction, which enables (or disables) the role of 
organizational attributes in strategy selection. By zeroing in on the specificity 
levels of a controversial demand, the thesis suggests that the presence (or absence) 
of discretionary power is not the only determinant of organizational resistance.  
Third, the study promotes the notion of an identity-based resistor: a 
composite condition of organizational identity that reflects both identity strength 




found to be the main element of organizational attribute configurations 
determining resistance levels. Fourth, emphasis is also given to perception 
management through organizational identity expression as a novel type of response 
strategy. This work also illuminates the dynamic relationships between 
organizational identity and institutionalization. Finally, this study explores the 
complex nature of managing organizational perceptions internally and externally. 
In doing so, it sheds light on the interrelationship between organizational identity 
and image as a mechanism through which perception management is used as a 
resistance strategy. 
Chapter 10 answers the initial research questions, which suggest that both 
institutional influences and organizational attributes (and their alignment) should 
be considered in studying resistance behavior. The essential contributions to the 
different streams of literature, i.e., organizational institutionalism, perception 
management, organizational identity, and public administration (particularly, 
discretion study), are highlighted. Furthermore, suggestions for future studies are 
outlined by considering the limitations of the current study. For instance, one 
suggestion emphasizes the need to further identify the nature of convergent 
response bundles as a form of isomorphism occurring in the context of institutional 
complexity. Further research should also study the adopters’ motivations and the 
characteristics of organizational fields where such isomorphism appears. Another 
limitation here is related to the type of organizations studied, i.e., public 
organizations fully controlled by the government. Therefore, research into 
relatively more independent organizations like private schools or hospitals is 
needed to find out whether organizations with greater discretion and less risk of 
resistance exhibit different behaviors. Furthermore, it would be valuable to 
investigate additional relevant organizational attributes, such as ownership, size, 
social capital, culture, or performance, that may shed light on their potential role 










Table of Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................. v 
Summary ..............................................................................................................viii 
Table of Contents................................................................................................. xiv 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................... xvii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................... xviii 
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Backdrop and Purposes of the Study ............................................................ 1 
1.2 The Contributions of the Study ..................................................................... 4 
1.3 Linking the Study to the Issue of Educational Inequality ............................. 7 
1.4 Indonesia as the Context of the Study ......................................................... 10 
1.5 The Case City .............................................................................................. 14 
1.6 Research Questions ..................................................................................... 16 
1.7 The Structure of the Monograph ................................................................. 17 
Chapter 2 Theoretical Foundation ........................................................................ 21 
2.1 Intra-institutional Contradiction and Controversial Demand ..................... 21 
2.2 Organizational Responses to Intra-institutional Contradiction ................... 25 
2.3 Institution-level Determinants ..................................................................... 27 
2.3.1 Institutional influences .......................................................................... 27 
2.3.2 Complexity level of intra-institutional contradiction ........................... 31 
2.4 The Role of Organizational Attributes ........................................................ 34 
2.4.1 Position or status ................................................................................... 35 
2.4.2 Power structure ..................................................................................... 36 
2.4.3 Decision-making mechanism ................................................................ 37 
2.4.4 Organizational identity ......................................................................... 38 
2.5 Perception Management as a Response Strategy ........................................ 40 
Chapter 3  Educational Inequality and the Contradictory Logics of  School 
Admission Systems in Indonesia .......................................................................... 43 
3.1 The Indonesian Educational Systems in a Nutshell .................................... 43 
3.2 The Long-existing Demand for Selectivity ................................................. 53 




3.3.1 The Quota Program ............................................................................... 59 
3.3.2 The Inclusion Program ......................................................................... 61 
3.3.3 The Affirmative Action Program.......................................................... 63 
3.4 The Tensions between the Logics of Inclusivity and Selectivity ............... 64 
Chapter 4  Methods .............................................................................................. 73 
4.1 Data Collection ............................................................................................ 74 
4.1.1 The exploratory stage ........................................................................... 74 
4.1.2 The second stage ................................................................................... 75 
4.2 Data Analysis .............................................................................................. 78 
4.2.1 Identifying institution-level influences ................................................. 78 
4.2.2 Assessing the role of organizational attributes ..................................... 80 
Chapter 5  School Responses to the Intra-Institutional Contradiction ................. 83 
5.1 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with High Specificity ................................... 83 
5.1.1 A very high resistance school ............................................................... 85 
5.1.2 High resistance schools ......................................................................... 86 
5.1.3 Moderate resistance schools ................................................................. 89 
5.1.4 Low resistance schools ......................................................................... 91 
5.2 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with Medium-level Specificity .................... 92 
5.3 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with Low-level Specificity .......................... 97 
5.4 The Patterns of School Responses: An Initial Analysis .............................. 99 
5.4.1 The pattern of response bundles ......................................................... 100 
5.4.2 The patterns of responses to each program ........................................ 100 
Chapter 6  Institution-level Determinants .......................................................... 103 
6.1 The Role of Stereotypical Isomorphic Influence ...................................... 103 
6.1.1 Glorifying the long-existing practices ................................................ 105 
6.1.2 Skepticizing the new demand’s prescriptions .................................... 107 
6.1.3 Stereotyping people benefited from the new demand ........................ 110 
6.2 The Influence of the Controversial Demand’s Specificity Levels ............ 118 
6.2.1 The new demand and its ambiguous prescriptions ............................. 119 
6.2.2 The high specificity prescriptions of the new demand ....................... 123 
Chapter 7  The Role of Organizational Attributes ............................................. 129 
7.1 The Influencing Organizational Attributes ............................................... 130 




7.1.2 Power structure ................................................................................... 134 
7.1.3 The decision-making mechanism ....................................................... 140 
7.1.4 Organizational identity ....................................................................... 147 
7.2 Organizational Attribute Configurations for High and Low Resistance .. 157 
7.2.1 Preparing the data ............................................................................... 158 
7.2.2 Analyzing the configurations .............................................................. 160 
7.2.3 Evaluating the results .......................................................................... 164 
Chapter 8  Zooming in the Identity-based Response Strategy ........................... 169 
8.1 Organizational Perception Management by the Schools .......................... 170 
8.1.1 Attracting and blocking ...................................................................... 171 
8.1.2 Attracting but not blocking ................................................................. 174 
8.1.3 Not attracting but blocking ................................................................. 178 
8.1.4 Not attracting and not blocking .......................................................... 180 
8.2 Identity-Image Configurations .................................................................. 182 
8.2.1 The attractive schools ......................................................................... 182 
8.2.2 The unattractive schools ..................................................................... 184 
8.3 Concluding Remarks ................................................................................. 185 
Chapter 9 Unpacking the Empirical Findings .................................................... 187 
9.1 Stereotypical Isomorphism ....................................................................... 187 
9.2 Complexity Levels and the Variability of Resistance Strategies .............. 195 
9.3 The Role of Organizational Attributes as Configurations ........................ 200 
9.4 Perception Management as a Resistance Strategy .................................... 203 
9.5 Identity-Image Interrelationship in Perception Management ................... 209 
Chapter 10 Conclusion and Research Implications ............................................ 211 
List of References ............................................................................................... 219 











List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1 NER by Household Expenditure Quantile, 1997-2019 (%) ................. 11 
Table 2.1 Levels and Types of Resistance Strategies and Tactics ....................... 25 
Table 3.1 Percentages of School and Students Numbers ..................................... 46 
Table 3.2 Educational Investments and Reforms ................................................. 48 
Table 3.3 The Final Exams and the Use of Its Results in School Admission ...... 54 
Table 3.4 Institutional Contradiction Related to School Admission .................... 66 
Table 4.1 Data of Informants ................................................................................ 76 
Table 5.1 Response Strategies when Facing the Quota Program ......................... 84 
Table 5.2 Response Strategies when Facing the Inclusion Program .................... 95 
Table 5.3 Response Strategies when Facing the Affirmative Action Program .... 97 
Table 5.4 Variations in Resistance Levels ........................................................... 99 
Table 6.1 Characterizations of Papuan Students ................................................ 111 
Table 6.2 Characterizations of Students with Disabilities ................................. 114 
Table 6.3 Characterizations of the Quota Program’s Beneficiaries ................... 116 
Table 7.1 Organizational Attributes and Resistance Levels of the Schools ....... 157 
Table 7.2 Truth Table of High Resistance Schools and the Four Conditions .... 160 
Table 7.3 The Stages of Configurational Analysis ............................................. 161 
Table 7.4 Consistency and Coverage of Conditions for High Resistance ......... 165 
Table 7.5 Consistency and Coverage of Conditions for Low Resistance .......... 166 
Table 9.1 Institutional Pillars and Carriers ......................................................... 190 


















List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Net Enrollment Rate by School Level, 1994-2019 (%) ...................... 50 
Figure 7.1 Venn Diagram of the High Resistance Schools’ Configurations ..... 162 
Figure 7.2 Venn Diagram of the Low Resistance Schools’ Configurations ...... 163 
Figure 8.1 The Orientations of Perception Management ................................... 170 
Figure 9.1 Mechanisms Leading to Homogeneity of Resistance Strategies ...... 196 





























1.1 Backdrop and Purposes of the Study 
This dissertation represents an organizational study, which is an important area in 
public administration field as listed in Global Encyclopedia of Public 
Administration, Public Policy, and Governance edited by Ali Farazmand (2018). 
Despite the close ties between the classics of public administration and the 
precursors of organization theories (e.g., Blau, 1955; Gulick & Urwick, 1937; 
Merton, 1952; Selznick, 1948, 1953; Simon, 1947; M. Weber, 1921/1978), and the 
inclusion of organizational studies in the list of topics in the current encyclopedia 
of public administration, it must be admitted that the development of 
organizational studies in the last decades has, to a certain degree, separated itself 
from the public administration field,1 dominated by sociology researchers and 
management scholars from business schools (Kelman, 2008; Vogel, 2014). 
However, as highlighted by Vogel (2014), the potentially strong connections 
between the two fields exist, in which institutional theory of organization is one of 
the brokerages that can play an essential role in the transfer of knowledge from 
organizational studies to public administration. This present dissertation, therefore, 
employs institutional theory (i.e., sociological/organizational institutionalism) as 
an attempt to make theoretical contributions while signaling that organizational 
studies are still, and will remain, relevant and essential in the field of public 
administration. 
Institutional theory, particularly organizational (sociological) 
institutionalism, has been the central approach employed to study organizations 
(Alvesson & Spicer, 2019; Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017; 
 
1 As identified in the bibliometric analysis conducted by Vogel (2014) based on 16 
European and North American top journals in the two fields spanning the period 2000 to 
2010, the nine clusters of current research (from ‘local government’ to ‘performance 
management’) have been dominated by public administration field, while eight other 
clusters (from practice theory to new institutionalism) have been the main domain of 
organization studies. The public administration field has very little representation in 




Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008; Vogel, 2012). In the last four 
decades, there have been several essential shifts in institutionalists’ theoretical 
concerns, including the shifts from isomorphism or organizational homogeneity to 
institutional pluralism and organizational heterogeneity (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2017; Kraatz & Block, 2017); and from macrostructural determinism to embedded 
agency and multi-level influences (Mutch, 2019; Ocasio, Thornton, & Lounsbury, 
2017). Since Friedland and Alford’s (1991) seminal work, and more 
comprehensive explanations and some adjustments provided by Thornton, Ocasio, 
and Lounsbury (2012), the institutional logics perspective has become one of most 
influential theoretical perspectives in organizational institutionalism (for 
recognition of the importance of institutional logics, see Scott, 2017; see also 
Mutch, 2019 for conceptual development and constructive criticism). 
Considering current developments of organizational institutionalism, 
including the institutional logics perspective, Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, 
Micelotta, and Lounsbury (2011) provide a comprehensive framework of how 
multilevel influences (i.e., institutions, organizational fields, and organization 
levels) affect organizational responses to institutional complexity. This well-
known article on the topic has inspired almost all empirical studies on 
organizational responses to institutional complexity. However, such empirical 
studies only examine one level of influence, i.e., either institution, field, or 
organization level (e.g., Aharonson & Bort, 2015; Berente & Yoo, 2012; Kodeih 
& Greenwood, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013; Sillince, Jarzabkowski, & Shaw, 
2012), rather than looking at the multilevel influences. In contrast, this dissertation 
examines the influences of the two levels suggested by Greenwood et al. (2011), 
i.e., institution and organization, while going one step further to consider the 
individual level.  
Typical studies of institutional complexity more frequently examine inter-
institutional contradictions (i.e., multiple expectations imposed by different 
institutional actors) while neglecting intra-institutional contradictions (i.e., the 
coexistence of conflicting institutional demands promoted by the same 
institutional actor). The latter carries different characteristics than the former and, 
therefore, the features of organizational responses may differ. This study 
contributes to the research stream by providing empirical evidence of 




The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following broad questions: 
• How do public sector organizations respond to an intra-institutional 
contradiction? 
• How can organizational responses be explained by both institution-level 
influences and organizational attributes? 
 
Indonesian schools constitute an optimal case for studying intra-
institutional conflicting demands on organizations. The case of public school 
responses to conflicting institutional demands related to student admissions (i.e., 
the long-institutionalized practice of selectivity versus the emerging institutional 
demand for inclusivity) in an Indonesian city provided theoretically relevant 
conditions, in which similar organizations in a particular field face the same 
institutional conflicts imposed by the government. Therefore, the case was selected 
for in-depth study. 
How educational reforms occurred in several countries, i.e., the 
transformation of educational tracking systems into comprehensive one or the 
adoption of inclusive education principles with varying degrees, have attracted 
great attention from scholars within the sociology of education (e.g., Blossfeld, 
2018; Forsberg & Lundgren, 2010; Hammack, 2004; Powell, 2014; Powell & 
Pfahl, 2019; Sahlberg, 2015). However, how schools as organizations respond to 
such changes and transitions are relatively neglected in this line of research. 
Meanwhile, the other research stream developed by scholars of organizational and 
institutional studies holds long-standing concerns with organizational responses to 
institutional demands (see Greenwood et al., 2011; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1991). However, the current situations are different from those faced by 
schools in J. W. Meyer & Rowan’s (1977) classic study on school resistance to 
change in the USA. They observed a circumstance in which schools faced an 
institutional change characterized by institutional actors’ intention to replace the 
old system with a new one. In contrast, the current circumstances reflect 
institutional complexity, such as in this dissertation where schools experienced 
contradicting institutional demands, i.e., the coexistence of both “old” and “new” 






1.2 The Contributions of the Study 
In public administration literature, the resistance or unwillingness to implement 
new policies is a consequence of tight institutional demands—for instance, those 
with high specificity enabling a low level of discretion, experienced by 
implementers. Tight institutional demand limits discretion (Goodrick & Salancik, 
1996; Tummers, Bekkers, & Steijn, 2012), and decreased level of implementers’ 
discretion in the introduction of emerging institutional demands, e.g., new policies 
that promote changes or are widely perceived as controversial, negatively affect 
the intention to implement them (Tummers, Bekkers, Thiel, & Steijn, 2015). 
However, there is a notable paucity of scientific literature specifically relating to 
the effect of such conditions on the variation of the types and levels of resistance 
adopted by organizations in a particular field. A more comprehensive 
understanding of how organizational characteristics contribute to the variety is also 
lacking. Whilst Greenwood et al. (2011) have theoretically highlighted the 
potentially significant role of organizational attributes, their work and existing 
empirical investigations on the subject consider the role of organizational 
characteristics (e.g., field position, identity, power structure, and governance) as 
single and separate attributes, rather than as configurations. 
This thesis expands insights into organizational institutionalism—
particularly related to organizational responses to institutional complexity—in 
several ways. First, while prior work examined organizational responses to 
conflicting prescriptions imposed by multiple institutional orders, the current work 
examines a situation in which organizations experience two conflicting 
institutional demands, which are both derived from values and desirable goals 
endorsed by the same institutional actor, e.g., government, representing an intra-
institutional contradiction. It allows the attempts to study the uniqueness of 
organizational resistance to a newly emerging demand that contradicts a long-
institutionalized practice in the public sector. In the face of such a circumstance, 
organizations experience a far greater dilemma since they may lose legitimacy 
when defying any institutional demands.  
In this case, neither power differentials between separate institutional 
referents nor the level of organization’s dependence on institutional actors (Oliver, 
1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) are irrelevant as a basis to predict specific resistance 




resistance can be predicted by considering the specificity of emerging demand and 
the varied combination of organizational attributes. As a developing country 
struggling with democratization and public sector decentralization, Indonesia 
provides an interesting context in which the rooms for organizational discretion in 
program implementations or public service provision are, in general, still limited. 
Conducting a research study in this context could reveal resistance strategies that 
differ from the existing insights based, for the most part, on empirical evidence 
from developed countries. In this dissertation, resistance strategies were initially 
identified using Oliver’s (1991) response strategies as a starting point while 
keeping open the possibility of other strategies and their applications. As a result, 
organizational perception management was identified as a relatively high 
resistance strategy. Therefore, this present study provides an answer to Christine 
Oliver’s (1991) call to extend the response strategy set available to organizations. 
Second, by considering varying levels of demand specificity and 
contradiction between emerging and existing institutional demands, this thesis 
offers the cases in which a higher level of intra-institutional complexity in the 
public sector exists. It is fertile ground for exploring under which circumstance 
(i.e., level of demand specificity) highly varied types and resistance levels emerge 
in facing institutional contradiction. Although institutional complexity has long 
been a concern of institutionalist scholars, e.g., perceived as multiplicity (Oliver, 
1991), the extent to which the characteristics of a controversial new demand 
determine the variety of organizational resistances remains largely unexplored.  
Third, by exploring the role of organizational attributes, this thesis 
highlights how combinations of organizational characteristics specify the types 
and levels of resistance. This research study diverges from prior work exploring 
the role of single attributes, such as organizational identity (e.g., Kodeih & 
Greenwood, 2014), the power structure of internal representatives (e.g., Pache & 
Santos, 2010), ownership (e.g., Miller, Breton‐Miller, & Lester, 2011), and field 
position (e.g., Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).  
Fourth, as still related to the highlighted organizational configurations, this 
work examines the role of organizational identity as a composite attribute in 
determining resistance strategies when organizations face conflicting institutional 
demands. Furthermore, this dissertation expands upon previous works that assess 




and Raffaelli and Glynn (2014), by highlighting its essential role as a critical 
reference for organization insiders in managing organizational images or 
outsiders’ perceptions of the organization, as a response strategy. Furthermore, by 
linking the works on organizational identity to perception management research 
(see Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Elsbach, 2006; Ravasi, 2016), this dissertation 
assesses the interconnection between organizational identity and image on the use 
of the response strategy. 
Fifth, this work considers organizational responses to both institutional 
expectations as a response bundle. Through this approach, the structure of 
responses to contradicting institutional demands can be observed more carefully. 
Moreover, by assessing a unique configuration of the two features of isomorphism, 
i.e., compliance and convergence (see Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2009), 
isomorphism occurring within institutional complexity can be identified. The 
finding of isomorphism characterized with the convergence of response bundles is 
a response to Boxenbaum and Jonsson’s (2017) call for research studying the 
relevance of isomorphism under conditions of institutional complexity. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to organizational institutionalism by 
introducing stereotypical isomorphism, which is argued as a kind of cognitive 
institutional influence. The notion of stereotypical isomorphic influence can be 
differentiated from the classic ideas of mechanisms leading to isomorphism 
proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983; see also DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
However, without intending to propose a fourth institutional pillar, this work 
emphasizes the other kinds of carriers (or mechanisms) of the cultural-cognitive 
pillar, which differ from ones proposed by Scott (2014) and institutional logics 
scholars (see Ocasio et al., 2017; Thornton et al., 2012). 
The following subsections describe the critical context of the study: 
educational inequality as a persistent global issue and its manifestation in 
Indonesia, a country with the fourth largest education system in the world2 (World 
Bank, 2014b). The city case and the reason for its selection are then presented, 
followed by the formulation of the research problem and questions that direct the 
empirical investigations.  
 
2 With more than 50 million students, 2.6 million teachers, and 250,000 schools, the 





1.3 Linking the Study to the Issue of Educational Inequality 
Inequalities remain a prevalent characteristic of education systems across the globe 
(Benavot et al., 2016; Borgna, Brzinsky-Fay, Dieckhoff, Holtmann, & Solga, 
2019; Chzhen, Rees, Gromada, Cuesta, & Bruckauf, 2018; Schleicher, 2018; 
Torpey-Saboe, 2018). The tracked educational systems applied to senior secondary 
or earlier levels, characterized by student grouping and placement into separate 
schools or tracks based on academic abilities (e.g., prior school achievements), 
have been empirically found as an institutional cause of educational inequalities in 
many countries (Batruch, Autin, Bataillard, & Butera, 2019; Betts, 2011; Robert, 
2010; Triventi, Kulic, Skopek, & Blossfeld, 2016). Under such systems, 
socioeconomically disadvantaged children are likely overrepresented in less 
preferred tracks, such as vocational or low-quality schools (Francis, Taylor, & 
Tereshchenko, 2019).  
At the same time, their advantaged peers tend to dominate favorite tracks, for 
instance, in academically oriented schools with more adequate resources 
(Buchholz et al., 2016; Contini & Triventi, 2016; Horn, Keller, & Róbert, 2016; 
Skopek, Triventi, & Buchholz, 2019; Teese, Lamb, Duru-Bellat, & Helme, 2007). 
Therefore, solving the gaps in educational opportunities and outcomes has become 
a fundamental goal of educational reforms both in developed and developing 
countries (Schleicher, 2018). Reforming tracked educational systems into 
comprehensive schooling systems, which provide equal opportunities for all 
children to access quality education regardless of their abilities and backgrounds, 
is an important policy goal (Blossfeld, 2018; Forsberg & Lundgren, 2010; 
Hammack, 2004; Rasmussen & Werler, 2015; Sahlberg, 2015). 
The rise of a global norm for inclusive education has also strengthened the 
new institutional demand for eliminating school differentiations and segregations 
(Powell, 2014). Inclusive education has been the internationally expected 
educational service model providing opportunities for children with disabilities, 
previously only offered at isolated and segregated services, to learn together with 
other children in regular schools (UNESCO, 1994, 2006). After the Dakar 
conference in 2000, inclusive education became aligned with the international 
shared understanding of “Education for All” and posited as an achievement 




rights of vulnerable children in accessing quality education. This is not only for 
children with disabilities but also many other academically at-risk children, such 
as those from low-income families, working children, remote rural dwellers, ethnic 
minorities, as well as those with special learning needs (Powell & Pfahl, 2019; 
UNESCO, 2000). Countries have increasingly ratified the global mandates for 
inclusive education, i.e., the Salamanca Statement and the UN’s Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNESCO, 2016), indicating a rise in the 
need for educational reforms in each participant country. 
Both comprehensive schooling systems and inclusive education reforms are 
the manifestations of the institutional logic of inclusivity in educational service 
provision, which contradict the institutional logic of selectivity manifested in 
tracked educational systems, school segregations, and merit-based admissions 
(Powell, 2014; Powell & Pfahl, 2019; Skopek et al., 2019; Triventi et al., 2016). It 
has been empirically proven that the reforms do not develop easily. Despite the 
strengthening of global pressures for inclusion, the practices of educational 
separation and segregation persist in the forms of rebranding or renaming special 
settings as particular forms of inclusive education without significant reforms of 
curricula, organizations, and culture (Powell, 2014).  
Similarly, not all countries successfully shift their educational systems 
toward comprehensive schooling systems (Jenkins, Micklewright, & Schnepf, 
2008; van de Werfhorst, 2018). For instance, Finland is one of the few countries 
that has successfully transformed its educational tracked systems into 
comprehensive ones (Sahlberg, 2015). Following the system’s transformation, 
Finland has much lower educational inequalities and has been labeled as an 
“educational superpower country” (Kilpi-Jakonen, Erola, & Karhula, 2016). In 
contrast, Germany is still a country with high inequalities, despite its long efforts 
in educational reforms after unification (Blossfeld, 2018; Buchholz et al., 2016; 
Kruse, 2018; Schneider, 2008).  
Similar system transformations with varied results can be found in other 
countries, giving rise to the variation in secondary education systems in 
contemporary societies (Robert, 2010; Triventi et al., 2016; van de Werfhorst, 
2018). Recently, countries adopting early tracking systems, in which educational 
track differentiations occur at the upper or senior secondary school level, are 




the Netherlands (Dronkers & Korthals, 2016), and Switzerland (Buchmann, Kriesi, 
Koomen, Imdorf, & Basler, 2016). Despite educational reforms, several other 
countries have continued to employ the dominant features of educational tracking 
systems combined with comprehensive schooling models. Some countries can be 
categorized as the adopters of this hybrid system, such as Italy (Contini & Triventi, 
2016; Panichella & Triventi, 2014), France (Farges, Tenret, Brinbaum, Guégnard, 
& Murdoch, 2016), Estonia (Saar & Aimre, 2014; Täht, Saar, & Kazjulja, 2016), 
Russia (Kosyakova, Yastrebov, Yanbarisova, & Kurakin, 2016), and Israel (Blank, 
Shavit, & Yaish, 2016). In contrast, comprehensive school systems have been the 
main feature of Nordic countries’ education system, such as Finland (Kilpi-
Jakonen et al., 2016; Sahlberg, 2015), Sweden (Rudolphi & Erikson, 2016), and 
Denmark (Wahler, Buchholz, & Møllegaard, 2016). 
Ability tracking systems are also prevalent in Asian countries, such as 
China. Although China’s central government has only allowed ability grouping at 
the senior secondary and higher education levels since 2006, such practices have 
been continuously maintained by schools at the junior high school level (Li et al., 
2018). The practices of ability grouping in Singapore and Hong Kong result in 
educational inequality, in which children from socioeconomically disadvantaged 
families are mostly accommodated in the less prestigious class or school types. For 
instance, in Singapore, “Melayu and Indian students are underrepresented in the 
most prestigious and top schools, where most students are Chinese and from 
wealthier family backgrounds” (M. H. Lee & Gopinathan, 2018, p. 196).  
Similarly, children from low-income families tend to be naturally excluded 
from elite schools in Hong Kong because of the high tuition fees and the 
meritocratic admission system. These realities show that parents’ socioeconomic 
status has played a more significant role in children’s educational achievement, 
leading to educational inequality (M. Lee & Morris, 2016). Furthermore, ability 
tracking systems in Asian countries have reproduced social and academic 
stratifications (Byun & Kim, 2010; M. Lee & Morris, 2016; M. H. Lee & 
Gopinathan, 2018; Li et al., 2018). 
In recent years, introduced and imposed by international institutions, 
demand for inclusiveness aligned with the comprehensive schooling model gathers 
more intensity. However, because the tracked and segregation schooling systems 




time (Powell, 2014), gradual changes, rather than radical ones, are typically 
moderate strategies adopted by many countries. This approach potentially creates 
a circumstance in which the two contradicting logics or demands coexist. For 
instance, the introduction of an inclusive education system—by partially applying 
it in pilot areas or schools—typically occurs without abolishing the “old” system, 
resulting in paradoxical tension. 
The coexistence of the logics of segregation and inclusion is also indirectly 
caused by the maintenance and the strengthening of academic standards (i.e., input, 
process, and output through accreditation and benchmarking systems). They are 
parts of mainstream strategies to increase the quality of educational services, 
address the uneven distribution of quality education provided by schools, and 
match the educational outputs to the needs of the labor market. Such educational 
standards reproduce school categorizations (e.g., based on quality) and stimulate 
school competition, which may strengthen the need to preserve merit or ability 
tracking systems. Powell (2014, p. 324) highlights that “increasing inclusive 
education rates do not automatically reduce segregation rate.” Moreover, they have 
been a paradox (Richardson & Powell, 2011), representing the coexistence of 
segregated schooling (as a consequence of the ideal of meritocracy legitimating 
inequality in contemporary society; see Meyer, 2001) and inclusive education 
and/or comprehensive educational systems (as a means to address social 
inequality; see Powell & Pfahl, 2019). Such institutional contradictions or 
complexities have been prevalent the world over as more and more countries ratify 
the global ideals of education for all and inclusive education but apply gradual, 
partial, and symbolic strategies in their application (Powell, 2014; Richardson & 
Powell, 2011).  
 
1.4 Indonesia as the Context of the Study 
Inequality in educational opportunity and attainment is also a persistent problem 
in Indonesia (Moeliodihardjo, 2014; Muttaqin, 2018; Suharti, 2013). As a 
thousand-islands country encompassing 34 provinces and 514 districts with 
inequality in economic development (i.e., between Java island and the other 
islands, between urban and rural areas, and between the east and west parts of the 
country; see Kurniawan et al., 2019; OECD, 2013b) and populated by more than 




Hasbullah, Handayani, & Pramono, 2015) with a substantial gap between the 
wealthiest and the rest (Gibson, 2017), Indonesia faces a considerable challenge in 
providing equal opportunities for all children to access quality education. In fact, 
children with socioeconomically disadvantaged conditions, such as those from 
low-income families, with disabilities, and/or living in remote areas, have much 
lower opportunities to access quality education (Mukminin & Habibi, 2019; 
OECD, 2015). 
Based on data from the national socioeconomic survey (Susenas), Table 
1.1 shows the progress of net enrollment rates for different levels of educations 
during 1997-2019. Based on per capita expenditure, the gap between the richest 
and poorest households in accessing education is particularly noticeable at the 
senior secondary level3. While the gap at the junior secondary level has narrowed 
(decreased from 37.7 percentage points in 1997 to 4.19 points in 2019), the striking 
disparity at the senior secondary level remains. In 2019, the rate was still 50 
percent, indicating that children aged 16-18 years old from the poorest 20 percent 
families have the lowest participation rate in the senior secondary level, compared 
with 66 percent of the wealthiest 20 percent families. 
Table 1.1 NER by Household Expenditure Quantile, 1997-2019 (%) 
Levels of 
Education 
1997 2006 2019 
Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 
Elementary 
 
90.3 92.4 2.1 92.6  93.2 0.6 97.32 97.52 0.2 
Junior 
secondary 
37.7 75.1 37.4 55.1 75.4 20,3 76.52 80.71 4.19 
Senior 
secondary 
12.4 60.9 48.5 25.0 64.1 39.1 49.95 66.27 16.32 
Source: based on microdata from the National Socio-Economic Survey (Survei Sosio-
Ekonomi Nasional, Susenas). 
 
Note: 
NER stands for Net Enrollment Rate 
Quintile 1 (Q1) is the poorest, and quintile 5 (Q5) is the richest, 20 percent of households. 
Internationally known as a “big bang” (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002) and one 
of the world’s most radical decentralization practices (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003), 
Indonesia’s 2001 decentralization policy has led to significant changes in 
educational provisions. A wide range of responsibilities, including elementary and 
 




secondary education management, has been transferred to local governments. The 
central government only keeps five policy domains: foreign policy, defense and 
security, monetary policy, the legal system, and religious affairs. This distribution 
of extensive power was followed by the transfer of almost two-thirds of the central 
government workforce (including more than 2.6 million teachers; see Muttaqin, 
2018), more than 4.000 provincial and district-level offices of the central 
government, and more than 160.000 public service facilities, including public 
schools, to provinces and districts throughout the country (Hofman & Kaiser, 
2002). Therefore, this governance reform has established Indonesia as one of the 
most decentralized countries in the world, which was previously categorized as 
one of the most centralized (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002). 
However, these radical changes in educational governance did not result 
in equitable improvements across Indonesia’s regions. Significant disparities in 
educational access, particularly at the senior secondary level, are still observable 
across the provinces and districts. In 2016, the enrollment rates varied from 43.48 
percent in Papua Province, one of the country’s poorest regions, to 72.40 percent 
in Bali Province (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016, p. 123). Disparities between 
urban and rural areas across 18 provinces were substantial, i.e., more than ten 
percentage points, with the widest gap observed in Papua, with 38.43 percent 
(based on BPS, 2016, p. 121-122). 
The most recent data (2019) shows that inequality issues remain and are 
more salient at the senior secondary level than within lower education. While the 
differences in enrollment rates between urban and rural areas were less than 1 
percent at the elementary level and 5 percent at the junior secondary level, the rate 
was more than 8 percent at the senior secondary level (based on BPS, 2019, p. 54). 
The gap between rich and poor families at the senior secondary level is also more 
salient than that at the two previous levels. The difference in enrollment rates 
between the 20 percent poorest and wealthiest households at the senior secondary 
level was 16.32 percentage points, compared with 0.2 points at the elementary 
level and 4.19 points at the junior secondary level, respectively (based on BPS, 
2019, p. 55). These points indicate that, after more than a decade of 
decentralization, Indonesia has significantly increased the enrollment rates of 
children from disadvantaged families at both the elementary and junior secondary 
levels. However, this trend is accompanied by only a modest improvement at the 




Under the decentralization system, particularly from 2001-2016, district 
governments became the central players in providing primary and secondary 
education.4 Performance is critically determined by district governments’ capacity 
to manage the sector (Muttaqin, 2018). Despite the large allocations of district 
financial resources to education, as highlighted by Al-Samarrai (2013), local 
governments’ ability to effectively use resources to improve educational 
performances vary considerably. In fact, studies suggest that spending is not a key 
determinant of education outcomes, as pointed by Al-Samarrai (2013). Some 
districts with below-average spending on education were found to reach higher 
secondary enrollment rates than the national average, while some other districts 
spending more than the average district have lower or much lower enrollment rates 
than the national average. A similar pattern is also seen in comparing districts 
based on their spending (input) and student scores on the national examination 
(outcome). These conditions indicate that decentralization has enabled variations 
in local government performance in fulfilling national targets and standards related 
to the improvement of access to, and quality of, education (Al-Samarrai, 2013; 
Idzalika & Bue, 2016; Muttaqin, 2018; Suharti, 2013). 
Because quality education is not evenly distributed throughout the country 
(Muttaqin, 2018; OECD, 2015) and merit-based admission was applied at public 
secondary schools (generally regarded as higher quality), inequality in opportunity 
to access such schools was experienced by most children from disadvantaged 
families and has become a core feature of Indonesia’s educational system (OECD, 
2015). Therefore, local governments’ capacity to provide accessible, quality 
education can be reflected in each local government’s willingness and ability to 
apply inclusive education principles, i.e., international norms of educational 
service provision ratified by the national government. However, variations are also 
found among districts in this regard. Many local governments provide financial aid 
for socioeconomically disadvantaged children already accepted in schools. A small 
number of local governments have a somewhat more substantial commitment to 
increasing students’ access to quality schools. For instance, few local governments 
 
4 Since 2017, the authority and management of senior secondary education provision have 
been relocated to provincial governments, while primary and junior secondary schools 
are still under district governments. This transfer of authority primarily aimed to reduce 
the gaps in the access to and quality of senior secondary level education between districts, 
which was prominent when the district government had a dominant authority in managing 




ensure that their school admission system increases the opportunity for those from 
socioeconomically disadvantaged families to attend public schools—most of 
which struggle to have high academic performance because of their lack of 
resources. 
In such localities, tensions arose as the emerging demand for inclusivity 
inevitably clashed with the long-existing demand for selectivity manifested in the 
merit-based admission. The latter has long been a widely-shared, taken-for-granted 
practice at public secondary schools across the country, in which the acceptance 
of students is based on their prior academic achievement, i.e., the score of national 
examination at the lower-level education (OECD, 2013c, 2015). Under this 
selective system, only children with a high score can attend public schools, which 
are preferred due to their low cost and better quality than most private schools 
(Newhouse & Beegle, 2006; OECD, 2015). Due to a lack of resources and 
supportive environment for (high) academic achievement, vulnerable children tend 
to have more limited opportunities to find acceptance in such schools. 
At the senior secondary level, competition between children for public 
schools, particularly those regarded as the best type (i.e., general or academically 
oriented ones; compared with vocational schools and madrasah or Islamic faith 
schools managed by the government), is exceptionally fierce. As explained in 
Chapter 3, the adoption of this formal educational track combined with the 
existence of a quality gap between school types and the use of merit-based 
admission has led to inequality of opportunity. Socioeconomically disadvantaged 
children tend to have more limited chances to be accepted in their most favorite 
track (particularly in schools perceived as ones with better reputations). They are 
overrepresented in less favored tracks or even in low-quality private schools 
(Asadullah & Maliki, 2018; Stern & Smith, 2016). 
 
1.5 The Case City 
An urban district located on the island of Java is one of the very few districts 
indicating its willingness to commence a moderate adoption of inclusive education 
principles by imposing the institutional demand for inclusivity into schools. This 
emerging demand was manifested into three programs for helping three different 




those from left-behind regions. As detailed in Chapter 3, these programs have 
different arrangements in providing opportunities for those socioeconomically 
disadvantaged children to attend public schools. 
Educational inequality in the case city was compounded by a supply-side 
problem rather than demand. The province where the city is located has a high 
percentage of junior secondary school graduates continuing to senior secondary 
levels, i.e., 96.56 percent, which is the highest in the country, while the national 
average in 2019 only reached 89 percent (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2019). The 
senior secondary net enrollment rate at the city is relatively high (i.e., 72.60 percent 
or eight percentage points higher than the national average and 10.7 points higher 
than the province average). The data indicate that the willingness of the school-
age children to attain a higher education level and their access to senior secondary 
schools in this city were better than those in many other districts (BPS-Statistics 
Indonesia, 2019; BPS-Statistics of D.I. Yogyakarta Province, 2019; BPS-Statistics 
of Yogyakarta Municipality, 2019). However, the total capacity of SMANs5 in the 
city is limited, i.e., only 22 percent of the total capacity of all types of senior 
secondary schools in the city. These conditions generated much tighter 
competition in the SMANs admission, which was entirely based on student prior 
achievement in the grade 9 national exam.  
Under the meritocratic admission system, SMANs in the city were occupied 
only by high-performing children, i.e., those with a high prior academic 
achievement. They were more likely to come from socioeconomically advantaged 
families. Meanwhile, the low-performing students, many of whom came from low-
income families, had to attend private SMAs or other senior secondary school types 
(i.e., vocational schools and madrasahs) managed by either the government or 
private institutions. Therefore, the meritocratic admission system enabled 
educational inequality, in which poor children in the city have less opportunity to 
 
5 SMA (sekolah menengah atas) is one type of Indonesian schools at senior secondary 
level that provides academic oriented education (different from vocational one: SMK). 
SMANs are managed and fully supported by the government, while SMAS are organized 
by private institutions. Further explanation about these school categorizations are 




study in the SMANs6. Such phenomena also occurred in almost all districts in the 
country. 
The attempts of the local government to combine and impose the two 
demands have produced a situation in which public secondary schools in the city 
experience the two conflicting institutional demands in school admission, 
stemming from existing and emerging logics, i.e., the demand for selectivity and 
inclusivity. In this case, the new demand was perceived as controversial because it 
offered different prescriptions than those of the long-held and deeply 
institutionalized demand manifested in the merit-based admission system. The 
emerging demand for inclusivity can result in more heterogeneous classes (in 
terms of student academic ability) in public schools, which is undesirable for 
teachers working at schools that can otherwise maintain homogeneity by attracting 
high-performing students. 
The tensions between the two institutional demands in the selected city 
were much more apparent, at both district and school levels, than those in many 
other districts in Indonesia. This was especially the case given that the local 
government initiated the two local programs and supported a national program 
intended to increase the access of vulnerable children. Furthermore, the studied 
city was nationally recognized as a leading district in introducing inclusive 
education in Indonesia, which issued a local regulation on the implementation of 
inclusive education before the central government set it up in the national 
regulations (Mulyadi, 2017). 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
School responses to contradictory demands might determine the success (or at 
least, the continuity) of adopting inclusive education principles. Therefore, the 
central issues here are both the variation in school responses and the extent to 
which the institutional demands and school characteristics affect the schools’ 
 
6 In Indonesia, SMANs, particularly those perceived to be most favorite ones in each 
district, can be categorized as elite schools because of the merit admission system. The 
difficulties experienced by children from socioeconomically disadvantaged families to 
access such elite schools are very common in many other countries, such as in Singapore 
(Lee & Morris, 2016), Hong Kong (Lee and Gopinathan, 2018), China (Li et al., 2018), 
Germany (Buchholz et al., 2016; Kruse, 2018), the Netherlands (Dronkers & Korthals, 




responses to institutional demands. The observed city provided compelling cases 
of school responses to an intra-institutional complexity, in which public schools at 
the senior secondary level, particularly those with academic orientation (i.e., 
SMAN), experienced the coexistence of the two conflicting demands in school 
admissions.  
The selected case was studied to illuminate the research problems as stated 
earlier: How do public sector organizations respond to an intra-institutional 
contradiction, and how can these responses be explained by both institutional-
level influences and organizational attributes? 
These research problems have been operationalized into the following research 
questions:  
1) What are the variations and similarities in school responses to the intra-
institutional contradiction? 
2) Through what mechanisms do isomorphic influences, emerging in the intra-
institutional contradiction, affect the variability of school responses in the 
organizational field? 
3) Why and to what extent do complexity levels determine the variability of 
school responses? 
4) What are the organizational attributes individually influencing school 
resistance to the emerging demand for inclusivity? 
5) How do specific organizational attributes play a joint role as necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions to determine levels of resistance to the emerging demand 
for inclusivity? 
Finally, as perception management was empirically found as a response strategy 
adopted by several of the observed schools, this question has been added: 
6) Why and how do organizational perceptions determine strategies adopted by 
schools in responding to the given intra-institutional contradiction?  
 
1.7 The Structure of the Monograph 
This monograph is organized into ten chapters, including this introductory chapter. 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework developed to analyze organizational 
responses to an intra-institutional contradiction. It starts with the explanation of 
intra-institutional contradiction as a kind of institutional complexity, types of 




attributes such as identity, status, decision-making mechanism, and power balance 
structure), and institution-level determinants (i.e., isomorphic influence and 
complexity level of intra-institutional contradiction).  
Chapter 3 describes a more empirical context for the relevance of the study. 
It explains the contradictory logics of school admission systems in Indonesia and 
their implementation in the observed city. The manifestation of both the long-
existing demand for selectivity and the emerging demand for inclusivity (that is, 
in the form of the three different programs: The Quota Program, the Inclusion 
Program, and the Affirmative Action Program) is described, which is then 
continued by the elaborations of tensions between these two institutional logics 
and/ or demands.  
Chapter 4 delves into research design and methods. It includes the reasons 
for employing a comparative case study involving 11 public schools with the same 
type (i.e., SMANs) operated in the city. The chapter also describes how data 
collection and analysis are carried out to answer research questions. 
Chapters 5 to 8 present the empirical findings. Chapter 5 describes the 
schools’ various strategies in responding to the intra-institutional contradiction. 
This chapter presents the patterns of variations and similarities of the response 
strategies in each circumstance of the intra-institutional contradiction. Chapter 6 
presents the role of institution-level determinants, which are an isomorphic 
influence and complexity level of the intra-institutional contradiction. While the 
former (i.e., the stereotypical isomorphic influence) was identified as the cause of 
convergence of general responses on each side of the conflicting institutional 
demands, the latter determines the variability of resistance levels to the emerging 
demand perceived as controversial. 
Chapter 7 describes the role of organizational attributes in determining the 
levels of school resistance or response strategies. It begins with the influence of 
individual attributes (i.e., organizational status or field position, identity, power 
balance structure, and decision-making mechanism) and proceeds with the 
consequence of attribute configurations.  
Chapter 8 presents in greater detail the use of organizational perception 
management as a resistance tactic. While this is not listed in Oliver’s (1991) 




The chapter also describes the role of identity-image interrelationship in the use of 
the above tactic.  
In Chapter 9, the findings are discussed for generating and articulating the 
contributions of the work for theoretical development on relevant topics: (1) 
stereotypical isomorphism, as a novel type of isomorphism which is relevant in the 
case of intra-institutional contradiction; (2) complexity levels and the variability 
of resistance strategies at the field level; (3) the critical roles of organizational 
attributes as configurations in leading to either high or low resistance; (4) 
perception management as a resistance strategy; and (5) reciprocal identity-image 
interrelationship in the use of perception management as a resistance strategy.  
Chapter 10 finalizes the thesis by presenting the conclusion or the answers 
to the research questions, extracted from the interpretation of the findings. 
Furthermore, the research implications are stated by addressing the study’s 


























































Institutional and resource dependence perspectives suggest that, when facing 
competing institutional demands, organizations are more likely to prioritize and 
comply with those enacted by institutional referents in which the organizations 
receive more significant institutional support and legitimacy (Deephouse, Bundy, 
Tost, & Suchman, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b; Oliver, 1991). However, 
power differentials between institutional referents become irrelevant as a basis for 
predicting response strategies to conflicting demands stemming from the same 
institutional actor. While prior research highlights that conforming to one demand 
might require losing legitimacy from the others (J. Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), this 
thesis questions how organizations maintain their legitimacy when experiencing 
conflicting prescriptions imposed by the same institutional actor. In the face of 
such intra-institutional complexity, organizations may lose legitimacy when 
defying any demands.  
This chapter presents an elaboration of intra-institutional contradiction, 
followed by the overview of these topics: (1) various responses strategies and their 
resistance levels; (2) the role of institution-level influences in determining 
similarity and variation in organizational responses, on each side of an intra-
institutional contradiction, at field level; (3) the role of organizational attributes in 
specifying resistance levels or strategies particularly in responding to a new, 
controversial demand; and (4) managing organizational perceptions as a potential 
response to an institutional contradiction. 
 
2.1 Intra-institutional Contradiction and Controversial Demand 
Recent works within organizational institutionalism have increasingly paid close 
attention to institutional pluralism and complexity (Ocasio et al., 2017). The 
former refers to circumstances in which organizations and individuals are faced 
with multiple institutional logics providing different values, understandings, and 
expectations (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Yu, 2015). Referring to a more challenging 




contradicting logics that are simultaneously prescribed by different audiences 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Raynard, 2016). Institutional logics, referring to socially 
constructed beliefs in the organizing principles of institutions (Ocasio et al., 2017; 
Thornton et al., 2012), are the central element of such situations.  
Meyer & Höllerer (2014; 2016) propose a categorization of institutional 
heterogeneity by differentiating intra-institutional complexity from inter-
institutional complexity. The favored situation explored in prior works is inter-
institutional complexity, a circumstance in which organizations experience 
contradicting logics arising from different institutional orders; for instance, 
institutional contradictions between market, state, and family logics (e.g., 
Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010), conflicting logics involving state, 
professional, managerial, and market logics (e.g., Blomgren & Waks, 2015), 
professional vs. market logics (e.g., Broek, Boselie, & Paauwe, 2014), community 
vs. market logics (e.g., Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), professional vs. market and 
corporation logics (e.g., Murray, 2010; Perkmann, McKelvey, & Phillips, 2018), 
or religion vs. other logics (Aysan, 2017). In contrast, intra-institutional 
complexity refers to contradictory demands emanating from the same institutional 
order, such as care vs. science logics within medical professional (Dunn & Jones, 
2010), Weberian traditional bureaucracy vs. managerial logics within state order 
(R. E. Meyer, Egger-Peitler, Höllerer, & Hammerschmid, 2014), and Anglo-
American vs. continental European business model within corporation order (R. 
E. Meyer & Höllerer, 2010).  
Since institutional logics are embedded in institutions, which can be 
identified not only at institutional orders of society, it is not surprising that scholars 
also explore institutional logics at other levels (Ocasio et al., 2017). For instance, 
contradictions among organizational field-level logics have been extensively 
studied (e.g., Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Colaner, 2016; Kodeih & Greenwood, 
2014; M. P. Lee & Lounsbury, 2015; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Mercado, 
Hjortsø, & Honig, 2018). In the education sector, an example is provided by 
Kodeih and Greenwood (2014), studying contradictory logics faced by business 
schools in France: Ecoles de Commerce logic with vocational orientation vs. 
international business school logic focusing on academic orientation. Another 
example is multiculturalism vs. Indigenous distinctiveness logics in educational 
services for Indigenous People in Canada (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016), in which 




importance of respecting the rights and cultures of Indigenous students in 
Canadian schools. 
Following Meyer & Höllerer’s (2016) attention to intra-institutional 
complexity, this work addresses a more specific circumstance called intra-
institutional contradiction7, in which similar organizations operating in an 
organizational field face conflicting demands imposed by the same institutional 
actor within an institutional order, i.e., the state as the institutional order imposes 
a new demand contradicting a long-established one still in force. The circumstance 
studied by this work diverges from common situations theorized by Thornton, 
Ocasio, & Lounsbury (2012) that different institutional logics are embedded in, or 
imposed by, different institutional orders. In the observed case, the state enforced 
two contesting institutional demands related to school admission, one of which 
was from another institutional order: the long-existing demand for selectivity 
derived from the logic of competition/segregation versus the emerging demand for 
inclusivity extracted from the logic of inclusiveness/integration. While the 
inclusion represents an educational arrangement endorsed by the state, the 
competition is more relevant to, or even the manifestation of, values or norms 
promoted by market order. However, when this logic of competition was stipulated 
by the state, as occurred in the observed case, the source of both legitimacy and 
the mechanism through which it is imposed into the observed organizations 
(schools) must be more relevant with state order, rather than market order. 
The principles of inclusive education prescribing to educate students with 
disabilities together with others in regular schools (not in special schools) are 
increasingly promoted while traditional views of special education that idealize 
segregation are still the mainstream worldwide (Haug, 2017; O'Rourke, 2015). The 
mainstream practices of education service provision for different groups of 
students, based on their academic abilities or physical conditions, reflect schools’ 
compliance with the institutional demand for selectivity in school admission. Such 
widely institutionalized practices are commonly characterized by their strong 
attractiveness for organizations in which they are imposed into, embodying 
resistance to change (Dacin & Dacin, 2008) or, for instance, to accept the contrary 
 
7 Henceforth the terms “intra-institutional complexity” and “intra-institutional 
contradiction” are used interchangeably to denote the circumstance studied. In this case, 




demands derived from the logic of an inclusive school (de Boer, Pijl, & Minnaert, 
2011). Therefore, governments’ efforts to adopt inclusive education principles in 
many countries are typically perceived as controversial (Armstrong, Armstrong, & 
Spandagou, 2011; Chowdhury & Panday, 2018). Moreover, the adoption of 
inclusive education principles causes regular schools to experience intra-
institutional complexity indicated by the coexistence of conflicting institutional 
demands imposed by the government (Richardson & Powell, 2011): the long-
existing demand for selectivity versus the emerging demand for inclusivity.8   
Under such situations, the emerging demands are typically perceived as 
counter-normative practices by organizational actors (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2017), especially during their introduction in a field (see Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 
2010; Jonsson, 2009) and, consequently, subject to refusal (Dacin & Dacin, 2008). 
Therefore, organizations are likely to maintain their compliance with mainstream 
demands while resisting new ones by using various strategies. Although field-level 
actors may try to accommodate such new demands institutionally, e.g., as a pilot 
project, an initial step, a gradual shift, or a partial and limited adoption (for 
instance, see Biermann & Powell, 2016; Opoku, Agbenyega, Mprah, Mckenzie, & 
Badu, 2017; Utomo, 2014) to give  legal space for the new practices, the 
 
8 This institutional contradiction occurs in many other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America that experienced the long-held practice of segregation or separation models of 
educational provision (Richardson & Powell, 2011). After ratifying global norms on 
“Education for All” and “Inclusive Education”, these countries gradually reform their 
education system, enabling the coexistence of educational separation and inclusion practices. 
Such circumstances are also experienced by several European countries. Richardson and 
Powell (2011: 219) classified countries based on the 1999-2001 segregation index, a measure 
indicating proportion of students with special education needs who are served in special 
schools or spend most of the day in separate classes. Several countries classified as ones with 
more established inclusive school traditions (segregation index <20 percent), i.e., Iceland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, and Finland, may experience relatively lower level of 
difficulties in complying with the current pressures for the adoption of inclusive education. 
In contrast, other European countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, 
and France, which had educational segregation cultures (segregation index >80 percent), may 
experience a tough educational reform. Observing beyond education services for children 
with disabilities, Triventi et al. (2016) highlight the comparison between the Scandinavian 
models of comprehensive schooling (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and the more 
traditional tripartite system (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland). 
Whereas the former essentially practiced integrated and inclusive programs in primary and 
secondary education levels, the latter was characterized by separation of students into 
different types of schools at those two educational levels. The two contrasting models passed 




incompatibilities perceived by organizational actors clearly reflect the existence of 
intra-institutional contradictions. 
 
2.2 Organizational Responses to Intra-institutional Contradiction 
Studies on organizational responses to institutional demands are mostly developed 
from Oliver’s (1991) generic typology of strategic responses from non-resistance 
to the highest level of resistance: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, 
and manipulation (Table 2.1). Acquiescence or compliance is the response that 
may lead to isomorphism or homogeneity in an organizational field (Boxenbaum 
& Jonsson, 2017, p. 84). However, when organizations experience controversial 
demands, Oliver (1991) proposed that adopting a non-conforming strategy is more 
likely. 
 
Table 2.1 Levels and Types of Resistance Strategies and Tactics 
Levels of 
resistance 
Strategies Tactics  











The most resistant tactic 
Pacify 
Bargain 
Moderate Avoidance Conceal 
Decouple 
Escape 
High Defiance Ignore 
Challenge 
Attack 
Very high Manipulation Co-optation 
Influence 
Control 
Source: Author’s own, based on Oliver (1991). 
 
Based on Oliver’s typology of resistance strategies, compromise refers to 
the lowest level of resistance characterized by partial compliance with institutional 
expectations. This strategy involves either balancing the competing demands, 
conforming to the minimal requirements of a demand that is followed by devoting 
resources to placate the other(s), or bargaining demand alteration through 
clandestine negotiations. Avoidance is the attempt to circumvent the conditions 
that make compliance with certain institutional expectations necessary. This 




compliance, decoupling real activities from organization programs, or escaping 
from the field where the pressure is imposed. 
A high-level resistance, defiance refers to the rejection of institutional 
demands in a public manner, enacted by ignoring institutional expectations, overtly 
challenging the prescriptions exerted, or even aggressively attacking them. As the 
highest-level resistance, manipulation refers to proactive efforts to change 
institutional demands by co-opting the sources of institutional contradiction and 
then neutralizing their conflicting prescriptions. This can be done by actively 
influencing institutional actors to adjust their demands or by controlling the source 
of pressure. 
Oliver (1991) argued that organizational preference in adopting response 
strategies is determined by the degree of organizations’ dependence on the 
institutional actors imposing the demands. An organization is likely to conform to 
institutional demands enforced by ones with stronger influences on its existence. 
The lower the degree of an organization’s dependence on an institutional actor, the 
higher the level of its resistance to demands imposed by that actor. However, when 
organizations experience an intra-institutional contradiction, in which the same 
institutional actor imposes the coexistence of contradicting demands, it is unclear 
which response strategy is more favored than others. 
While experiencing institutional complexity, particularly in the forms of 
inter-institutional contradictions, compliance to institutional demands is 
troublesome for organizations, particularly in managing their legitimacy 
(Deephouse et al., 2017; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). Organizational 
institutionalism scholars have identified varied strategies adopted by organizations 
in responding to such situations. The response strategies include defiance by 
ignoring one side of conflicting demands or through co-optation and controlling 
tactics (Marquis, Yin, & Yang, 2017; Quirke, 2013), avoidance through 
decoupling (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015), compromise by developing hybrid 
organization (Almandoz, Lee, & Marquis, 2017; Battilana & Lee, 2014), and 
compartmentalizing (Sinha, Daellenbach, & Bednarek, 2015). These response 
strategies all represent resistance strategies, which indicate an organization's 




The increased interest of institutionalists in studying institutional 
complexity has given rise to the idea of solving structure versus agency debate in 
the institutional theories of organization (see Heugens & Lander, 2009; Thornton 
et al., 2012), otherwise known as the institutional logics perspective (Ocasio et al., 
2017). This perspective provides a new approach in consolidating theoretical 
assumptions and explanations of the two competing views. The structuralist view 
believes that isomorphism or homogeneity in organizational fields is an inevitable 
consequence of institutional influences (coercive, normative, and mimetic or 
cultural/cognitive) and organizational actors’ motivation to gain legitimacy and 
survive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). In contrast, the 
agency approach argues that organizational actors play a more active and 
significant role in responding to isomorphic influences, enabling the potential for 
deviance, heterogeneity, entrepreneurship, and change in organizational fields 
(Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hoffman, 1999; 
Oliver, 1991). The institutional logics perspective provides a bridge by focusing 
on the prevalence of institutional pluralism, integrating top-down (structure) and 
bottom-up (agency) mechanisms, examining the interrelationships between 
institutions, organizations, and individuals, and placing organizations and 
individuals as embedded agents. Therefore, this perspective is critical in better 
understanding the role of institution-level influences and organization-level factors 
in affecting organizational responses to an intra-institutional contradiction. 
The following sections briefly review the potential roles of the two levels 
(i.e., institutions and organizations) in framing how organizations first perceive 
institutional demands and then select the available strategic response options. 
 
2.3 Institution-level Determinants 
2.3.1 Institutional influences 
According to the structural approach, organizational responses are determined by 
isomorphic influence (i.e., coercive, normative, and mimetic or cultural/cognitive), 
enabling isomorphism or homogenous organizational structures or strategies in 
organizational fields. Without denying the possibility of isomorphism, the 
institutional logic perspective proposes an alternative view of institutional 






a. Isomorphic pressures  
The core idea of institutional isomorphism is that low variations in organizations’ 
structures and strategies in fields result from organizational conformity to taken-
for-granted modes of organizing (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such institutional 
expectations are imposed into organizations through isomorphic pressures, i.e., 
coercive, normative, or mimetic (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991b). Organizations structurally or strategically become similar for a 
number of different reasons. They can be pressured to conform to the expectations 
of institutional actors who have coercive mechanisms (e.g., regulations, 
accreditations, evaluation, legal requirements, or contractual responsibilities); 
expected to comply with the code of ethics and standards of professionalism 
promoted by relevant professional associations through education, training, and 
certification processes; or have the desire to voluntarily imitate other organizations 
perceived as ones with best practices when responding to uncertainty in their 
fields. Widely accepted institutional demands practiced for a long time, such as 
grouping students based on their academic ability and physical condition, reflect 
the homogenization of organization practices through isomorphic processes. These 
three isomorphic forces “can overlap and intermingle” in influencing organizations 
(Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004, p. 285). 
To identify the existence of isomorphism, Ashworth et al. (2009) suggest 
the importance of considering isomorphism’s different traits. The first 
characteristic is compliance, which refers to organizations’ direction in responding 
to institutional expectations, particularly intended to increase their compatibility 
with those demands. The second is convergence, pointing to a condition in which 
organizations within an organizational field exhibit their similarity in responding 
to institutional demands due to an isomorphic influence. Finally, another essential 
characteristic of institutional isomorphism is that organizational responses are 
motivated by the intention to manage legitimacy, such as being regarded as 
organizations with institutionally accepted actions and structures, not by 
efficiency-seeking (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). 
In circumstances in which organizations experience institutional 
contradictions, however, DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal work on the role 
of three types of isomorphic influences lacks explanatory power. Moreover, under 




organizational fields, and organization compliance on all sides of conflicting 
institutional demands is certainly impossible practice. While the relevance of 
institutional isomorphism in field heterogeneity, or conditions of institutional 
complexity, is recently questioned (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017), it is argued in 
this dissertation that compliance and convergence as the two features of 
isomorphism should be observed in a different way.  
When organizations face contradicting demands, conformity to one demand 
while resisting the other is acceptable as the characteristic of response exhibited 
by single organizations. Convergence or similarities in response strategies adopted 
by all organizations in a field, therefore, should refer to “the resemblance of a 
response bundle” to both sides of contradicting demands—complying with one 
demand while resisting the other. By employing that approach, this thesis intends 
to capture isomorphism occurring in institutional complexity and identify an 
alternative isomorphic pressure that enables its emergence.  
 
b. Institutional logics 
While isomorphism or the homogeneity of organizations in organizational fields 
was the central proposition of neo-institutional theory highlighting the dominant 
role of macro-social forces or structural influences (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; J. 
W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977), organizational heterogeneity in structure and strategy 
has been the more recent concern of institutionalists spotlighting the active role of 
organizations and individuals as agents. Although the institutional logics approach 
is the extension of the agency perspective, it aligns with the structuralist view on 
the influence of “cultural rules and cognitive structures on organizational 
structures” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 100). Consistently, Ocasio et al. (2017, 
p. 524; an emphasis added) suggest that the role of agency “in adaptation and 
intentional action,” including the decisions to resist an institutional demand, should 
be “shaped by social and cultural structures.”  
However, in contrast to the structuralists’ focus, the institutional logics 
promoters highlight that organizations and individuals are embedded agents under 
the prevalence of institutional pluralism, in which multiple logics coexist as the 
references containing particular prescriptions for actions (Thornton et al., 2012). 
As embedded agents, organizations or individuals experience and learn the 




strategically, shaped by influential logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Ocasio et al., 
2017) and internal dynamics inside organizations (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013) in 
responding to conflicting institutional demands derived from divergent, 
incompatible logics (Ocasio & Radoynovska, 2016). 
Introduced first by Alford and Friedland (1985), the concept of institutional 
logics was initially recognized in organizational institutionalism as society-level 
influences that configure organizations (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Integrating 
Jackal’s (1988, 2010) structural-normative approach and Friedland and Alford’s 
(1991) structural-symbolic approach, Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p. 804) define 
institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural 
symbols and material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their daily activity.” The inclusion of structural and agency 
approaches (Ocasio et al., 2017), as well as macro-structural (J. W. Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) and micro-processes perspectives (Zucker, 1977), is reflected in 
Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) aforementioned definition of institutional logics.  
The two other perspectives in organizational institutionalism propose the 
existence and influence of separate institutional carriers, such as DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) coercive (structural), normative, and mimetic (symbolic) 
mechanisms of structural isomorphism and, similarly, Scott’s (1995, 2014) 
regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars. In contrast, the institutional 
logics perspective postulates that those influencing mechanisms are “integral parts 
of any institutional order—family, religion, state, market, profession, corporation” 
(Thornton et al., 2012, p. 51). Thus, individuals and organizations live in local 
contexts of multiple institutional orders. Each contextualized order represents a 
governance system providing different logics (e.g., organizing principles) that 
shape individual cognition and organizational behaviors through several 
mechanisms. They include individual and organizational identification with 
collective or field-level identities, competition for status promoted by prevailing 
institutions, socially constructed classifications and categorization, and 
organization decision-makers’ allocation of attention to particular institutional 
logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, pp. 111-114).   
Although the institutional logics perspective believes in institutional 




producing local variations (Lounsbury, 2001; Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010). 
Institutional logics are “frames of reference that precondition actors’ choices for 
sensemaking” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 54), while sensemaking itself is an 
ongoing retrospective process rationalizing individual and organizational 
behaviors (Thornton et al., 2012; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2010). Such 
reasons of actions “are shaped by institutional logics that actors have learned, 
experienced through practices, and with which they identify” (Ocasio et al., 2017, 
p. 525). This explanation differs from rational choice perspectives that view 
organizational preferences as the reflection of individual interests. Despite the 
foundational assumption of embedded agency and the increasing prevalence of 
institutional pluralism, the institutional logics scholars do not “negate the existence 
of isomorphic pressures” and argue “that shared commitments or conformity to 
institutional logics will lead to isomorphism among organizations” (Ocasio et al., 
2017, p. 524). 
 
2.3.2 Complexity level of intra-institutional contradiction 
As mentioned, prior studies focus more on institutional complexity resulted from 
contradictions between institutional logics or demands imposed by different or 
multiple institutional actors. Two aspects of complexity observed in this research 
line are the number of logics (or demands) and the degree of incompatibility 
between them (Greenwood et al., 2011). The latter considers complexity based on 
the difference between intended goals (e.g., Purdy & Gray, 2009) or between 
chosen means (e.g., Dunn & Jones, 2010) and on specificity levels (Goodrick & 
Salancik, 1996).  
Pache and Santos (2010) argue that the tensions arising from 
incompatibility or conflict between institutional demands on goals or ends are 
more problematic, that they endanger institutional legitimation more than those 
related to means. Highlighting the degree of specificity of institutional demands 
and the opportunity for taking discretionary actions, prior works (e.g., Goodrick & 
Salancik, 1996; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999) 
suggest that, when facing ambiguous demands related to means, the selection of 
response strategies is mainly determined by organizational interests.  
Demand specificity has also received wide attention from public 




public administration literature (e.g., Evans & Hupe, 2020b; Gilson, 2015; Hill & 
Hupe, 2014; Lipsky, 2010; Tummers, 2013). Demand specificity in these literature 
strands is considered as a condition in which street-level bureaucrats (e.g., 
teachers, nurses, or social workers) have or do not have discretion in implementing 
a policy. Despite its multiple meanings, discretion can generally be defined as “the 
extent of freedom a worker can exercise in a specific context [of policy 
implementations]” (Smith, 1981 as cited by Evans, 2016, p. 2; an emphasis added). 
This freedom can be either “prescriptively granted by a rule maker,” “actually 
being used by the implementers” (Hupe, 2013, p. 435), or “subjectively perceived 
by the implementers” (Tummers & Bekkers, 2020, p. 168). The core idea is that 
policies with highly specified prescriptions can eliminate the discretion of policy 
implementers. 
In a theoretical framework explaining behavioral public administration, 
particularly psychological perspective about discretion, Tummers (2017) 
introduces the notion of policy alienation by defining it as “a (public service 
worker’s) cognitive state of psychological disconnection from the policy program 
to be implemented” (p. 571, an emphasize added). Several works in this line of 
research have shown that policy alienation negatively influences behavioral 
support for policy effectiveness (see, e.g., Kerpershoek, Groenleer, & de Bruijn, 
2016; Tonkens, Bröer, Van Sambeek, & Van Hassel, 2013; Tummers, 2011; van 
Engen, Tummers, Bekkers, & Steijn, 2016; Van Loon & Jakobsen, 2018).  
Among the five dimensions of policy alienation constructed by Tummers 
(2013), tactical and operational powerlessness are relevant to this thesis. While 
tactical powerlessness reflects “the workers’ perceived lack of influence on 
decisions concerning the way policy is implemented within their own 
organization,” operational powerlessness constitutes “the perceived lack of 
freedom in making choices concerning the sort, quantity, and quality of sanctions 
and rewards on offer when implementing the policy” (Tummers, 2017, p. 573). 
Both indicate that organizational actors do not have discretionary autonomy or 
room for maneuver in policy implementation (see Evans & Hupe, 2020a; Hill & 
Hupe, 2014; Hupe, 2013; Lipsky, 2010), which is an implication of facing an 
institutional demand with a high level of specificity (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). 
Tummers et al. (2015) empirically found that, when feeling alienated from 




Furthermore, Tummers and Bekkers (2014) and others (see Hill & Hupe, 2014; 
May & Winter, 2007; Maynard-Moody & Portillo, 2010; Meyers & Vorsanger, 
2007; Sandfort, 2000; Tummers, 2013) highlight that discretion can strengthen a 
public service policy’s effectiveness as it increases public servants’ willingness—
or decreases their resistance—in implementing policy. However, it is important to 
note that, as emphasized by Tummers and Bekkers (2014; see also Barrick, Mount, 
and Li, 2013; Hill and Hupe, 2014; May and Winter, 2007), the influence of 
discretion on the willingness to implement a policy is more substantial when their 
relationship is mediated by the more perceived client, and societal, meaningfulness 
(i.e., public servant’s perception that a public service policy is valuable for a client 
or, in general, for society). According to the institutional perspective, such values 
represent particular institutional logics or expectations that affect the perceptions 
and behaviors of policy implementers or organizational actors (Thornton et al., 
2012). 
Although the level of specificity (or ambiguity) of institutional demands in 
affecting types of organizational responses has been studied, whether and to what 
extent this institution-level factor determines variation in response strategies or 
resistance levels is still poorly understood. Greenwood et al. (2011) convincingly 
explain that organizations exhibit variations in response strategies when they 
experience institutional complexity while having attributes with different 
conditions. However, there is still a limited understanding regarding whether the 
specificity levels of institutional demands have different effects on the role of 
organizational attributes in resulting response variation, particularly when 
organizations face the circumstance of intra-institutional contradiction. Therefore, 
it is critical to understand what level of demand specificity enables divergent 
responses to the controversial demand and, conversely, prevents the influence of 
organizational attributes so that the opportunity for convergent responses 
increases. 
In the context of intra-institutional contradiction, the contrarieties can have 
varying levels of complexity, ranging from low to high. Each level represents an 
implication of the clash between a long-existing (preferable) demand and a new 
(undesirable) one with a certain level of specificity. Under such contradiction, 
problematic levels of complexity can be determined by the specificity level of the 
new, controversial demand. The more rigid the new demand, the greater the 




when the long-existing demand is preferable while the new demand is rigid. A less 
problematic situation may be experienced by organizations when the new demand 
contains ambiguous prescriptions. 
Complexity levels, in this case, can therefore be identified from both the 
specificity levels or the availability of the room for discretionary actions (Goodrick 
& Salancik, 1996; Greenwood et al., 2011) and the risk level of losing legitimacy 
when refusing the new demand (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008). It is generally expected that the complexity levels, representing 
configurations of specificity or ambiguity level (high or low) and risk level of 
losing legitimacy (high or low), determine the selection of strategies in responding 
to the new, controversial demand and enable either homogeneity or heterogeneity 
of resistance strategies and levels in organizational fields.  
In the context of facing a new institutional demand perceived as 
controversial (or challenging the long-existing practice), homogeneity of 
resistance strategies within organizational populations is likely to arise when the 
prescriptions of the new demand have moderate or low specificity. This can occur 
because institutional demands with less specificity provide larger opportunities, 
and flexibilities, for organizational actors to reject or avoid them. In this event, 
resistance levels tend to be more determined by the levels of risk of losing 
legitimacy. While low risks allow the adoptions of high or very high resistance 
levels, high risks enable the tendencies to adopt lower resistance strategies. In 
contrast, heterogeneity of resistance strategies within organizational populations is 
likely to occur when the controversial emerging demand has high specificity 
prescriptions. In such situations, the selections of resistance strategies are more 
determined by organizational characteristics, enabling variations in response 
strategies among organizations in particular fields.  
 
2.4 The Role of Organizational Attributes 
Despite their similarities, organizations within a given field have unique 
characteristics that distinguish them from each other (Scott & Davis, 2014). 
Greenwood et al. (2011) argued that organizational attributes, such as field 
position, power structure, identity, and governance, “frame how organizations 




repertoire of responses available to them” (p. 339). That is why organizations 
operating in the same field (e.g., healthcare or education), or located in a specific 
jurisdiction, may perceive the same institutional pressures differently and therefore 
respond to them distinctively (Greenwood et al., 2011; Yu, 2015). Such attributes 
are interrelated with each other (Fiss, Marx, & Cambre´, 2013) and, therefore, 
should be viewed as a configuration rather than in isolation. This thesis argues that, 
in the context of facing a new institutional demand with strict prescriptions that 
contradict the long-established one, the variation of resistance strategies adopted 
by similar organizations in a field is caused by different combinations of the 
organizations’ attributes. What follows below is a review of the four organizational 
attributes identified by Greenwood et al. (2011). 
 
2.4.1 Position or status 
Organizations with diverse structural positions or statuses (i.e., either as a central 
or peripheral organization within their field) tend to have different preferences in 
responding to emerging institutional demands (Greenwood et al., 2011). Central 
organizations (i.e., ones with more prestigious status as the advantage of 
compliance to the existing institutional arrangements) are likely to be more 
resistant to emerging institutional expectations, especially those perceived as 
controversial and potentially threatening their current positions (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Marquis et al., 2017). In contrast, 
peripheral or low-status organizations, particularly those disadvantaged by 
mainstream institutional demands, are more likely to accept alternatives or act as 
institutional entrepreneurs by creatively building novel practices (D'Aunno, Succi, 
& Alexander, 2000; Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002).  
However, with its theoretical explanations of mechanisms by which 
institutional logics influence individuals and organizations, the institutional logics 
perspective provides an alternative possibility. According to this perspective, both 
central and peripheral organizations tend to be relevant and correspond to 
pervasive institutional logics, i.e., long-standing and widely institutionalized ones. 
Competition for status is one of the ways by which particular institutional logics, 




organizational field9 (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Therefore, when experiencing a 
new demand that contradicts the mainstream one, both central and peripheral 
organizations are likely to favor the long-practiced demand to maintain the status 
they have been competing for. Since central organizations relish more significant 
advantages under the mainstream arrangement, these organizations (compared to 
peripheral ones) are likely to exhibit a higher level of resistance when responding 
to the emerging demand. 
 
2.4.2 Power structure 
Inside organizations, individuals and groups make sense of and interpret 
institutional demands (Binder, 2007) and then decide to either be a local proponent 
or ‘opponent’ of them (Brandl & Bullinger, 2017). Although there is a sense that 
individuals with a higher social standing or hierarchical position (e.g., organization 
leader) have a greater influence in determining organizational response (Marquis 
& Lee, 2013; Shaked & Schechter, 2017), its acceptance tends to be higher when 
the prescribed practices are widely accepted throughout the organization (Raffaelli 
& Glynn, 2014). In this context, structure is not always about the number of units 
within an organization, structural positions with various levels of influence, or 
division of tasks. More generally, it is rather about the power structure inside an 
organization. Thus, organizations are categorized into: a) those with an unbalanced 
power structure (i.e., the role of organization leader, who is either the proponent 
or opponent of particular institutional demands, is dominant in decision-making, 
neglecting the opposing group/people); and, b) the ones with a more balanced 
power structure, characterized by the existence of individuals or groups able to 
counterbalance the leader’s role in decision-making. 
In confronting a new demand that contradicts a long-established one, 
wherein organizational leaders are officially assigned by the institutional actor to 
 
9 The other mechanisms are individuals and organizations’ identification with collective 
identities, social classifications or categorizations, and organizational decision-makers’ 
attention (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Thornton and Ocasio (2008) note that institutional 
logics exert their effects on individuals and organizations when: (1) organizational actors 
identify with the collective identities of an institutionalized group, organization, 
profession, industry or population; (2) individual cognition is determined by socially 
constructed systems of classifications that categorize organizations in their fields; and (3) 
decision-makers’ attention to and understanding of issues and solutions are determined 




oversee the coexistence of conflicting institutional templates, organizations with 
an unbalanced power structure are likely to show low resistance strategies (i.e., 
compromise with its varied tactics). Conversely, response strategies indicating 
higher resistances (i.e., avoidance, defiance, or even manipulation) are likely to be 
adopted by organizations with a balanced power structure as a solution reached by 
the conflicting insiders. 
 
2.4.3 Decision-making mechanism 
Greenwood et al. (2011) highlight that organizational responses to institutional 
demands represent the most influential group or person’s interests, such as 
organization owners, leaders, or functional groups of professions. However, it is 
argued in this thesis that the essential features are not only the actors or groups that 
either own organizations or have a more decisive influence but also the decision-
making mechanism institutionalized within organizations (Heimer, 1999). 
Decision-making mechanisms are a critical aspect of governance that signifies how 
strategic decisions are made (Levi-Faur, 2012) through either a command (top-
down/ hierarchical) or persuasion (negotiated/ democratic) mechanism.  
An organization with traditional command-and-control mechanisms is 
characterized by leaders’ dominant role in the decision-making process. In 
contrast, organizations adopting more inclusive, persuasion-based mechanisms 
focus on “the elaboration of values, preference, and interest as well as the 
rationalization and framing of options for action and the exchange of ideas and 
information in a deliberative manner” (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 9). This democratic 
mechanism, in turn, enables the rise of opposing groups or individuals (e.g., groups 
of professions or senior members of an organization) taking part in interpreting 
institutional demands (Weick et al., 2010) and shaping repertories of possible 
responses, which are based mainly on their preferences.   
In the face of a new demand challenging the long-held one, organizations 
with a command-and-control mechanism are likely to adopt low-level resistance. 
This is because organization managers, especially those in the public sector, are 
likely to defer to government expectations (Berg & Pinheiro, 2016), regardless of 
the new expectation’s controversies. Those managers could potentially confront 
organization members who become opponents of a new demand at odds with 




organizations that adopt a more inclusive, persuasion mechanism in decision-
making. Consequently, under the aforementioned circumstance, organizations 
with a persuasion decision-making mechanism are likely to exhibit higher 
resistance levels.  
 
2.4.4 Organizational identity 
Organizational identity (OI) can be defined as an organization’s key trait that 
confirms a member within particular social categories or the sameness of social 
categories—such as schools, banks, or small and medium enterprises (King, Felin, 
& Whetten, 2010). Simultaneously, it also indicates the organization's uniqueness 
that differentiates it from other similar organizations in an organizational field 
(Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013). While the former represents the 
social actor view of OI that posits OI as an organization’s self-proclaim as a part 
of social categories at the field level, the latter reflects the social construction view 
of OI, seeing OI as a product internally constructed through insiders’ mutual 
understandings (Foreman & Whetten, 2016).  
Several studies on OI, such as Gioia and Hamilton (2016) and Brickson 
(2013), have started to integrate those two views of OI as “interdependent and 
mutually constitutive nature” (Besharov & Brickson, 2016, p. 398). In short, OI 
considers the questions around who we are and what we do in which either can be 
influenced by institutional pressures. Therefore, OI is an essential attribute to 
understand how organizations cope with institutional complexity (Foreman & 
Whetten, 2016). 
OI’s two critical dimensions that determine an organization’s orientation in 
responding to institutional contradiction, as suggested by institutionalists and 
identity scholars, are identity alignment and identity strength (Besharov & 
Brickson, 2016; Greenwood et al., 2011). Identity alignment is the main 
consideration of organizational actors in screening institutional prescriptions, 
particularly based on the suitability between OI and institutional identities 
manifested by such demands, and in specifying response strategies (Glynn, 2017; 
Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). In the face of contradicting institutional demands, 
organizations would rather embrace those aligned with their OI and exhibit their 
reluctance to accept the contrary (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Raffaelli & Glynn, 




their OI and the institutionally intended changes, OI could stimulate organizational 
members to either resist, accept, or initiate such changes (Anthony & Tripsas, 
2016; Knippenberg, 2016).  
Identity strength, indicating the extent to which an organization’s identity 
is widely believed and expressed by insiders (Ashforth, 2016), is the other 
dimension of OI used to better understand an organization’s confidence in 
responding to institutional expectations. Pointing a similar aspect, Kraatz and 
Block (2008) suggest that organizational responses to institutional demands 
depend on whether insiders have either more coherent or fragmented perceptions 
about their organization’s identity. Those with a strong identity, meaning that 
insiders have convergent perceptions of their organization identity—as Ashforth 
(2016) classified into an “it-is” level of the identity emergence processes—tend 
to have “confidence in its ability to ignore or comply with external demands” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 348). However, when insiders signal different identity 
claims in the circumstance of OI emergence, as Ashforth (2016) categorized into 
“I-think” and “we-think” levels, or when an organization has multiple identities 
(Pratt & Kraatz, 2009), it is argued here that organizational response to institutional 
demands will be more ambiguous. Such a vague response is likely to emerge 
because of insiders’ divergent interpretations of external forces, framed by varied 
beliefs and perceptions of their organization (Besharov & Brickson, 2016; Dejordy 
& Creed, 2016). 
While identity alignment reflects the existence (or the absence) of 
interconnection between OI and institutional identities or expectations (Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), identity strength represents strong (or 
weak) interlinkage between OI and organizational members’ identification (Ravasi 
& Schultz, 2006; Reissner, 2019). Considering both these two dimensions of OI 
(identity-based resistor), therefore, is more useful in understanding combinations 
of conditions causing organizations’ particular resistance levels in responding to 
institutional demands.  
Each organizational attribute briefly reviewed above may individually 
determine response strategies adopted by organizations, as empirically found or 
theoretically proposed by prior studies (e.g., Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Pache 
& Santos, 2010; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 




existence of certain configurations of organizational attributes may strategically 
cause certain levels of resistance. The Identity-based resistor potentially becomes 
the main consideration for organizational actors in perceiving institutional 
expectations and making a decision to respond to them. Furthermore, the 
organization’s identity-based resistor is likely to influence the cognition of each 
party involved in internal contestation stimulated by an institutional contradiction. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that an identity-based resistor, as a composite identity 
characteristic, is likely to be a key component of configurations of organizational 
attributes determining organizations’ resistance levels to a controversial 
institutional demand.  
 
2.5 Perception Management as a Response Strategy 
This subsection was particularly added as the consequence of the preliminary 
findings related to the forms of response strategies employed by the observed 
schools. As presented in more detail in Chapters 5 and 8, several schools were 
identified to use perception management to respond to the Quota Program. This 
empirically found tactic is not listed in Oliver’s catalog of resistance strategies and 
would be relevant to include as an additional tactic under high resistance strategies. 
This subsection briefly reviews relevant concepts and theoretical explanations 
related to organizational perception management as a starting point for making 
contributions. 
Organizational identity, image, and reputation are different but 
interconnected concepts, indicating how an organization is perceived (Elsbach, 
2006; Ravasi, 2016). While “organizational image” can represent both internal and 
external perceptions about a particular organization, “organizational identity” (OI) 
and “organizational reputation” refer to either insiders’ or outsiders’ perception of 
an organization (Gioia, Hamilton, & Patvardhan, 2014; Hoon & Jacobs, 2014; 
Ravasi, 2016; Whetten, 2006). Internal and external organizational perceptions can 
influence each other. In a situation, an organizational image may intentionally be 
developed by insiders through communicating their aspirations or beliefs about 
how external audiences should perceive them. Despite referring to “a connecting 
door” between organizational identity and image, scholars used different terms 
such as “desired future image” (Gioia & Thomas, 1996), “construed external 




or “intended image” (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006). Organization leaders 
and members can deliberately arrange communicative actions to shape outsiders’ 
perceptions so that there is a possibility of conformity of perceptions between 
insiders and outsiders. 
Organizations tend either to retain what they believe about “who we are” 
and “what we do as an organization” (Ravasi, 2016) or to realize what they wish 
to become (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014) by expressing their OI to respective 
stakeholder groups, including those who are (or not) expected to be part of the 
organization, such as prospective students or employees and the unwanted ones. 
Those actions might be intended to fulfill an institutional demand, e.g., by 
attracting the target audience to join the organization and support it in fulfilling 
that institutional demand. For the same reason, however, such communicative 
actions structured by internal stakeholders might also be intended to resist another 
institutional demand, e.g., by creating voluntary aversion for unwanted people to 
join such organizations. 
However, on the other hand, external perceptions about the organizations 
might be a reference for insiders to either retain or shift their organizational 
identity. Maintaining an OI can be a strategic alternative when outsiders’ 
perceptions have been matched with insiders’ for a long time. As external images 
tend to be sticky and inertial (Tripsas, 2009), organizations may feel “trapped” in 
a problematic situation when experiencing a new institutional demand with 
controversial prescriptions that challenge organizational identity (and image). An 
organizational image can also challenge, influence, or even change members’ 
claims and beliefs about their organizations (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Gioia, 
Schultz, & Corley, 2000). It may occur when outsiders’ perceptions are different 
from insiders’ and motivate insiders to question and reconsider their organizational 
identity (“who are we really?”). 
This nature of identity-image interrelations points to the works of 
organizational perception management. For contributing to this line of research, 
further explanations of under which circumstance an organizational identity 
determines external perceptions and vice versa are required. Since organizational 
perceptions held by insiders and outsiders are assumed to be mutually interrelated 
and influential, it is critical to identify organizational response strategies resulting 





























Chapter 3  
Educational Inequality and the Contradictory Logics of  
School Admission Systems in Indonesia 
 
 
As sketched out in Chapter 1, this thesis examines how Indonesian public schools 
respond to conflicting institutional demands related to student admission systems: 
the long-institutionalized demand for selectivity versus the emerging demand for 
inclusivity. The rise of the new demand is intended to address the unequal 
opportunity vulnerable children experience in accessing quality education, which 
is a consequence of (formal and informal) school differentiations and uneven 
distribution of quality education provided by schools in Indonesia 
(Moeliodihardjo, 2014; Mukminin & Habibi, 2019; Muttaqin, 2018; OECD, 2015; 
Suharti, 2013). 
The following subsection provides a brief overview of the Indonesian 
education systems, particularly those representing educational tracking and school 
differentiation, and the key reforms intended to increase vulnerable children’s 
access to education. This overview is followed by a more detailed description of 
the merit admission system, representing the institutional demand for selectivity, 
which has enabled educational inequality in districts across the country. The 
emerging institutional demand for inclusivity, manifested in the implementation 
of the three programs in the case city, and the tensions that emerged because of the 
conflicting institutional demands are then presented in sequence. 
 
3.1 The Indonesian Educational Systems in a Nutshell 
Indonesia’s education system consists of four levels of education, which include 
primary school (grades 1 to 6), junior secondary school (grades 7 to 9), senior 
secondary school (grades 10 to 12), and higher education. Since 2014, Indonesia’s 
compulsory education has been extended from 9 years (i.e., primary and junior 
secondary school) to 12 years (i.e., until senior secondary school). At the senior 
secondary school level, students aged 16 to 18 can choose one of the two tracks: 




educates those who want to continue their study in higher education institution 
(HEI) or, alternatively, more vocationally oriented schools (Sekolah Menengah 
Kejuruan, or SMK), which prepares those who prefer finding particular jobs 
directly after graduation.10 This categorization also applies to the country’s Islamic 
school system, which differentiates Islamic general senior secondary schools 
(Madrasah Aliyah, or MA) and Islamic vocational senior secondary schools 
(Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan, or MAK).11 
Responsibility for managing the education system is shared across two 
ministries: 84 percent of schools are under the Ministry of Education and Culture 
(MoEC), while the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) manages the rest, known 
as madrasahs or Islamic schools (Kingham & Parsons, 2013; OECD, 2015). As 
part of decentralization reforms implemented since 2001, MoEC and local 
governments share responsibilities and resources in managing education service 
provision at the primary and secondary levels, as specified in Law 20/2003 of the 
National Education System. While the central government or MoEC is responsible 
for establishing the national policy, curriculum, standards, and school 
accreditation, district governments have an enormous responsibility for the overall 
 
10 In practice, SMK graduates can continue their studies in higher education institutions 
(HEIs), with a more limited choice of study programs, if they pass the entrance selection 
test. Because SMK teaches more practical skills than theoretical knowledge (which is the 
main difference with SMA), their students or graduates must prepare themselves more in 
order to pass the HEI entrance test, e.g., by taking additional training programs provided 
by tutoring agencies (which is known as the phenomena of shadow education). However, 
most commonly, SMK tends to be an option for children from low-income families 
because they do not have a sufficient financial support to study at the higher education 
level. Unfortunately, as stated by the OECD-ADB’s review team (OECD, 2015: 164), 
“(Indonesia) vocational education training at the senior secondary level is of inadequate 
quality that does not address the needs of industry or the job seeker.” This review is 
consistent with the World Bank’s study highlighting the employers’ report on the 
weaknesses of Indonesian SMKs: the school curricula are not based on the labor market 
requires, and the learning facilities are outdated and not adapted to current technologies 
and innovations (World Bank, 2010; see also Di Gropello, 2013 and Di Gropello, et al., 
2011). 
11 Madrasah are education service providers under MoRA that deliver general education 
combined with Islamic studies from primary to senior secondary levels. At the senior 
secondary level, madrasahs provide either general or vocational education. In contrast to 
education in SMA and SMK, the proportion of Islamic religious education in madrasahs 
is much larger. Although the Ministry of Religious Affairs manages madrasah resources 
(i.e., teachers, facilities, and learning materials), their learning processes, outputs, and 
teacher qualifications must follow the educational standards set and controlled by the 




management of primary and secondary education,12 including infrastructures, 
facilities, and teachers. Moreover, local governments can also issue local 
regulations specifying their education standards in terms of inputs, processes, and 
outputs, as long as they comply with the minimum standards set by MoEC. 
However, the decentralization does not apply to MoRA in managing 
madrasahs at the primary to senior secondary levels. The management system 
remains centralized, and thus MoRA is responsible for the overall management 
and governance of madrasahs. The system has been the major obstacle in 
improving the quality of madrasahs because these Islamic schools have no 
relationship with local governments and, therefore, do not receive resources and 
financial support from the provincial and district governments where they are 
located (Kingham & Parsons, 2013).  
Private institutions play an essential role in the provision of education in 
the country. While the government dominates the provision of education in both 
primary and junior secondary levels,13 private institutions (mostly religion-based 
foundations) play a significant role in providing senior secondary schooling, 
especially vocational schools (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016). More than 60 
percent of senior secondary schools (SMA, SMK, MA, and MAK) are privately 
administered. However, they only have less than half of the total senior secondary 
school students. These facts indicate that private parties have a significant role, but 









12 Since 2017, the authority that manages education at senior secondary level has been 
relocated to the provincial governments. 
13 Madrasahs or Islamic Schools are the exceptions. Most madrasahs at the primary to 
senior secondary levels are privately run. The 2019 MoRA data show the dominant 
proportion of private madrasahs to the total madrasahs at each level of education: 
Madrasah Ibtidaiyyah, which is equivalent to primary school (23.868 units or 93.3 
percent); Madrasah Tsnawiyah, which is equivalent to junior secondary school (16.557 
units or 91.5 percent); and Madrasah Aliyah, which is equivalent to senior secondary 
school (8.064 units or 90 percent). These madrasahs are mostly managed by Islamic civil 
society (non-profit) foundations, such as Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah—




Table 3.1 Percentages of School and Students Numbers 
Source: based on BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2017, pp. 11-12). 
 
Considering the overall quality of different senior secondary school types, 
people prefer SMA over SMK or madrasah. Moreover, the first choice of most 
children is public secondary school. Many children are forced to enroll in private 
schools only after failing to obtain the national examination score required to enter 
public senior secondary schools, especially those perceived as favorite schools in 
each district. Although there are important exceptions14, SMK and madrasah have 
typically been considered a second, or even the last, option for most families. 
Such a trend is mainly due to the shortcomings of many SMKs in terms of 
their quality, particularly related to teaching and facilities, which is consistent with 
the employees’ perceptions regarding the central weaknesses of SMKs in 
Indonesia (Di Gropello et al., 2011; World Bank, 2010). Furthermore, SMK 
graduates tend to find themselves at a disadvantage when they turn towards higher 
education because of the academic emphasis of HEI entrance tests, including those 
in polytechnics that provide vocational education (OECD, 2015). Such selection 
tests give an advantage to SMA graduates rather than SMK graduates. It is 
important to underscore that SMK students (compared to SMA students, in 
general) tend to come from economically disadvantaged families and, therefore, 
have a higher tendency to drop out for financial reasons (OECD, 2015). 
 
14 The competition to enter a small number of high-quality SMKNs can be tight, which is 
primarily determined by prior academic achievement, i.e., the national exam scores at the 
9th grade. Such SMKs could attract 30 per cent of the top 25 per cent of academic 
achievers in its district (OECD, 2015). A much more limited number of quality Islamic 
schools is also an exception. In 2021 there are only 35 quality Islamic schools managed 
by MoRA throughout Indonesia (i.e., 23 prototype boarding schools, 10 Madrasah Aliyah 
with a special language program, and two pilot vocational Islamic schools), with a total 
capacity of 2.883 students. The selection is centrally conducted by MoRA, including 
academic-skill test, interview, Al Quran reading test, and Arabic and English language 
proficiency test (Caesaria, 2021).  




Public Private Public Private 
Primary 89,5 10,5 87,55 12,45 
Junior secondary 60,38 39,62 74,77 25,23 
General senior secondary (SMA, MA) 49,96 50,04 73,33 26,67 




The great majority of madrasahs have similar conditions. Characterizing 
the madrasahs that are mostly private, Kingham and Parsons (2013, p. 68) note 
that: 
“The majority of private madrasah has a lower income base, fewer resources, 
and poorer facilities than the state-funded schools, and thus deliver a 
significantly lower standard of education. They are disproportionately 
represented in remote or disadvantaged areas and generally have higher 
proportions of poor students than their state school equivalents.” 
 
Many private madrasahs are affordable or even free and serve children 
from low-income families, while few others charge high fees and cater to children 
from wealthy families (Asadullah & Maliki, 2018; Rahman, 2016). Based on the 
government’s 2019 national data of accreditation, only 14 percent of private 
madrasahs were accredited “A” (officially considered eligible ones with sufficient 
quality). In contrast, more than half of public madrasahs obtained an “A” 
accreditation (World Bank, 2020). 
Over the past two decades, after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 
1998, Indonesia has implemented a broad range of education sector reforms. 
Several institutional arrangements have been reformed, mainly intended to 
improve the quality of and the access to compulsory education (Al-Samarrai, 2013; 
Muttaqin, 2018; Tobias, Wales, Syamsulhakim, & Suharti, 2014). Significant 
reforms include decentralizing education management to local governments, 
allocating a minimum of 20 percent of the annual government budget for 
education, providing financial support both to schools and children from 
disadvantaged families, establishing new schools and increasing the number of 
administratively qualified teachers, and improving teachers’ quality and 















Table 3.2 Educational Investments and Reforms 
Educational investments Detailed efforts and/or results  
(at the senior secondary level) 
The establishment of new 
schools  
• The total number of schools rose from 14.260 
units in 2000 to 26.350 units in 2016 (increased 
85 percent in less than 20 years) 
• The increase in the number of vocational schools 
was more massive than that of general/academic 
schools in five years from 2012 to 2016 (24 
percent compared to 8.5 percent) 
• The increase in the number of private vocational 
schools was slightly higher than that of public 
vocational schools during 2012-2016 (30 percent 
compared to 27 percent). 
• The number of public general schools increased 
by 18 percent, while private general schools were 
only 8 percent from 2012 to 2016. 
The massive teacher recruitment During the first nine years of the decentralization of 
educational management (2001-2009), the number 
of teachers (excluding those in Islamic schools) 
rose by 72 percent (compared to 41 percent at the 
primary level and 45 percent at the junior 
secondary level). This increase has reduced 
student-teacher ratios. 
The improvement of teachers’ 
quality and professionalism  
• The Law on Teachers and Lecturers (Law 
14/2005) requires all primary and secondary level 
teachers to hold at least a bachelor’s degree and 
complete a certification process to upgrade 
teacher’s competencies, as the requirements to 
obtain a professional allowance (known as 
tunjangan profesi guru, or TPG). This regulation 
has forced existing teachers to take higher 
education programs.  
• Since 2013, teachers have also been required to 
take a competency test associated with the 2013 
(new) curriculum.  
• The percentage of teachers holding the minimum 
qualification increased from 68.4 percent in 2000 
to 94.03 percent in 2016, with significant gaps 
between regions. 
• In 2019, 41 percent of SMA teachers and 28.5 
SMK teachers were certified. 
The provision of financial 
support to school 
• Since 2005, the central government has provided 
School Operational Assistance or BOS fund, 
allocated to schools based on student number in 
each school, to abolish school fees for all students 




Educational investments Detailed efforts and/or results  
(at the senior secondary level) 
• According to the World Bank (2014), the BOS 
fund has positively impacted enrollment rates, 
especially among students from low-income 
families. When the amount of BOS was increased 
significantly in 2009, household education 
spending decreased, especially among the 
poorest families. 
The provision of financial 
support to disadvantaged 
students 
The “cash transfer for poor students program” 
(known as Program Kartu Indonesia Pintar, or 
KIP), is intended to prevent school dropout and 
relieve the financial burden on poor families to pay 
for schooling. KIP is a national program to help 
children from the poorest 25 percent of households 
by covering indirect educational costs. In 2015 the 
program covered 21 million eligible beneficiaries, 
which has doubled the number of beneficiaries 
covered by BSM, the precursor program. 
Source: based on Ministry of Education and Culture (2021), Ministry of Education and 
Culture (2012), BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2016), Suharti (2013), World Bank (2020), 
World Bank (2014a), OECD (2015), UNICEF (2020). 
 
The existence of several school alternatives and the government’s growing 
investments in the sector have made enormous progress in improving access to 
secondary education (Faisal & Martin, 2019; Jasmina, 2017; Suharti, 2013). This 
improvement can be observed from the significant increase of net enrollment rates 
at the junior secondary level (from 50 percent in 1994 to 78 percent in 2016) and 
senior secondary level (from 33 percent in 1994 to 60 percent in 2016) (Figure 
3.1). Despite the government’s decision to extend the length of compulsory 
education (from 9 to 12 years in 2015), enrollment rates at the senior secondary 
level remain low, with a slight increase between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points 




















Source: based on microdata from the National Socio-Economic Survey (Survei Sosio-
Ekonomi Nasional, Susenas). 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, net enrollment rates for poor households have 
significantly improved, but a substantial gap between the wealthiest (Q5) and 
poorest (Q1) households in access to secondary education remains wide. Given the 
government’s strong commitment to investing significant resources in the 
education sector, access to education at all levels is likely to continue to increase, 
including among children from low-income families. However, the issue lies in 
the quality of Indonesian education, which is still lacking despite various policies 
aimed to improve it. The increase in educational access has only been accompanied 
by a modest improvement in quality (Al-Samarrai, 2013; World Bank, 2020). The 
low quality of Indonesian education can be identified from students’ failures to 
fulfill both national standards, such as the national examination administered by 
the MoEC, and international standards like the OECD’s Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), which assesses the competence of 15-year-old 
students in reading, mathematics, and science. 
Although no longer employed as determinants of student graduation since 
2015, the grade 9 national exam (the final junior secondary year) and grade 12 (the 
final senior secondary level) can still be used as a measure to evaluate the 
fulfillment of educational quality standards. When the minimum passing score set 
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by the government was 55 (out of 100 points), the average score across all subjects 
and school types at the senior secondary level was only 51 points in 2017, 46.72 
points in 2018, and 48.03 points in 2019 (Ministry of Education and Culture, 
2019). This indicates that the academic abilities of Indonesian students, on 
average, were below the standards set by the government. Student performance 
based on the examination scores, and their comparison between school types 
(general, vocational, and Islamic schools) and school status (public and private 
schools) varies considerably across provinces and districts, signaling the varied 
quality of Indonesian schools.15 
Indonesia has participated in PISA tests since 1990, and the results show 
that Indonesian students’ academic abilities are consistently below the averages of 
the participating countries, both OECD members and partner countries. In the 2009 
PISA test, in which 65 countries participated, Indonesia was ranked 58th in 
reading, 63rd in mathematics, and 62nd in science (OECD, 2010). Based on the 
2012 PISA results and data of participating schools provided by the Ministry of 
Education and Culture, the OECD (2015) highlights that senior secondary public 
school students performed better than private school students in all three subjects. 
In its report on the 2018 PISA results, the OECD (2019b, p. 16) states that 
“between 2003-2018 Indonesia enrolled many more 15-year-olds in secondary 
education (i.e., almost 1.8 million, to participate in PISA tests) without sacrificing 
the quality of the education provided.” The 2018 PISA results show the share of 
low achievers in all three subjects (below Level 2) was 51.7 percent, while the 
proportion of top performers in at least one subject (Level 5 or 6) was below 1 
percent (OECD, 2019b). 
The above shows that most Indonesian schools still suffer from lower 
quality, despite the significant allocation of financial resources (Kurniawati, 
Suryadarma, Bima, & Yusrina, 2018). The massive increases in resources 
allocated to the sector in the last two decades—for instance, to establish new 
infrastructures and facilities, increase the supply of teachers, and provide 
 
15 On the 2018 national exam for senior secondary level (grade 12), the gap between the 
three top performing provinces and the three lowest performing provinces was 21 points 
(on a 100-point scale). Among the 34 provinces, only 4 provinces (i.e., DKI Jakarta, DI 
Yogyakarta, Central Java, and Riau Islands) had an average score above the minimum 
passing score of 55. The results are even lower for vocational schools and Islamic schools 




enormous teacher allowances—have yet to meaningfully improve the quality of 
education. Lower student-teacher ratios have not increased learning (OECD, 
2015), and there is no convincing evidence of any difference between certified and 
uncertified teachers in their actual competencies or their impact on student learning 
outcomes. Moreover, Indonesia still struggles to provide equitable quality 
education for all its citizens, marked by a high variation of education quality 
between regions and school types (Suharti, 2013; Tobias et al., 2014). 
International measures also indicate prominent learning inequalities in 
Indonesia. Based on the 2011 PIRLS data that assessed students’ reading skills, 
the World Bank (2019) shows that the achievement gap between the poorest-
quintile students and the wealthiest-quintile students in Indonesia was significant 
(35.4 points) and tended to be growing. A similar condition was also found in the 
PISA tests. The OECD points to persistent gaps between socio-economically 
advantaged and disadvantaged students in Indonesia, such as in reading skills. The 
performance difference between the two groups in the PISA test was 52 score 
points in 2018 and 44 score points in 2009 (OECD, 2019a).  
Given the uneven distribution of education quality among regions, school 
types, and school status, such a learning inequality may reflect a more severe 
problem: educational inequality. The latter is a condition in which children with 
different socioeconomic statuses or other conditions obtain education services with 
a highly varying quality gap. Increasing access to schools is insufficient when it is 
not accompanied by a more equitable improvement in the quality of education. 
There have been more attempts to increase access to schools alone without 
addressing the causes of systematic educational inequality, such as institutional 
demand for selectivity manifested in the merit-based admission system.  
The decentralization in the governance of primary and secondary 
education is one of the significant reforms. After the larger authorities to manage 
those education levels have been decentralized to the provincial and district 
governments since 2001 (Heyward, Cannon, & Sarjono, 2011; Tobias et al., 2014), 
the local governments have played a more central role in managing and financing 
education provisions and in specifying sectoral priorities. Therefore, variations 
among local governments in providing adequate access, equity, and quality 
education can be more easily observed (Al-Samarrai, 2013; Muttaqin, 2018; 




for inclusivity that increases vulnerable children’s access to quality education, 
while maintaining the mainstream practice of merit admission, have caused public 
schools to undergo an institutional contradiction. Because of decentralization, 
schools in different localities may experience diverse levels of such institutional 
complexity.  
The last two subsections of this chapter describe the case city in greater 
detail, where the emerging institutional demand for inclusivity imposed onto the 
public schools resulted in the coexistence of two conflicting demands. Because of 
the local government’s willingness to put inclusive education into practice in 2008 
(Hanjarwati & Aminah, 2014), the public secondary schools in the city with 
competitive admissions were also pressured to provide special opportunities for 
socioeconomically disadvantaged children. Hence, the institutional contradiction 
in the selected city was more salient than those in other districts16 and was therefore 
considered an appropriate research setting. Furthermore, the public senior 
secondary schools in the city were chosen as the cases because the tensions of 
those two conflicting demands were more experienced by schools at this education 
level, as explained in-depth below. 
 
3.2 The Long-existing Demand for Selectivity 
As mentioned, because of fully government-supported resources and higher 
academic achievements of most of their graduates, public schools in Indonesia are, 
in general, considered to be of higher quality, despite substantial variation among 
schools within and across provinces (OECD, 2013b, 2015). Although local 
governments do not publish any list of “quality schools,” students and parents tend 
to be influenced by public schools’ reputations in each district. Consequently, the 
competition for placement in public secondary schools, commonly perceived as 
low-cost-better-quality ones, is intense in most districts.  
 
16 The studied city was nationally recognized as a leading district in introducing inclusive 
education in Indonesia. The city government had issued a local regulation on the 
implementation of inclusive education before the central government set it up in the 




Until 2016, admission to public schools at both junior and senior secondary 
levels was based entirely on students’ prior academic ability.17 This practice has 
long been applied nationally since 1950 and cannot be separated from the final 
examination system, i.e., the national examinations taken by students in the last 
year of elementary school (grade 6), junior secondary (grade 9), and senior 
secondary (grade 12). Although the final examination system itself changes quite 
often, particularly related to its management and its usage as an evaluation 
instrument (see Table 3.3), its result (i.e., student scores) has consistently been 
used to “rank students for competitive entry to the next level of education” (OECD, 
2015, p. 313). Although the national exam results have no longer determined 
student graduation since 2015, they are still used in student admissions to public 
schools at the junior and senior secondary levels. 
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17 In 2017 the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) decided to change the public 
school admission system, which was previously based entirely on the prior academic 
achievement (i.e., the Grade 6 national exam scores for junior secondary and the Grade 9 
exam scores for senior secondary) to one prioritizing the student’s house-to-school 
distance. The new admission system, commonly known as the “school zoning system”, 
allows the children living near public schools to enroll. This new system is expected, 
particularly by the central government, to address inequity in access to quality education 
across the country. More specifically, this new system is intended to provide more low-
performing, poor students access to the public schools. Based on their study conducted in 
junior secondary schools in Yogyakarta, Berkhout and Tresnatri (2020a, 2020b) show the 
results of the new system and persistent problems occurred under the new system 
implementation, i.e., such as the reluctance of low-performing, poor children to choose 
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Source: based on Puspendik Kemdikbud (2018), Alhadza and Zulkifli (2017), OECD (2015) with 
emphasis. 
 
While only 43 percent of students in OECD countries attend schools with 
selective admission, 67 percent of Indonesia’s students attend such schools 
(OECD, 2013b, p. 78). Under this competition-based admission system, public 
secondary schools in Indonesia have traditionally been occupied by students with 
higher academic scores (Newhouse & Beegle, 2006; Newhouse & Suryadarma, 
2011). The system groups students based on their academic scores so that each 
public school always has relatively homogeneous classes containing students with 
relatively similar academic abilities. Moreover, as highlighted by the OECD 
(2013b), 35 percent of Indonesian students attended a school whose principal 
reported that the school would likely transfer students to another school because 
of low academic achievement, behavioral problems and/or special needs.  
Selectivity is also stimulated by competition among schools on academic 
matters (Maulana & Yudhistira, 2019). Such a competition is commonly measured 
by student scores in the national examination and the number of successful 
graduates entering public HEIs. While the former was based on the government’s 
official indicators in evaluating schools, the latter was frequently considered by 




graduates entering public HEIs is based particularly on academic scores during the 
senior secondary school period (formally referred to as Seleksi Nasional Masuk 
Perguruan Tinggi Negeri/SNMPTN), which differs from test-based admissions 
(Ikhsan, Massie, & Kuncoro, 2019; Logli, 2015; OECD, 2015). The school ranking 
that shows graduates’ academic achievement, published annually by the local 
government, has always intensified school competition. Therefore, schools have 
more adequate resources to compete when they have more students with higher 
academic abilities. As highlighted by Newhouse and Beegle (2006, p. 529), 
“higher-quality inputs at public secondary schools promote higher test scores” and 
increases school achievement as a whole. In short, the logic of competition 
associated with the institutional order of the market has generated the demand for 
selectivity (OECD, 2013b). 
At the senior secondary level, general senior-secondary schools (SMAs), 
particularly those fully managed by the government or public schools (SMANs), 
are the best track to be competitively admitted in public HEIs. The fact that 
graduates of this type of school dominate the proportion of students admitted to 
public HEIs in Indonesia—more than 65 percent (Moeliodihardjo, 2014)—has 
generated a widely shared assumption that SMANs are of higher quality, as 
compared to both private schools (particularly government-dependent private 
schools; see Stern and Smith, 2016)  and other types of public schools at the same 
level of education, i.e., public vocational schools (SMKNs) and public madrasah 
or Islamic schools managed by the government (MANs).  
Moreover, because of their reputations (primarily related to the number of 
graduates successfully admitted in highly ranked public universities), few SMANs 
in each district have become a stronger magnet for the best prospective students. 
For the first time in the 1980s, such favorite schools existed when the government 
developed model schools in several districts. During the same period, the 
government established a new admission system based on student scores of the 
national examination (EBTANAS), replacing the school entrance examination 
system. As a result, those model schools, considered ones with better quality, 
became preferred choices for high-performing students. 
From 2007 to 2010, favorite schools were designated as the pilot of 
international standard schools (Rintisan Sekolah Bertaraf Internasional/ RSBI). 




facilitated by the government to adopt the educational curriculum and evaluation 
systems of OECD member countries (OECD standards). They were allowed by the 
government to adopt a more selective admission system, that is, by considering 
prior academic ability and/or entrance test scores. However, the public widely 
criticized this system, and the Constitutional Court then annulled this system’s 
regulatory basis (Dharmaningtias, 2013). The Court agreed that the adoption of 
International Standard Schools had violated the principle of “Education for All” 
and enlarged social gaps among students. In 2011, the government then decided to 
(re-)apply the single standard of national education for all schools; hence, the 
national examination score is the only criterion of selection in public schools. The 
competition-based admission system using national exam scores remained 
unchanged when the government changed the educational curriculum into the most 
recent version in 2013. 
Unfortunately, the use of a competition-based admission system in 
Indonesian public schools has caused equity problems. This is consistent with 
OECD’s study concluding that “the more differentiated and selective education 
systems tend to show not only much larger variation in school performance, but 
also larger performance differences between students from more and less 
advantaged family backgrounds [who study in separate schools or tracks]” 
(OECD, 2004, p. 264, with emphasis). Indonesian public secondary schools were 
dominated by students who had not only higher test scores but also came from 
wealthier households (Newhouse & Beegle, 2006) and/or better-educated parents 
(Newhouse & Suryadarma, 2011). Considered cheaper but better in providing 
higher opportunities to be accepted in public HEIs, SMANs are always more 
favored by Indonesian children and occupied mainly by those with better social 
and economic support to obtain higher academic scores (Newhouse & 
Suryadarma, 2011).  
Meanwhile, low-performing students, particularly those categorized as 
academically at-risk, such as children from low-income families or those with 
disabilities, have less opportunity to be accepted in such selective schools (Stern 
& Smith, 2016; UNESCO, 2009a). Consequently, some of them voluntarily choose 
other types of public schools (i.e., SMKNs, MANs, MAKs) or private schools, while 




As highlighted by the OECD (2012b), particularly at the senior secondary 
school level, the socio-economic background of Indonesian students who attend 
publicly managed schools tends to be more advantaged than that of students who 
attend privately managed schools (p.26). By categorizing and comparing 
Indonesian private schools, Stern and Smith (2016) note that children with 
socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to attend 
government-dependent private schools, which in general are of a lower quality 
than government-independent ones. The latter tend to serve more advantaged 
children with much better educational environments and resources. Furthermore, 
Newhouse and Suryadarma (2011, p. 318) showed that “children of highly 
educated parents tend to select general schools, rather than vocational schools; 
(and) private vocational schools are the last resort, serving students with the lowest 
test scores and the least educated parents.” These facts indicate an inequality 
problem caused by the availability of many school alternatives (but with quality 
disparity) and the use of competition-based-admission system which does not 
benefit vulnerable and academically at-risk students. 
 
3.3 The Emerging Demand for Inclusivity 
Based on the logic of competition, the institutional demand for selectivity might 
be part of the government’s efforts to reduce the quality gap among schools and 
increase the quality of education in Indonesia. However, as mentioned above, this 
causes equity issues related to vulnerable children’s access to quality education. 
This global issue has raised the resolution of inclusive education which supports 
the principle of “Education for All” by encouraging regular schools to accept all 
school-aged children, including ones with disabilities, to learn together in the same 
social environment (Powell & Pfahl, 2019; Richardson & Powell, 2011). This new 
demand for inclusivity requires that schools accommodate all children, regardless 
of socio-economic background or educational need, by reducing marginalization 
and exclusion of vulnerable children from and within schools. The aim of inclusive 
education is to increase the access of vulnerable children to school and fulfill 
equality in education (Andreozzi & Pietrocarlo, 2017). Because the management 
of primary and secondary education provision has been decentralized to lower 
levels of government (Al-Samarrai, 2013; Muttaqin, 2018; Tobias et al., 2014), the 




2009a) depending on the strength of local governments’ commitment and 
willingness. 
This research study was conducted in the city nationally recognized as a 
leading district in introducing inclusive education, which issued a local regulation 
on implementing inclusive education before the central government made it a 
national mandate (Mulyadi, 2017). To improve vulnerable children's access to 
public schools, which were usually competitive in their admission, the city 
government implemented three programs to encourage public schools to improve 
their inclusivity and accessibility practices for three different groups of students.  
The two programs were purely local ones initiated by the local government. 
The first was the Quota Program (a pseudonym18), in which the local government 
established a special quota-based admission system for poor students who want to 
study in public schools despite low academic achievement. The second was called 
the Inclusion Program (not the exact real name), in which the local government 
developed initial supports to educate students with disabilities together with other 
students in regular schools.  
In contrast, the third program called Afirmasi Pendidikan Menengah 
(abbreviated as ADEM; hereafter called the Affirmative Action Program) was 
developed by the central government to provide an exceptional opportunity for 
children living in Papua and West Papua (the most disadvantaged provinces in 
Indonesia) to attend schools in developed provinces. The studied city is one of the 
program locations that has accommodated many of the Papuan students.  
 
3.3.1 The Quota Program 
First implemented in 2010, the Quota Program was principally meant to increase 
the number of children from low-income families attending public schools in the 
city, especially at junior and senior high school levels (Fatony, 2011; Sidik, 2014). 
Because of their competitive admission, public schools at these education levels 
were usually much less accessible for low-performing children. The problem is 
that less advantaged students (i.e., those with low socioeconomic status) are at 
higher risk of low academic performance than their more advantaged peers, as 
 




commonly found in Indonesia and many other countries (OECD, 2013a; Torpey-
Saboe, 2018).  
Although some children from low-income families have high academic 
abilities, many others do not perform well because of the lack of economic and 
social resources.19 Consequently, such children’s access to public secondary 
schools, widely perceived as quality schools with a meritocratic admission system, 
tended to be lower.20 To increase such children’s opportunity to attend public 
secondary schools, the Quota Program was designed as a special admission system 
with a much lower competition level than regular admission. The government 
provides tuition fees and a monthly scholarship for three years for those accepted 
through the program. 
As a mandatory measure, the program represented a coercive institutional 
influence with tight (or high specificity) prescriptions that did not allow school 
actors’ discretion in its implementation. Depending on the quota annually set by 
the government, each school must provide five to nine percent of its capacity for 
poor children, who are the city residents and officially registered as a member of 
a low-income family, to be accepted through this less competitive admission 
system. Through this special admission system, such students have a higher chance 
 
19 The PISA results indicate that socio-economic status significantly influenced academic 
performance of students in all PISA participating countries (i.e., the OECD countries and 
partner countries, including Indonesia), in which socio-economically advantaged students 
(compared to disadvantaged students) obtained higher scores in mathematics, science, 
and reading. In Indonesia, the performance gap between these two groups was most 
evident in reading: 52 score points in 2018 and 44 points in 2009. Despite their lower 
performance, some 14 percent of poor students in Indonesia scored amongst the highest 
performers in reading within the country (OECD, 2019: 4). 
20 Neither national nor local data, showing the proportion of poor students in each type of 
senior secondary schools, are available. However, as mentioned, several studies have 
clearly highlighted this educational inequality issue in Indonesia (e.g., OECD, 2015; the 
World Bank, 2020; Stern & Smith, 2016; Heyneman & Stern, 2014; Newhouse & 
Suryadarma, 2011). The World Bank (2020:49) states that “schools attended by poor 
students have a lower proportion of classrooms in good condition and are less likely to 
be A-accredited. The differences in the characteristics of schools catering to the poor and 
the nonpoor increases as students reach upper secondary school.” Similarly, OECD 
(2012b) highlights that the socio-economic background of Indonesian students attending 
public schools tends to be more advantaged than that of students attending private 
schools, particularly government-dependent private schools (Stern and Smith, 2016). 
Furthermore, private vocational schools tend to be the last resort accommodating students 





of being accepted in public schools since they only need to compete with other 
poor students applying to the same school. Those with a low academic score can 
be accepted as long as the chosen schools’ quota has not yet been fulfilled (Sidik, 
2014). These accepted students must be served together with other students 
enrolled through regular admission.  
 
3.3.2 The Inclusion Program 
Children with disabilities are the other marginalized group with limited access to 
schools. Initially, the special school21 was the only choice for such children to 
access educational services. On November 30, 2011, Indonesia ratified the UN’s 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Article 24 states that 
persons with disabilities are not excluded from educational services and can access 
inclusive, quality, and free primary and secondary education on an equal basis with 
others in the communities in which they live. Five years after the ratification, 
Indonesia’s central government issued the Law on Disabilities (No. 8/2016) and 
needed two years afterward to provide more operational regulations. Even though 
in 2009 a lower-level regulation of inclusive education for children with special 
needs had been introduced (i.e., Ministry of Education Regulation No.70), the local 
efforts to fulfill the right of persons with disabilities to educational services in 
Indonesian provinces and districts varied greatly. Moreover, few schools showed 
the willingness to adopt a moderate model of inclusivity by adapting the inclusion 
services to the readiness of individual schools (Andriana & Evans, 2017).  
The studied city was nationally recognized as one of the few pioneers of 
inclusive school development in Indonesia (Helen Keller International, 2013). The 
city was chosen as a pilot project of inclusive education development managed by 
the cooperation between the government of Indonesia (including at provincial and 
district levels) and international institutions, such as the Norwegian Government 
through Braillo Norway (1998-2002) and Helen Keller International (1978-1984) 
(Heung & Grossman, 2007) as well as Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund in Germany (since 
2006) (Pertiwi & Lissa, 2009). The local government’s more active effort began 
in 2008 by issuing a local regulation of inclusive education, a year before the 
Ministry introduced its national-level regulation. 
 




The second program developed by the local government is in line with the 
global agenda of inclusive education, that is, by encouraging regular (public and 
private) schools in the city to accept and facilitate students with disabilities to learn 
together with other students. The local government gradually increased the number 
of regular schools appointed as schools providing inclusive education (Rahayu & 
Dewi, 2013). In 2014, 57 regular schools, from kindergarten to senior secondary 
level, were officially registered as inclusive schools in the city, including 5 (of 11) 
public schools at the senior secondary level. The local government supports the 
so-called “inclusive schools” by providing financial resources for students with 
disabilities and schools and training regular teachers to educate such students in an 
inclusive school environment. Teachers at the special schools located in the city 
(and other districts within the same province) are also empowered to support 
regular-school teachers at the appointed schools (Pertiwi & Lissa, 2009).  
The specificity of this program, however, is quite different from those 
enforced by the Quota Program. While the Quota Program is a tight institutional 
demand that leaves no room for discretion, the Inclusion Program can be 
categorized as a moderately tight demand or one with ambiguous prescriptions. 
Although the local government encourages all the schools to be inclusive, and the 
public schools in the city are particularly not allowed to reject students with 
disabilities, it does not set a specific quota. Neither does it establish a special 
admission system for such students. Furthermore, the government’s strategy of 
gradually adding the number of regular schools to be officially appointed as 
inclusive schools in the city, as highlighted by Rahayu and Dewi (2013), points to 
the program’s ambiguity. Consequently, the adoption of this strategy weakens the 
program’s power in encouraging all the schools to become inclusive. This 
program’s intent is in accordance with the enthusiasm and ideas of inclusive 
education, a normative institutional pressure or an idealized practice of education 
stipulated by both international human rights law and the Indonesian Constitution 
but still lacking operational clarity. 
Significant challenges have consistently emerged during the 
implementation of the program, such as low awareness and understandings of the 
orientations of inclusive education and resistances from both internal school 
stakeholders and the wider community regarding the presence of children with 
disabilities in regular schools (Pertiwi & Lissa, 2009; Utomo, 2014; Villeneuve et 




government’s efforts, the case city was appointed by UNESCO in 2013 as a model 
for the development of inclusive schools that is not only to be replicated across 
Indonesian schools but also in Southeast Asia (Muryanto, 2013; Villeneuve et al., 
2016). 
 
3.3.3 The Affirmative Action Program  
Unlike the two other programs, the Affirmative Action Program (a pseudonym but 
similar to the original name) was initiated and developed by the central 
government. This program was intended to increase the access of senior secondary 
school-age children from the least developed provinces in Indonesia, i.e., Papua 
and Papua Barat, to quality education by selecting and sending them to the schools 
on the islands of Java and Bali (UP4B, 2014). The two provinces were chosen as 
the target since they were ranked lowest in the human development index (HDI) 
and have a low literacy rate and inadequate educational service provision (UP4B, 
2014). While the national literacy rate average of the above 15 age group reached 
93.25 percent in 2012, Papua Province had a literacy rate of 65.69 percent, which 
was the worst in Indonesia (Badan Statistik Indonesia, 2012). In general, 
educational services in Papua, from primary to senior secondary level, suffer from 
the lack of teacher quantity and quality, proper learning materials, and appropriate 
infrastructure (Myriad Research, 2015; UNCEN, UNIPA, SMERU, BPS, & 
UNICEF, 2012; UP4B, 2014). Therefore, the Affirmative Action Program is an 
integral part of the government’s efforts to accelerate social and economic 
development in the provinces. 
Started in 2013, the affirmative secondary education program (ADEM) 
sends 500 students from 42 districts in the two provinces to 179 senior-secondary 
schools in 6 other provinces to the islands of Java and Bali. The studied city was 
one of the participating districts which, in the first year of program 
implementation, accepted a total of 90 Papuan students; the largest number, 
compared with those accepted in other participating districts at that time. At both 
provincial and district levels, the local government invited both public and private 
schools in the city to voluntarily take part in the program by accepting those 
Papuan students. This indicated that the program had a low-level specificity.  
The Ministry of Education and Culture makes available financial resources 




costs. Because Papuan students come with different cultural backgrounds and 
traditions, assimilation and character-building are integral to the program. The 
participating schools are responsible not only for both academic and non-academic 
activities at school but also for after-school activities of the Papuan students. They 
are educated together with—and have the same responsibility as—other students. 
After finishing three years at senior secondary school, the Papuan students are 
encouraged to continue their studies at an HEI through a similar program, entitled 
ADiK (Afirmasi Pendidikan Tinggi—Affirmative Action Program at HEI level). 
 
3.4 The Tensions between the Logics of Inclusivity and Selectivity 
The two contradicting institutional demands are first derived from the contrasting 
models (or logics) in educational service provisions. In this case, the models are 
comprehensive schooling versus educational tracking (Skopek et al., 2019; 
Triventi et al., 2016). The strengthening of the global norm of inclusive education, 
which has shifted its focus from including students with disabilities in regular 
schools to fully inclusive education provisions by ensuring education for all 
children with different backgrounds and conditions in schools (UNESCO, 2009b), 
increased these tensions (Powell, 2014).  
The comprehensive model promotes inclusive educational provision for 
heterogeneous students as adopted with varied applications in secondary schools 
across the Nordic countries (Jenkins et al., 2008; Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2016; 
Rudolphi & Erikson, 2016; Wahler et al., 2016). In contrast, the educational 
tracking model applied in Germany, Hungary, Austria, Netherlands, Japan, Korea, 
and Singapore is generally characterized by sorting out or grouping students based 
on interests and academic abilities (i.e., prior school achievements), placing them 
into various types of secondary schools or classes with different curricula, 
orientations, and even quality standards (Betts, 2011; Buchholz et al., 2016; Horn 
et al., 2016; Jenkins et al., 2008; Kruse, 2018; M. H. Lee & Gopinathan, 2018; 
OECD, 2013b; Triventi et al., 2016). In fact, some countries (e.g., Germany, 
Austria, Hungary, and the Netherlands) apply school differentiation and 
stratification for placing students into separate schools as early as age ten 





The comprehensive model tends to result in schools and classes containing 
students with variations in their academic abilities. In contrast, the educational 
tracking model is characterized by school differentiation in which each school 
contains students with relatively homogeneous academic abilities. The trade-off 
between these two models is perceived to be between equality and efficiency 
(Thiemann, 2017; van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010). The expected benefit of 
tracking models is to enable more conducive learning environments in which 
schools can efficiently deliver focused curricula and learning instructions to 
students with certain needs, talents, and capacities, thereby increasing overall 
students’ academic performance (Betts, 2011; Booij, Leuven, & Oosterbeek, 2017; 
Duflo, Dupas, & Kremer, 2011; Krueger, 1999; OECD, 2004). As highlighted by 
Hallinan (1994, p. 79), “a good fit between a student’s ability and the level of 
instruction is believed to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
instructional process.” Furthermore, tracking systems allow higher-level schools 
or classes to challenge high-performing students and lower-level tracks to provide 
more attention and resources to low-performing students or those with learning 
difficulties or special needs (Duflo et al., 2011; Francis et al., 2019).  
However, it has been criticized and empirically proven that the tracking 
system can lead to inequalities (Chzhen et al., 2018; Hanushek & WÖßmann, 
2006; Hattie, 2009; F. T. Pfeffer, 2008). Based on research conducted in nine 
countries, van de Werfhorst (2018) suggests that such inequalities can be reduced 

















Table 3.4 Institutional Contradiction Related to School Admission 
Dimensions Demand for Selectivity Demand for Inclusivity 
The logic or 
educational model/ 
approach behind the 
institutional 
demand 
Ability tracking system The comprehensive school 
system and the international 
norm of inclusive education  
The manifestation School differentiation or 
segregation: schools provide 
specific curricula, programs, 
classes, or tracks for children 
with homogeneous abilities. 
Inclusive education: schools 
provide comprehensive 
curricula or educational 




and conditions.  
The expected 
benefit 
Enabling conditions in which 
teachers can efficiently target 
instruction to students’ needs 
Providing equitable access of 
all children to quality 
education 
Basic principle(s) 
and/or assumptions  
Students achieve better if they 
are grouped based on their 
academic ability and placed in 
classes/ programs containing 
those who are more alike with 
each other, especially 
regarding existing capabilities. 
• Lower-performing 
children may benefit from 
mixing with higher-
performing peers without 
hampering the latter (e.g., 
the latter can be peer tutors 
for the former).  
• Inclusive education 
enables children with 
different abilities and 
conditions to learn how to 
accept differences, respect 
each other, and live 
together in heterogeneous 
social environments. 
Perspective on the 
rights and 
opportunities of 
children to access 
educational services 
Children have the right and 
equal opportunities to access 
educational services most 
suitable for their abilities, 
needs, conditions, and 
preferences. 
Regardless of their different 
abilities, conditions, and 
socioeconomic backgrounds, 
all children have the right to 
quality education. 
Perspective on the 
access of vulnerable 
children to school 
Vulnerable children (e.g., ones 
with disabilities) can be served 
in special schools separated 
from regular schools. 
Such children can be served 
together with other students 
in regular schools by 
providing additional services 
to fulfill their special needs 
and customizing learning 
activities and evaluations. 
Perspective on the 
efficiency of 
Academically learning 
activities can be more efficient 
with students grouped more 
Efficiency occurs when 
schools or classes contain 




Dimensions Demand for Selectivity Demand for Inclusivity 
teaching and 
learning activities  
homogeneously because the 
classes are easier to manage.  
academic abilities and 
conditions. Teachers can 
encourage students to help 
each other in learning 
activities and motivate 
children from socio-
economically disadvantaged 
families by providing them 
with better learning 
environments and resources.  
Benchmarks Germany, Hungary, Austria, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, 
China, and Singapore 
Nordic countries (Finland, 
Norway, Denmark, and 
Sweden) 
Source: based on Triventi et al. (2016), Dovigo (2017), Andreozzi and Pietrocarlo (2017), 
Heung and Grossman (2007), Robert (2010), OECD (2004; 2012), (Francis et al., 2019), 
and Oakes and Wells (2004). 
 
 
In contrast, comprehensive school systems focus on educational equality by 
stressing the importance of providing equitable access for all children to quality 
education. Although managing learning activities in heterogeneous classes 
requires more effort, the proponents of comprehensive school systems argue that 
it can be an efficient approach because of the opportunities of joint learning that 
can enable positive peer-group effects. Low-achieving students, often those from 
less advantaged families, can benefit socially and academically (i.e., motivation 
and better classroom discussions) from interactions with enthusiastic and higher-
achieving peers in heterogeneous classes (Hanushek & WÖßmann, 2006; Robert, 
2010; Triventi et al., 2016). Moreover, inclusive education promotes behavioral 
outcomes beyond academic aspects. The opportunities within inclusive education 
range from being “a resource that helps us cope with the complex society we live 
in” (Dovigo, 2017, p. xi) to reproducing an inclusive and democratic society 
(Ainscow & Miles, 2008; Powell, 2014), as well as being a community that can 
accept social differences and uphold the principle of anti-discrimination. 
Another essential difference between comprehensive and tracking 
educational systems is their perspective on children’s access to educational 
services. Tracked systems operate on the recognition that children can access 
educational services that are most suitable for their preferences, abilities, needs, 
and conditions (Oakes & Wells, 2004), which can legitimize school segregation or 




Meanwhile, comprehensive educational systems acknowledge that quality 
education is the right of all children, regardless of their different backgrounds, 
abilities, and conditions (Richardson & Powell, 2011; Slee, 2001; UNESCO, 
1994). 
These two systems also differ in their perspective on how to fulfill the right 
of children with disabilities to access education. While tracked systems require 
such children to be placed in special schools separated from regular schools to 
obtain unique educational treatments, comprehensive systems embrace such 
children within regular schools (Richardson & Powell, 2011). In regular schools, 
as prescribed by the proponents of inclusive education, while children with 
disabilities can benefit from the school environment’s inclusiveness, schools can 
provide additional services to support their special needs and customize learning 
activities and evaluations to be adapted to their conditions (Suleymanov, 2015). At 
this point, these two different streams of educational equality ideas, each of which 
historically had a different focus and separate path of development, now have the 
same concerns. A fully inclusive education system that expands the focus of 
inclusive education, from giving special treatment to children with disabilities to 
promoting inclusion for all children regardless of their socio-economic conditions, 
is matched with the global goal of providing education for all (Powell, 2014). This 
shift also aligns with the purpose of comprehensive school systems that idealize 
the elimination of school differentiations and segregations.  
Triventi et al. (2016) identify several forms of between-school 
differentiations, categorized as formal and informal differentiations. Referring to 
“regulated forms of diversity that are recognized by law and are visible in school 
certificates and qualifications” (Triventi et al., 2016, p. 11), formal differentiations 
include ones based on the owner status (public vs. private schools), the school 
specializations (general/academic vs. vocational schools), and the educational 
programs provided in different types of schools. In contrast, informal 
differentiations refer to contextual features of individual schools such as school 
ranking or reputation, resources, and student composition that may indicate school 
quality.  
Both formal and informal school differentiations may become problematic 
when children from less advantaged families are more likely to be placed in less 




children’s personal and professional future (OECD, 2012a; Skopek et al., 2019; 
Triventi et al., 2016). These phenomena of social inequality in education, 
particularly at the senior secondary level, have been highlighted by several studies, 
such as in Germany (Buchholz et al., 2016), Hungary (Horn et al., 2016), and Italy 
(Contini & Triventi, 2016).  
The Indonesian educational system at the senior secondary level has also 
been characterized by both formal and informal school differentiations, in which 
children were tracked by ability. Public school admissions were run based on 
competition, in which high-performing children competed for reputable public 
schools. As highlighted by the OECD, Indonesia is one of the countries with a 
school admission system that allows for school competition. While fewer than 50 
percent of students in countries adopting the comprehensive secondary school 
system (such as Norway and Finland) attend schools that compete with others for 
students, over 90 percent of students in Indonesia attend such schools (OECD, 
2013b, pp. 134-135, with emphasis). This competition is more obvious at the 
senior secondary school level, where a tracked educational system or school 
differentiation is adopted. Therefore, the tension between the two demands is more 
pronounced at this level of education, particularly in public schools, because of 
tighter competition involving both students (competition for schools perceived to 
be of better quality) and schools (competition for prospective students).  
The formal differentiation of senior secondary schools in Indonesia are 
characterized by school providership (public vs. private schools), school 
specialization (SMA or general/academic vs. SMK or vocational schools), and 
school types (faith schools—madrasah and religion-based private schools vs. non-
faith schools; as well as regular vs. special schools). However, between-school 
differentiations in the country are also featured by informal aspects. The most 
common informal feature differentiating (public) schools at secondary levels is 
school reputation, which is mainly determined by student academic achievements, 
i.e., the percentage of graduates successfully accepted in public universities and 
the national examination scores. Children and their parents prefer SMANs with 
great academic reputations. Ability tracking in the form of a selection-based 
admission system (i.e., based on prior academic achievement) creates a 
segmentation in which high-performing students dominate such schools. In 
contrast, their peers with lower academic abilities are overrepresented in schools 




country, SMANs in the city (13 percent of the total capacity of various senior 
secondary schools in the city) are contested by prospective students. 
Selectivity or ability tracking is the source of inequality with regard to 
educational opportunities in Indonesia. Furthermore, a competition-based 
admission system can affect differences in social composition between secondary 
schools (OECD, 2013a). Children with a disadvantaged socioeconomic 
background are more likely to attend less preferred schools (mostly alternative 
private schools) after unsuccessful entry into the public school system. Research 
conducted in Indonesia reveals that family background (parental education and 
income) has a fundamental impact on the type of school attended (Bedi & Garg, 
2000; Newhouse & Suryadarma, 2011) and students’ academic performance 
(OECD, 2013a; Torpey-Saboe, 2018). Parents with higher education or those 
wealthier can boost their children’s opportunities to attend public secondary 
schools by providing additional coaching and/or tutoring (Bedi & Garg, 2000) and 
a more conducive home environment for learning and academic achievement 
(Newhouse & Beegle, 2006). Parents who place greater value on education are 
also more likely to send their children to public schools, which are more favorably 
and generally viewed as higher quality in Indonesia.  
More motivated students or those from socioeconomically advantaged 
families are more interested in enrolling in and have a greater chance of attending 
public schools (Bedi & Garg, 2000). Meanwhile, vulnerable students, such as those 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds or with disabilities, are particularly 
affected by academic selection. In contrast to those from wealthier families, this 
group tends to have limited resources and support that would boost their chances 
of acceptance to such selective schools, and many of them must choose a lower 
quality school and even with higher costs. Studies also confirmed the influence of 
parental socioeconomic characteristics on children’s educational opportunities and 
academic achievement in many other countries (Buchholz et al., 2016; Bukodi & 
Goldthorpe, 2013; M. Lee & Morris, 2016; M. H. Lee & Gopinathan, 2018; 
Robert, 2010; Schnepf, 2003).  
Affirmative actions are required to increase vulnerable children’s access to 
public schools. Following the principles of inclusive education (Andreozzi & 
Pietrocarlo, 2017; Dovigo, 2017; Heung & Grossman, 2007; Powell, 2014), the 




encouraging the schools to accept and educate all children—including those who 
are likely to have not only low academic scores but also diverse needs, 
backgrounds, and abilities. This situation has raised tensions and inevitably 
fostered the coexistence of the two conflicting demands: the long-existing demand 
for selectivity and the emerging demand for inclusivity. The latter contradicts and 
challenges the widely adopted (or institutionalized) norms that have guided the 
competition-based school admission tradition. 
The flaring tensions in Indonesia are similar to those in many other 
countries, particularly in Latin America, Asia, and Africa (Richardson & Powell, 
2011). Such friction has emerged from the contradictions between the two 
institutional logics in educational service provisions. The logic of segregation 
manifests itself in tracked educational systems that focus on selection and 
competition. In contrast, the logic of inclusion is found in comprehensive school 
systems and inclusive education norms that pay more attention to equality of 
opportunity. Although inequalities in educational opportunities have attracted 
international attention and many efforts have been developed to overcome the 
issues, school segregation is still the dominant, legitimate, and influencing 
organizational modes of educational service provisions (Powell, 2014; Richardson 
& Powell, 2011). 
The coexistence of these contradicting demands can be understood as the 
implication of both logics’ simultaneous institutionalization at international, 
national, and local levels. Richardson and Powell (2011) highlight the paradox 
resulting from institutional forces with different directions, i.e., the simultaneous 
diffusion of segregated schooling and inclusive education. In many countries, the 
adoption of inclusive education does not automatically reduce or replace 
segregation practices (Powell, 2014). Moreover, the educational reforms face 
fierce resistance by the implementers, especially teachers and school managers, 
who spark local conflicts involving the proponents of segregation and inclusion. 
Therefore, many governments have chosen to adopt inclusive education systems 
gradually, namely through pilot schools or regional trials. Such approaches, 
however, have very often thrust schools into experiencing the coexistence of those 
contradicting logics (Biermann & Powell, 2016; Powell, 2014).  
The increasing demand for improving school performance by 




to the strengthening of competition, which can positively encourage school quality 
improvement. At the same time, however, it can also strengthen schools’ tendency 
toward admission selectivity, a typical characteristic of the tracked systems. The 
use of benchmarks, league tables, and rankings—both formally and informally—
has become increasingly popular at all levels. Examples include the OECD-PISA 
studies (international level), the mean scores of national examinations, and the 
percentage of school graduates successfully accepted in public universities based 
on their academic achievements in senior secondary school (national and local 
levels in the Indonesian case). Such measures encourage schools to opt for high-
performing children as they are the necessary resources to become instant winners 
in a league table at the local level. This has advanced the institutional logic widely 
accepted in the practices of schooling that legitimizes the sustainability of the 
informal tracked educational systems in Indonesia, establishing barriers to both the 
diffusion of inclusive education and the installment of comprehensive school 
systems in educational reform. Consequently, education can remain the arena of 
and reproduce social inequalities in Indonesia, as occurred in many other countries 
where the tracked systems have been adopted (Buchholz et al., 2016; Contini & 
Triventi, 2016; Hanushek & WÖßmann, 2006; Horn et al., 2016; F. T. Pfeffer, 
2008; Triventi et al., 2016). 
Teachers are likely to resist the emerging demand since it requires 
considerable changes in approaches, strategies, and traditions—from handling 
homogeneous classes to managing classes containing students with heterogeneous 
academic abilities, needs, and conditions. Moreover, there is a presumption that 
the fulfillment of the demand for inclusivity can decrease school performance, 
measured with student scores, and in turn, affect its reputation and attractiveness 
to prospective students. The finding of OECD’s study, which notes that “teachers 
instructing socio-economically disadvantaged children are likely to face greater 
challenges than teachers teaching students from more advantaged backgrounds” 
(OECD, 2014, p. 36; see also OECD, 2013a), similarly point to why teachers tend 











This thesis employed a comparative multiple case study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Yin, 2014) to generate insights into organizational strategies in responding 
to intra-institutional contradiction and the role of institution-level influences and 
organizational attributes in determining response strategies. The research was 
conducted in a city located on Java Island in Indonesia, where the local government 
is nationally well-known for its relative willingness to commence adopting 
inclusive education principles while the logic of selection is still the mainstream. 
The site was chosen because their opposing practices of school admission were 
relevant to the theoretical context highlighted in this thesis, specifically the intra-
institutional contradiction characterized by the coexistence of conflicting 
institutional demands imposed by the same institutional actor. 
To address the research questions, this thesis involved all 11 SMANs (public 
senior secondary schools) located in the city. Due to confidentiality concerns, the 
real name of the schools (i.e., SMAN 1, SMAN 2, and so on) was replaced by the 
pseudonyms (Schools A, School B, and so on; in which the sequence was 
randomized: School A does not refer to School 1 and so on). These cases were 
selected for several reasons. First, as aforementioned, these schools experience 
conflicting institutional demands that stem from both long-standing and emerging 
logics that were tried to be combined by the government, i.e., the demand for 
selectivity (or competition) and the demand for inclusivity in school admission. 
Thus, the organizations in the selected site provide interesting cases relevant to the 
theoretical issues with the potential to contribute to theory building (Yin, 2014). 
Second, by observing similar organizations, i.e., public schools at the same level 
of education operating in the neighborhood, this study aims to identify the 
variations of organizational attributes and their role in determining organizational 





4.1 Data Collection 
The fieldwork was conducted in two stages throughout 2016 to collect the data 
using face-to-face, semi-structured interviews involving 155 informants from the 
schools (i.e., managers, teachers, and students) and the local office of education. 
The interviews were all conducted by the researcher in the local language, i.e., 
Indonesian, and sometimes in the Javanese language. Different sets of open-ended 
questions were used to collect information from the various groups of informants. 
The interviews were recorded after permission was given by each informant (by 
signing the consent letter), and all audio recordings were then transcribed 
verbatim.22 
 
4.1.1 The exploratory stage 
The purpose of the first stage was to ensure that the schools did indeed face 
contradicting institutional demands. This was also meant to identify conflict 
among organizational actors—for instance, between principals who tended to be 
the proponent of both demands and group(s) of teachers who tended to oppose the 
emerging demand—which would delineate that the contradictions were internally 
represented. 
In this stage, interviews were conducted with six informants who had 
relevant responsibilities in the district education office, including the head of the 
office, and two persons in the provincial education office. The central aim of the 
interviews was to gather information related to the admission systems (both the 
regular, competitive one and the special, less competitive one), including the three 
programs demonstrating the demand for inclusivity, the coexistence of the two 
contradicting demands, and school responses. In addition, relevant archival data 
were also collected from both the office and the online admission system’s official 
website. Items included regulatory documents, admission procedures, and the 
annual data of admission in each school, such as the number of applicants for the 
regular and quota-based admission system. 
 
22 Analysis using NVivo was carried out on transcriptions and recorded interviews in 





Interviews were also conducted with two to three informants (school 
managers and teachers) in each observed school. Several types of response 
strategies to the contradicting demands were initially recognized. The attempts to 
identify relevant organizational attributes were also commenced. The result 
suggested that the most critical attributes needed to be explored more deeply in the 
second stage included: (1) school status in the “local” field, which differentiated 
the observed schools into two categories: a central organization (favorite school) 
or peripheral organization (non-favorite school); (2) power balance structure of the 
proponent/opponent of the emerging demand for inclusivity, i.e., balanced or 
unbalanced structure; (3) organizational identity alignment with the long-
established demand for selectivity (aligned or not aligned); (4) organizational 
identity strength (strong or weak identity); and (5) organizational governance, 
particularly referring to the decision-making mechanism, i.e., command or 
persuasion.  
 
4.1.2 The second stage 
In the second stage, interviews involving more people were conducted in the 
schools. Interviews were done with 11 to 14 informants in each school, including 
the principal, two to three vice-principals, four to six teachers, and four to five 
students. Two main criteria were used in choosing teachers to be informants: they 
must have worked at the current school for at least six years and performed duties 
as the committee of new student admission in the last six years (2010-2015). 
Students chosen as informants were those accepted either through the competitive 
admission system, the Quota Program and, if any, students with disabilities and 
Papuan students admitted through the Affirmative Action Program. The data of the 
participants are summarized in Table 4.1. The shortest interview lasted 20 minutes, 









Table 4.1 Data of Informants 
Organization Category of informants 
Number of 
informants 
District Education Office Top and middle-level manager 6 


















School managers  3 
Teachers 5 
Students 4 
School 2 School managers  4 
Teachers 5 
Students 4 
School 4 School managers 3 
Teachers 5 
Students 5 
School 6 School managers 5 
Teachers 5 
Students 4 
















Organization Category of informants 
Number of 
informants 
 Students 3 
School 10 School managers 4 
Teachers 5 
Students 5 




Note: Certain informants in each school were interviewed more than once to seek 
clarifications. They were also asked to evaluate some interpretations made by the 
researcher.  
 
In the schools, interviews were mainly intended to identify the following 
relevant issues: teachers’ and school managers’ perceptions towards the two 
conflicting demands, response strategies adopted by the schools, and students’ 
experiences in the admission process. Questions delivered to informants were 
always adapted into ones that were more easily understood by them, for instance, 
by translating the conflicting demands into the contradiction between the regular, 
competitive admission system and the opposite system manifested in the three 
different programs. For the same purpose, the school’s response was also 
translated into what the school does in the face of the contradicting demands, 
including each program manifesting the emerging demand for inclusivity. 
The interviews were also conducted to confirm the five school attributes 
that influence responses. The status of each observed school—whether it is a 
favorite or not in the local field or public school population—was determined by 
comparing the number of applicants to school capacity23. Interviews were then 
 
23 Schools with the number of applicants choosing the school as the first choice reached 
at least 80 percent of the school capacity were categorized as favorite or highly 
competitive schools, while ones with a more limited number of applicants choosing the 
school as the first preference were classified as non-favorite schools or schools with a 
lower level of competition. The school admission data in the last 6 years (2011-2016) 
shows that there was no change of the schools’ field position, i.e., six schools were 
favorite schools and five others were categorized as non-favorite schools (source: the 




used to understand how school managers and teachers consider their school’s 
position in perceiving the demand for inclusivity and its consequences. The 
interviews were also designed to learn about the connections between the other 
attributes and school response to the intra-institutional contradiction. 
During the 2016 admission process, observations were conducted in three 
schools (Schools A, B, and D), particularly to observe the interactions between the 
school admissions committee and (prospective) applicants. Some interviews were 
then conducted with the admission committee members to confirm what they did 
when interacting with the applicants or prospective applicants. Although such 
observations were not conducted in the other schools, similar questions related to 
the three schools’ practices were relevant to confirm whether similar practices 
were also carried out in the other schools. 
In addition, in order to verify data regarding strategies adopted by the 
schools in responding to the intra-institutional contradiction, relevant information 
obtained from an informant was always double-checked with other informants in 
the same school and even partially confirmed with actors from other schools or the 
education office. Moreover, the interview data were triangulated and 
supplemented with other sources like archival materials of complaints obtained 
from the ombudsman quarterly and annual reports (from 2010 through 2016), local 
newspapers, as well as relevant research and monitoring reports. 
 
4.2 Data Analysis 
4.2.1 Identifying institution-level influences 
The analysis was carried out in two stages: within-case analysis in the first stage, 
followed by a cross-case analysis. The within-case analysis was conducted to 
identify strategies adopted by each of the 11 schools to respond to the contradicting 
demands, including each of the three programs representing the emerging demand 
for inclusivity. This was undertaken by reading all the transcripts for each school 
carefully, particularly identifying the school practices in responding to each 
demand. The school responses were then categorized and coded based on Oliver’s 
(1991) typology of generic response strategies. School responses different from 
any tactic mentioned by Oliver (1991) were considered as the other tactic(s). 




response strategies and the teachers’ and school managers’ perceptions of the 
contradicting demands, which were the essential consideration in determining the 
school responses. 
By developing an analytical matrix, as suggested by Miles and Huberman 
(1994), a cross-case analysis (Bazeley, 2013; George & Bennett, 2005) was then 
conducted to understand the similarities and variations in response strategies 
across the observed schools and their potential causes. In this stage, the schools’ 
responses to each demand were compared to identify their similarities and 
variations. It was identified that these 11 schools exhibited similar responses, that 
is, complying with the long-existing demand for selectivity while resisting the new 
demand for inclusivity.  
The analysis was then directed to identify institution-level factors enabling 
the two tendencies: (1) the low variability or homogeneity of the response bundles, 
i.e., the schools’ responses on both sides of the intra-institutional contradiction; 
and (2) various resistance strategies adopted by the schools in response to 
emerging demands for inclusiveness. By comparing school actors’ perceptions of 
the conflicting demands, three dominant perceptions were identified: the 
glorification of the long-institutionalized practice based on the mainstream 
demand, skepticism towards the new demand’s prescriptions, and negative 
stereotypes about vulnerable children benefitted by the new demand. These 
dominant perceptions indicate the existence of an isomorphic institutional 
influence (i.e., stereotypical isomorphic influence), which is the cause of the first 
tendency mentioned above. The explanation of stereotypical isomorphism and its 
isomorphic influence is provided in Chapter 6.  
Meanwhile, the explanations of the second tendency are based on the 
existence (or the absence) of internal conflict triggered by the intra-institutional 
contradiction, which was experienced or observed by school actors (teachers, vice-
principals, and principals). The open and intense conflict was only found in a 
circumstance in which the specificity level of the program reflecting the emerging 
demand for inclusivity was high (i.e., the Quota Program). Such conflicts were 
relatively unnoticeable, or could be avoided, when the school actors faced the two 
other programs that contained ambiguities or medium and low specificity (i.e., the 
Inclusion Program and the Affirmative Action Program). This suggests that the 




determining the homogeneity (or heterogeneity) of resistance strategies in the 
field, which is explained in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
Two approaches were adopted to minimize analytical biases. The first was 
to cross-check interview data gathered from various informants, particularly in 
interpreting school responses to institutional demands. The second approach, as 
Bazeley (2013) recommends, was to conduct supplementary interviews with key 
informants or school representatives to consult about school-level findings, i.e., 
school’s attributes and response strategies. 
 
4.2.2 Assessing the role of organizational attributes 
The within-case analysis was conducted first to gather an in-depth understanding 
of each observed school as single cases. This was done particularly to identify the 
school’s organizational attributes and how school actors consider each attribute 
when perceiving the conflicting demands. It was intended to evaluate the fitness 
between the empirical evidence, i.e., each attribute's role in determining certain 
resistance levels, and those theoretically predicted in the literature review 
(Paterson, 2010). To ensure both quality data of individual schools and comparable 
findings required in cross-case analysis, the insights originated from within-case 
analysis of a single school were used to validate the within-case analysis of other 
schools previously observed and guide the analysis of subsequent ones.  
Comparative analysis was then conducted to identify similarities and 
differences among the schools (Marx & Duşa, 2011) regarding their organizational 
attributes, which were linked with the schools’ resistance levels, as found in the 
preliminary study. This analysis resulted in a set of data presenting the connection 
between each school’s resistance level and organization attributes (as presented in 
the truth table), which will be the basis for further analysis. 
A variant of qualitative comparative methodology (QCA) called crisp-set 
QCA, as recommended by Rihoux and Mour (2009), was then used to 
systematically identify the combinations of organizational attributes in specifying 
the resistance levels (either high or low). Crisp-set QCA (csQCA) was employed 
since the data presenting the schools’ conditions (i.e., organizational attributes) 
represent dichotomous variables, which is only suitable for csQCA (comparing to 




Cronqvist (2016), the study explored under what conditions a high-or low-level 
resistance strategy was adopted. The stages of analysis included: (1) data 
preparation (transforming data into dichotomous ones, entering data into the 
Tosmana’s working sheet, and processing data into the truth table—a list that 
presents certain combinations of conditions associated with a given outcome; (2) 
configurational analysis by using Tosmana to identify organizational attribute 
combinations leading to high and low resistance; and (3) result evaluation to assess 
the fit of the set-theoretic relations to the underlying data.  
A number of strategies were applied to address both the internal and 
external validity of the csQCA results. Internal validity refers to the degree of 
confidence regarding the relationship between the sufficient and necessary 
conditions and outcomes identified in csQCA. To ensure the internal validity, the 
use of csQCA was complemented by within-case knowledge (i.e., in-depth 
understanding of each observed school as single cases) before, during, and after 
the truth table analysis (for a more detailed argument, see Thomann & Maggetti, 
2020). As mentioned, data regarding conditions and outcomes processed in the 
truth table were supplied based on case knowledge, i.e., the inductive element of 
the employed csQCA. The case knowledge was also considered when evaluating 
the csQCA results, i.e., whether the formulas indicating the relationship between 
sufficient and/or necessary conditions and specific outcomes makes sense and 
conforms to the case knowledge. 
External validity refers to the extent to which the csQCA results can be 
generalized widely beyond its boundaries, i.e., relevant with other organizations 
and situations. External validity is typically required by deductive studies 
involving large-N cases to assess the applicability of existing knowledge. 
However, the proponents of QCAs argue that, as highlighted by Thomann and 
Maggetti (2020, p. 366), “small-N, case-oriented deductive studies can also make 
conclusions about the applicability of propositions to cases that satisfy the scope 
conditions—although this precludes an interpretation in terms of more general 
applicability.” Therefore, as recommended by QCA experts (e.g., Berg-Schlosser, 
Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009; Thomann & Maggetti, 2020; Wagemann & 
Schneider, 2015), the external validity of the present csQCA study was attempted 
by involving logical remainders, that is, cases with configurations of studied 
conditions that were not empirically observed but may occur in other settings. 




observation of phenomena that are present in a limited variety, we can thus support 
theoretical inquiries beyond observed cases.” 
As presented in Chapter 7, the logical remainders were included in the 
analysis to solve the limited diversity of the observed cases (a small set of 
purposively selected cases). Furthermore, this procedure enabled the assessment 
of the scope conditions using Boolean minimization (Wagemann & Schneider, 
2015), resulting in reduced formulas describing sets of the observed cases in 
logically simple expressions (for a more detailed explanation, see Meur et al., 
2009). Such expressions represent generalizations that are much more modest than 
statistical inference, a typical external validity of QCA results (Thomann & 
Maggetti, 2020). Therefore, the csQCA results can only be applied to other similar 
cases, i.e., ones that satisfy the scope conditions or share a reasonable number of 
characteristics with the observed cases (see Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009, pp. 11-
12). 
As stated in Chapter 2, this thesis has a deductive element—particularly in 
the subsection that reviews existing knowledge and formulates theoretical 
expectations of empirical findings. Therefore, to obtain both external and internal 
validity, iterative processes were carried out to ensure that the logically short 
expressions resulted by the csQCA correspond to both the theoretical expectations 
and the in-depth understanding of the observed cases. The case knowledge was 
used to clarify the causally interpretable aspects of QCA results by discussing each 












Chapter 5  
School Responses to the Intra-Institutional Contradiction 
 
 
As previously described in Chapter 3 and 4, the institutional demand for selectivity 
is manifested by the competitive admission system, while the new demand for 
inclusivity was reflected through the three programs: the Quota Program with high 
specificity, the Inclusion Program with medium specificity, and the Affirmative 
Action Program with low specificity. The following subsections present strategies 
adopted by the schools in responding to the institutional contradiction. This chapter 
concludes with the discussion related to the patterns of the schools’ responses to 
the intra-institutional contradiction. 
 
5.1 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with High Specificity 
When facing the institutional contradiction with a high complexity level (i.e., the 
new demand’s prescriptions had high specificity), the schools exhibited their 
preference for complying with the mainstream demand for selectivity while 
resisting the new demand for inclusivity, which was perceived as controversial. As 
indicated by many other teachers and school managers, a vice-principal of School 
G explained why the selection-based admission system is preferred: 
“Children with higher academic achievements should get better opportunities. 
Being accepted to public school, especially in a favorite one, is an incentive for 
them. Public schools, with greater achievements, also deserve to be favored by 
children. These show that the competition is fair and can encourage both 
children and schools to excel. […] Giving a special opportunity for children 
with low academic achievement to be easily accepted in public schools can 
endanger the fairness and the positive spirits developed by the system.” (vice-
principal, School G) 
 
Based on the above interview excerpt and many others with similar observations, 
the schools’ conformity to the mainstream demand was not caused by the coercive 
influence of the demand for selectivity, but rather the school actors’ awareness of 
the advantages of the practices prescribed by this long-existing demand. A senior 




have the autonomy to manage the new student admission, we will continue to adopt 
the (selection) system.” 
Meanwhile, as shown in Table 5.1, the schools resisted the Quota Program, 
which manifested the new demand for inclusivity with coercive pressure and high 
specificity. Response strategies with varied resistance levels were adopted: very 
high resistance (1 school), high resistance (4 schools), moderate-level resistance 
(2 schools), and low resistance (4 schools). School K was the only one embracing 
a very high resistance strategy: manipulation through an influencing tactic. High-
level resistance was observed at four other schools (Schools A, F, G, and I), in 
which they adopted a similar strategy and tactic, that is, by managing 
organizational perceptions (the school identity, image, and reputation) both to 
attract the most desirable prospective students (ones with high academic 
achievements) and to filter undesirable ones (academically at-risk students). This 
practice is not on the list of Oliver’s (1991) resistance strategies.  
Two other schools employed two different strategies categorized as 
moderate-level resistance: School J adopted an avoidance strategy with a 
decoupling tactic combined with a low-level resistance strategy, i.e., compromise 
through a pacifying tactic, whereas School C undertook an avoidance strategy with 
concealing as a tactic. Meanwhile, low-level resistance was found in the remaining 
four schools. These low resistance schools adopted compromise strategies with a 
pacifying tactic (School B) or a balancing tactic (Schools D, E, and H). 
 
Table 5.1 Response Strategies when Facing the Quota Program 
Levels of 
Resistance 
The Current Main 
Strategy (Tactic) 
Other Strategy (Tactic) Organization 
Very high Manipulation (influencing) Avoidance (decoupling)1 School K 
High  Filtering through 
perception management 
Avoidance (decoupling)1 School A 
School F 
School G 
Avoidance (decoupling)2 School I 
Moderate Compromise (pacifying) Avoidance (decoupling)2 School J 
Avoidance (concealing) Avoidance (decoupling)1 School C 










Note: the “1” sign indicates strategy replacement (the other strategy that was previously 




strategy coexistence (the second strategy used together with the primary strategy). The 
resistance level was identified based on the current primary strategy. When a double 
strategy was adopted, the resistance level was identified based on either the main or the 
second strategy (whichever is higher). 
 
5.1.1 A very high resistance school 
School K, a favorite school in the city, adopted a high-level resistance strategy by 
proactively influencing the local government to add a special requirement and 
lower the quota offered for poor students to be accepted into the favorite schools. 
As indicated by a vice-principal of the school: 
“[…] we [school] gave suggestions, that is why it was then decided [by the 
government to adjust the requirement and quota]. We knew that the school 
could not refuse a policy. But I think we have the right to give suggestions 
based on our real experiences, [and] difficulties, in implementing the 
program.” (vice-principal, School K) 
 
The local government added a special prerequisite in 2014 that required children 
from low-income families who wanted to enroll in Schools A, F, G, and K to have 
at least the average score of the national exam for junior high school. The local 
government also set fewer quota for each of those four schools, i.e., a maximum 
of eight persons in each period. 
Another vice-principal added that, from 2010 to 2013, some teachers and 
school managers complained about the program on numerous occasions, e.g., in 
the local agency of education meetings or the local parliament’s evaluations. The 
most frequent complaint was that most poor students accepted through the program 
typically lacked academic performance. The vice-principal expressed 
dissatisfaction or annoyance related to the teachers’ difficulties in handling the 
classes containing some students with much lower academic performance: 
“[…] in a meeting with the Local Agency of Education, at the district level, I 
explained, again and again, the difficulties experienced, [and] frustration felt, 
by most teachers in School K. Teaching several students with much lower 
[academic] abilities was challenging. The gap [of student abilities in each 
class] was too wide. I am sure that teachers in other schools, particularly 
favorite ones, also experienced the same things. They kept silent, however. 
People who dared to speak loudly were needed at that time. … one day, this 




was] a perfect opportunity [to complain]. They need to know the real problems 
faced by schools.” (vice-principal, School K) 
In 2010-2013 (before the local government finally adjusted the requirement 
and quota), School K also employed an avoidance strategy with a decoupling 
tactic by filtering such children before the formal processes of admission, such as 
when such prospective students or their parents visited the school and inquired 
about their chances of acceptance. On these occasions, only those with tolerable 
academic scores were recommended to officially register. Meanwhile, students 
with a very low academic score were subtly asked to enroll in another school 
because the competition at School K would be too intense. This was mentioned by 
a senior teacher in School K, as quoted below: 
“[…] there were no rejections here. […]  We would accept them, but we just 
wanted them to understand their choice [to attend the school] and its 
challenges, and the alternative as well, first. Then, they realized whether they 
were fit or not at the school. [If they push themselves to study here], they would 
only be an observer here, not players. […] We have no [negative] experience 
regarding their academic performance; all students are always promoted to 
the next grade because, indeed, we have made sure from the beginning [at the 
pre-admission process]. […] I said to the teachers who became the admission 
committee that it [the filtering practices] is not a violation.” (teacher, School 
K) 
The practice undertaken by the school did not completely conform to the 
local government’s expectations. This can be categorized as an avoidance strategy 
with decoupling as the tactic because the school actors covered up the violation 
they committed. The poor students accepted through the Quota Program were only 
those with higher academic achievements, while the soft rejection (eliminating 
prospective students with too low academic scores) was covered up. Furthermore, 
as mentioned, the school also adopted a very high resistance strategy by 
influencing the local agency of education to adjust the institutional prescriptions. 
 
5.1.2 High resistance schools 
The four other schools (i.e., Schools A, F, G, and I) employed another resistance 
strategy, which is not on the list of Oliver’s (1991) response strategies. Despite its 
softer approach, the perception management tactic undertaken by those four 




on the targeted students’ reluctance to enroll in these schools. As explained in more 
detail in Chapters 7 and 8, these schools have relatively strong organizational 
identities recognized in the (local) field. By echoing their strong identity through 
the dissemination of school programs and achievements, each of these four schools 
intentionally managed the perceptions of outsiders (i.e., prospective students and 
their parents or the general public) about the school. As further described in 
Chapter 8, it was found that these perception management strategies were intended 
both to attract the most desirable prospective students and softly deter 
academically at-risk children, including those from low-income families with low 
academic achievements who are the target group of the Quota Program.  
The statement of a vice-principal at School F reflected the use of perception 
management as a resistance strategy: 
“It [the quota] was not fulfilled for several years. [We did] not reject them. 
[...] Children not interested in academic achievements, reluctant to study hard, 
[with] low motivation, will not consider our school. It is natural, their own 
decision. […] On several occasions [such as] in competitions for [junior high 
school] students or social events organized by the school and the student 
council in this school or ones conducted in a village, we exhibit the school’s 
performance: student academic and non-academic achievements, school’s 
facilities, and student extracurricular activities. […] We want people to know 
what we have, what we do to obtain all those things. It (such information) is 
good for prospective students, the parents as well. They need to know which 
school is more suitable for them (or) for their children, encouraging a spirit to 
learn harder and obtain more achievements. Is School F a suitable choice or 
not?” (vice-principal, School F). 
 
Although they did not experience an explicit rejection, such children 
avoided the more demanding learning processes firmly attached to the four 
schools’ identities as either with excellent academic achievements or with a strong 
ambition to achieve them. A student at School D, a beneficiary of the Quota 
Program, expressed her perception of schools with academic excellence. 
“[…] [I am] not choosing School F, or School A. […] [My house] is close to 
School F, but [I am] not choosing that school. It must be hard to study there; 






This explains why the government's annual quota for poor students with low 
academic achievement, particularly in Schools A, F, and G, was not fulfilled in the 
three years of the program implementation (2010-2013). Such students fear the 
tight competition since other students accepted through the regular admission have 
much higher academic abilities.  
For a rather different reason, some students interviewed in non-favorite 
schools (i.e., Schools D, E, and H), did not include School I in their list of the 
selected schools in the admission process because of the school’s strong ambitions 
to compete with prestigious schools in the city (such as Schools A, F, or G) and its 
strong identity as an Islamic public school—both of which influence its learning 
activities, orientations, and social environment. 
“School I is really like Muhammadiyah schools [ones managed by 
Muhammadiyah, an influential Islamic organization in the country]. While 
some of my friends chose that school, I did not. […] ([I] would feel 
uncomfortable with religious activities there, so many Islamic-related activities 
while I am not a Muslim. […] I [also] do not like how teachers there [are] 
always pressuring students to learn harder, exercise and exercise every day. 
[…] I heard about it from my friend studying there.” (student, School J) 
 
As practiced by School K, an avoiding strategy through a decoupling tactic 
was also adopted by these four schools, especially when ‘risk takers’ or highly 
speculative students tried to enroll. Statements by teachers in Schools F and I 
indicate how this tactic was used in practice. 
“[…] when their NEM, [meaning, the score of national exams obtained in 
junior high as the basis for selection] is too low, we said ‘You can be accepted 
as long as the quota is still available. However, have you thought about your 
decision once again? The NEM of many other students [accepted through the 
regular admission system] must be much higher. Are you ready to take the risk 
[of school failure when you study here]?’ for instance.” (teacher, School F) 
 
“That [possibility of low-performing children choosing the school] has been 
anticipated. Teachers assigned to the admission committee have understood 
their tasks, including asking for the NEM of applicants. There are always 
teachers, experienced teachers, who handle the task, asking and providing 
appropriate suggestions for the prospective applicants or their parents.” (vice-





The key difference here was that Schools A, F, and G employed the tactic only in 
the early implementation of the program (i.e., in 2010-2013), while School I 
continuously used the tactic to deter undesirable students from applying.  
 
5.1.3 Moderate resistance schools 
As the schools with a moderate level of resistance, School J and School C opted 
for different strategies. While the former undertook the combination of moderate 
and low-level resistance strategies, the latter adopted a single moderate-level 
resistance, i.e., a decoupling tactic at the beginning of the program implementation 
that shifted toward a concealing tactic in the later years. More recently, a 
compromise through pacifying tactic was adopted by School J by declaring that, as 
a general public school in the city, the school is more suitable for students from 
low-income families who have limited opportunities to continue post-secondary 
studies. School J provided practical skill training programs, which are more 
common in vocational schools and useful for financial earnings after graduation. 
Such programs are more common in vocational schools and rarely provided by a 
general (or academic) school like School J.  
The tactic adopted by School J increased the number of prospective poor 
students interested in enrolling there. As a result, the competition between poor 
students who want to be accepted through the special scheme becomes much 
higher. It means only those with higher academic achievement will be accepted in 
the school, a condition that is certainly more desirable. A vice-principal of the 
school explained further:   
“[…] [The tactic used by the school] increases the number of prospective poor 
students interested in our school, tightening the competition in school 
admission and increasing the school’s opportunity for having poor students 
with higher academic achievement.” (vice-principal, School J) 
 
However, as a backup strategy, the avoidance with decoupling tactic 
undertaken by the above-mentioned schools was also adopted by School J. A 
statement by a school manager indicated the use of this tactic:  
“The quota is limited; should we prioritize such children with lower academic 
abilities while the ones with higher abilities also want to [enroll]? They can 
choose another [public] school, School H or School E. It is good for them to 




system, not by us, and ‘thrown’ to a lower school—their second choice. If 
unlucky, they would also lose their chance to be accepted there, (because the 
student’s spot) would be prioritized for other children choosing those schools 
as their first choice. If so, they will have to study in private schools. So, why do 
they not choose School E as their first choice? That can increase their chance 
of being accepted there. This is a good strategy; better for them. […] There is 
no intention to reject them here.” (school manager, School J) 
 
Like other favorite schools, between 2010-2013, School C also adopted 
avoidance with decoupling as a tactic to subtly filter poor students with low 
academic scores. However, under the current principal, this tactic became a 
concealing tactic. Low-achievement students from low-income families were 
accepted without filtering measures and without providing special services for 
them, such as social and psychological counseling and extra lessons outside school 
hours. As described by the school’s principal:  
“They [low-performing children from disadvantaged families] are just 
children with the same obligations and rights. They must follow the same 
standard [of learning and evaluation]. Because of the government program, 
they were accepted easily. We have done our task in the program [to accept 
such children]. Now, they must compete with others without special 
treatments.” (principal, School C) 
 
This non-filtering action in the admission process can be interpreted as a 
symbolic behavior intended to disguise non-compliance with the essential 
missions for educating children from low-income families. In this case, the 
acceptance of such children was not followed by adequate care, such as 
recognizing their social problems and special needs in learning and ensuring that 
the learning processes dominated by high-performing students are also beneficial 
for them. A teacher in School C explained a reason behind the adoption of this 
strategy: 
“Some of them [the applicants] were not eligible to be the program 
beneficiaries. It is true that they have low academic abilities, but there are 
poorer students than them. […] Many of them do not understand that the 
government and the school have helped them. [For instance,] they used the 
money [state financial aid] to buy a cellular phone, not something else relevant 
to their learning needs. Some of them do not come to school, making problems. 




many other negative things; [they are] naughty, always attracting attention 
from other people, teachers, [and] their friends. That is why the principal said, 
‘That is enough; it is time to treat them more professionally, more equal to 
other students. Do not spoil them anymore.’” (teacher, School C). 
 
The above excerpt, generally, represents school actors’ views, which tended to see 
the negative behaviors of students admitted through the Quota Program while 
neglecting that such behaviors might reflect psychological problems resulting from 
the lack of attention and socio-economic support from their parents. Furthermore, 
some teachers interviewed in School C supported the school managers’ policy to 
provide no special treatments for the program beneficiaries, indicating a 
characteristic of the moderate resistance level. 
 
5.1.4 Low resistance schools 
Low-level resistance was observed in four other schools: one was a favorite school 
(School B), and the three others were non-favorite ones (School D, E, and H). 
School B undertook an avoidance through decoupling tactic in the early 
implementation of the Program (in 2010-2013). However, the school then 
decreased its resistance level by adopting a compromise strategy with a pacifying 
tactic. School B accepted poor students with a low score through the special 
scheme without any filtering actions. However, unlike School C, School B 
provided more attention to such students. A teacher at School B explains further: 
“The principal really pressures the teachers [here] to serve such students [the 
program’s beneficiaries: low-performing children from low-income families] 
more than those accepted through regular admission […] for making sure they 
could fulfill the standard of learning and evaluation. [We are also asked] to 
monitor not only their academic achievement but also their social and 
psychological problems.” (teacher, School B) 
When the principal was confronted, he asserted that: 
“They [Low-performing children from low-income families] just need more 
attention. They do not get [such attention] from their parents. They [the 
parents] are too busy: some work as a porter in a [traditional] market, or a 
pedicab driver, so they are rarely at home. […] It must be difficult for those 
children. We need to help them [not only] fulfill their right to attend school 
[but also] solve their psychological problems. … they cannot perform better if 





Meanwhile, three other schools undertook another low-level resistance 
strategy. Despite the schools’ involvement in the competition to attract prospective 
students and maintain school performance, these non-favorite schools were less 
reluctant to accept poor students with low academic achievement. These schools 
undertook a less resistant tactic—a balancing tactic—by accepting such students 
without filtering actions but then quite simply expelling those who 
underperformed. As mentioned by the principal of School E, 
“Despite the ‘lower level’ public school in this city, [...] those who could not 
perform as expected will be ‘transferred’ to another school. We have the 
[school] rule based on government rules and standards. We are allowed to do 
that. Like doctors, they can send their patients to the hospital because the 
patients need more help. We have helped them [the program beneficiaries], but 
some could no longer be helped. They always got the lowest scores, or rarely 
came to school. [As a result, they are] not eligible to continue to the next grade. 
[…] If they were not sent to another school, the school’s performance would 
also decrease. That is the consequence.” (principal, School E) 
 
A vice-principal of School H mentioned a similar practice: 
“There is no special [treatment] with students accepted through the program. 
… Without the [Quota] Program, we always accepted and taught such students 
[with lower academic abilities]. [Moreover], the government also assigns this 
school to operate a special class for students with sports talents—we must serve 
regional-level athletes who have great achievements in certain fields but low 
academic abilities. […] This is not special treatment. Children committing 
serious violations will be expelled from the school. So, the common problems 
are not related to their academic performance but [more related to] ethical 
issues. […] I do not know [why, but] such children tend to have similarities 
related to their attitude behavior.” (vice-principal, School H) 
 
 
5.2 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with Medium-level Specificity  
When experiencing the institutional contradiction with a moderate level of 
complexity (i.e., the new demand’s prescriptions were ambiguous), conformity to 
the mainstream demand for selectivity was also seen in all observed schools. For 




complying with the competition-based admission system. For instance, a vice-
principal at School A stated that: 
“The [selection] system is important both to schools and children as 
prospective students. For [public] schools, it is to make sure that they have 
students who are ready to follow [the learning] processes in the school, [and] 
to compete with other students [during the learning process.] For children, the 
[selection] mechanism is needed to place them into a school that is suitable for 
them.” (vice-principal, School A) 
 
Related to the opportunity of students with disabilities to be accepted in 
regular schools, a senior teacher in School K noted the following: 
“It is clear that the admission system is mainly based on the competition 
mechanism. [Only] children with high academic achievement can be accepted 
[in public schools], including those with disabilities—why not? If they have 
great academic performance, it will be fine. But the problem is that it is still 
unclear which [public] regular schools should accept them.” (teacher, School 
K) 
 
The above statement indicates the ambiguity associated with the Inclusion 
Program, which can also be identified from government regulation. On the one 
hand, the local government stated in its regulation that the so-called “inclusive 
schools” were only those officially assigned to accept students with disabilities and 
educate them together with other students. On the other hand, however, the local 
government also set the annual targets stating that the number of inclusive schools 
in the city will continuously increase. Concerning the latter, the government 
consistently encouraged all regular schools in the city not to reject such students 
as they transitioned into inclusive schools. Because of this ambiguity, school actors 
perceived a risk of losing legitimacy when defying the demand. However, at the 
same time, they also realized that the program had a loophole, providing them with 
a chance to avoid the demand without losing legitimacy. 
In responding to the Inclusion Program, characterized by its normative 
pressure with ambiguous prescriptions, the observed schools exhibited low 
variability in resistance strategy. Strategies representing a moderate-level 
resistance were identified in all the schools. While seven schools adopted an 
avoidance strategy with a decoupling tactic, escaping (either as a single tactic or 




chosen tactic found in three other schools. Schools with decoupling tactics only 
accepted students with disabilities who have high academic achievement and are 
thus “still manageable.” School actors in the seven schools assumed that those who 
passed the selection-based admission system have the potential to be successful 
learners, as expressed by a teacher in School K: 
“[If they have] passed the tight selection [of school admission], such children 
must already possess the ability not only to handle their limitations or to fulfill 
their needs of learning but also to compete with others.” (teacher, School K) 
The above reasoning is hard to interpret as the manifestation of the willingness to 
accept such students. Moreover, it does not sufficiently show that the 
government’s intention to develop inclusive schools has gained widespread 
acceptance across the city’s schools.  
There were two facts indicating pre-admission filtering and the school 
actors’ reluctance to serve professionally. Even though the law guarantees the 
fulfillment of the rights of children with disabilities, their parents are still worried 
about the willingness and readiness of regular schools to admit their children. 
Commonly, before officially registering through the centralized and web-based 
admission system, the parents first consult with the desired schools to gauge their 
child’s likelihood of being accepted or getting disabled-friendly services in the 
school(s). However, schools’ subtle rejections frequently happened in these 
consultations, for instance, by stating the school's lack of support and facilities and, 
instead, recommending such students choose another school. As the principal of 
School F explained: 
“When they [children with disabilities or their parents] came here for asking 
the chance to be accepted here, […] I think it is more important for them to 
know about the services, facilities, and how the readiness of our teachers, 
whether our school could offer them what they need. Moreover, it is good for 
them to know other schools that are better equipped to serve them.” (principal, 
School F) 
 
The second indication of an avoidance strategy was related to the absence 
of professional services in the learning process, despite the strong commitment of 
the government to provide financial and technical support. In this case, schools, 




students to another school due to teacher’s inability to manage the student’s needs. 
A teacher in School I expressed it as follows: 
“[…] it was especially intended for their future. We do not have the ability to 
teach them. They need something much better from other schools.” (teacher, 
School I) 
 
Table 5.2 Response Strategies when Facing the Inclusion Program 
Levels of 
Resistance 
The Current Main 
Strategy (Tactic) 
Other Strategy Organization 
Moderate Avoidance (escaping) Avoidance (decoupling)2 School F 
Avoidance (escaping) Avoidance (concealing)2 School A 












Avoidance (concealing) - School D 
Source: Own compilation, 2021. 
Note: the “2” sign indicates the adoption of strategy coexistence (the second strategy 
used together with the primary strategy). The resistance level is identified based on the 
current primary strategy. When a double strategy is adopted, the resistance level is 
identified based on either the main or the second strategy (whichever is higher). 
 
Escaping was another avoidance tactic practiced by three other schools (A, 
F, and G). Schools with escaping tactics avoided the demand for accepting students 
with disabilities by declaring themselves as special inclusive schools, which 
provided particular concerns for those who have special talents that produce much 
higher academic achievements than average. By reframing the concept of inclusive 
education and adapting the Inclusion Program to their concern, these schools 
claimed that the acceleration class program was the manifestation of inclusive 
education.  
In the Indonesian context, acceleration classes pertain to special classes 
managed by a small number of schools that have received approval from the local 
government. These classes were a manifestation of both ability grouping and grade 
skipping in which students with superior intelligence (i.e., getting an IQ test score 




move on to higher education. By organizing this acceleration class program, the 
three schools claimed that they had taken part in the Inclusion Program by 
accepting and educating only one type of children with special needs in learning:  
“[…] it is a kind of distribution of tasks; specialization in serving children with 
special needs. This school serves children with superior intelligence, while 
other schools may serve another kind of students with other special needs such 
as those with physical disabilities.” (teacher, School G). 
 
Both Schools F and A combined this tactic with either a decoupling or 
concealing tactic. In practice, children with physical disabilities would only be 
included if they had excellent academic achievement and demonstrated both the 
willingness and ability to independently fulfill their learning needs despite their 
limitations and lack of school support. Those schools with decoupling tactics were 
less willing to accept children with disabilities and recommended them to other 
schools. In contrast, a school that exhibited a concealing tactic showed a slightly 
higher commitment to accept students with disabilities, but the learning successes 
were more dependent on those students’ ability to adapt to the mainstream system. 
This condition was indicated by a teacher in School A who illustrated the 
experience of a student with disabilities: 
“She [a student with disabilities] tries to fulfill her needs by herself, sometimes 
with the help of her classmates. She has special equipment and always brings 
it in the classroom […] so that she could follow the learning processes in the 
class.” (teacher, School A) 
Another teacher similarly added, 
“I did not need to prepare special [learning] materials for her. She always 
participated in the learning activities [and] was able to adapt to the class.” 
(teacher, School A) 
 
Concealing as a primary response was observed in School D. This school 
accepted a student with severe physical disabilities regardless of his academic 
achievement and kept this student until graduation. Despite the widespread social 
empathy towards the student, the school’s enduring internal conflict regarding 
educational treatments for such students in a regular school undermined the 
school’s efforts to provide a more customized learning process for the referred 




“The headmaster decided to accept him. […] While some of us have always 
learned to serve him in proper ways, some others still resist and treat him like 
many others.” (teacher, School D) 
The student was included in the learning processes that still inappropriately viewed 
the “Education for All” principle as providing the same treatment and evaluation 
for all learners. 
 
5.3 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with Low-level Specificity 
When all public and private senior secondary schools in the city were expected by 
the local government to voluntarily participate in the Affirmative Action Program, 
which has low specificity in its prescriptions, the observed schools exhibited low 
variation in their responses. High-level resistances with three different strategies 
were identified in 10 schools, while a low-level resistance strategy was observed 
only at one school (School E). The defiance strategy (by ignoring the demand) was 
adopted by most high-resistance schools (Schools B, C, D, H, J, and K). Despite 
the obvious invitation (clearly confirmed by the provincial agency of education), 
these schools did not take part in the program for various reasons, such as they did 
not get an official mandate to participate, they considered it as voluntary (not an 
obligation), or did not receive clear information about the program. 
 
Table 5.3 Response Strategies when Facing the Affirmative Action Program 
Levels of 
Resistance 





High Defiance (managing 
organizational perception) 




Defiance (ignoring) - School B 





Low Compromise (balancing) - School E 
Source: Own compilation, 2021. 
 
Striking differences in academic abilities and life habits of Papuan students, 




reluctance to take part in the program. At School J, for example, a teacher stated 
that: 
“We all know the behaviors of Papuan students. […] we believe that their 
negative habits will be the main obstacle to their learning success and will 
distract the entire learning activities in the school.” (teacher, School J) 
 
The majority of teachers and school administrators interviewed assumed that all 
Papuan students have low academic ability and that it would be inappropriate to 
include them in public school classes in the city. This clearly indicates that school 
actors still preferred the long-existing demand for selectivity. Some worried that 
accepting Papuan children could endanger their school’s performance, or teachers 
would find it difficult to manage the learning activities.  
“We can understand why they have low academic abilities. Many schools do 
not operate normally there [in Papua]. The poverty rate is high. It may be the 
highest [in the country]. We very often hear from the mass media that tribal 
warfare frequently occurs there. We can imagine that. Can we expect that there 
are Papuan children who have good academic performance? I cannot imagine 
how we teach them here. Should we teach them from the zero, teaching them 
how to read or to count first?” (teacher, School G) 
 
Among strong-identity schools were three schools (Schools A, F, and G) 
widely recognized by local citizens as ones occupied by high-performing students. 
These three favorite schools relied on their strong identities to signal the high-risk 
challenges that underachieving students would face if they choose to attend the 
schools. School I, a peripheral school with a strong identity, also adopted a similar 
strategy. In the early phase of program implementation (2013-2014), School I was 
one of the two public schools in the city accepting Papuan students. However, after 
experiencing difficulties, the school decided to no longer participate in the 
program. 
Instead of explicit and direct reluctance, School I took a subtle approach by 
declaring that the school would continue accepting Papuan students, especially 
those with characteristics that match the school’s identity as a faith-based public 
school—a strongly internalized and externally recognized identity. More 
specifically, school actors claimed that the school could educate optimally when 
participating students embrace a religion in accordance with the school’s identity. 




by the school, it is unlikely they will receive students that match the preferred 
criteria. 
School E, a peripheral school, was identified as an outlier with a low-level 
resistance. Since program implementation in 2013, School E accepted Papuan 
students without any filtering approaches. However, disobedient students were 
expelled from the school or transferred to private schools. Instead of acquiescence, 
this practice can be categorized as a low-level resistance by employing a 
compromise strategy with a balancing tactic. As expressed by a school’s 
administrator, this practice was intended to save the school’s performance, that is, 
by removing such students from the calculation of average scores. 
 
5.4 The Patterns of School Responses: An Initial Analysis  
As summarized in Table 5.4, the data described in this chapter reveals three 
interesting patterns of school responses: first, the pattern of whole responses (or 
response bundles); second, the patterns of responses to each program; and three, 
the relationship between the level of resistance and specificity. The following 
subsections provide initial analyses of the findings. 
 
Table 5.4 Variations in Resistance Levels 
Resistance 
Levels 





The Affirmative Action 
Program 
Very high (1 school) 
School K 
- - 
High (4 schools) 
School A   School G 
School F   School I 
- (10 schools) 
The observed schools, 
except School E 





All 11 schools  
- 
 
Low (4 schools) 
School B   School E 









5.4.1 The pattern of response bundles 
It was found that all 11 schools adopted a similar response bundle, i.e., responses 
on each side of the conflicting demands. The schools exhibited their preference for 
the long-existing demand for selectivity while resisting the emerging demand for 
inclusivity manifested in the three programs. These findings suggest the existence 
of isomorphism. 
Ashworth et al. (2009) characterize organizational isomorphism by using 
both compliance, i.e., organizations’ conformity to an isomorphic pressure, and 
convergence, i.e., homogeneous structures or actions exhibited by organizations in 
an organizational field or population because of institutional influences. However, 
in the context of an institutional contradiction, this thesis shows that those two 
criteria must be employed in a different way to observe organizational responses 
to conflicting institutional demands. 
First, the fulfillment of the first criteria must be reflected from 
organizations’ compliance with (at least) one of the contradicting institutional 
demands. The observed schools all indicated the preference for complying with 
the long-established institutional demand while resisting the new demand that runs 
counter to that mainstream demand.  
Second, the two responses (i.e., organizations’ conformity to one side of 
conflicting institutional demands and organizations’ resistance to the other) should 
be considered as “a bundle of responses” to the contradicting demands. The 
homogeneity of such a response bundle points to the convergence in an 
organizational field, which is the second characteristic of organizational 
isomorphism (Ashworth et al., 2009).  
Due to the fulfillment of isomorphism criteria, it is argued that the similar 
response bundles represent the existence of isomorphism. Further discussions in 
Chapter 9 illuminate stereotypical isomorphism as a novel type of isomorphism, 
which is relevant to understand isomorphic responses that occur in the context of 
institutional complexity. 
 
5.4.2 The patterns of responses to each program 
Different patterns of similarity or variation in responses to each program 




in the responses to the Quota Program (an emerging demand with high 
specificity). In contrast, low variation was identified in the responses to the 
Inclusion Program and the Affirmative Action Program, which have medium and 
low specificity levels, respectively (see Table 5.4).  
These patterns align with the theoretical expectations, in which resistance 
strategy homogenization within organizational populations is likely to occur when 
the prescriptions of the controversial institutional demand have moderate or low 
specificity. When facing an externally controversial expectation, organizations 
tend to resist because it runs counter the long-standing, institutionalized practice 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). The tendency towards resistance (Tummers & 
Bekkers, 2020) is facilitated by the ambiguity of the new demand prescriptions 
(Goodrick & Salancik, 1996), which produces homogeneous resistance strategies 
in the organizational population. In the face of such an ambiguous controversial 
demand, as anticipated, the tendency for adopting response strategies with higher 
resistance levels gives organizations more room to maneuver, and the selections 
of resistance strategies are determined by the levels of risk of losing legitimacy 
(Deephouse et al., 2017). Therefore, the lower the specificity of demand 
prescriptions, the higher the level of resistance. The related findings are presented 
in Chapter 6 and discussed further in Chapter 9. 
The pattern of responses to the new demand with high specificity is also 
consistent with the theoretical expectation. As predicted, when facing a counter-
normative practice with high specificity prescriptions, organizations tend to resist 
by adopting different strategies that suit their respective organizational 
characteristics, which results in the heterogeneity of resistance levels at the 
organizational population. As described further in Chapters 6 and 9, the high 
specificity demand intensified the internal conflict between proponents and 
opponents of the new demand, activating organizational attributes as the filters in 


































The school responses contained two conditions, which may suggest that 
institution-level factors exist, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The first 
condition was the similarity of the “bundle” of strategies adopted by each school 
in responding to the contradicting demands. The bundle of response strategies here 
refers to the school response to each conflicting demand. When each school’s 
response bundle indicates a similarity, i.e., preferring the long-existing demand for 
selectivity while resisting the emerging demand for inclusivity, this raises a 
question: is there isomorphic institutional influence in the observed cases, and how 
does it determine the low variation in the response bundle? 
The second identified condition of the school responses was the variability 
(i.e., either high or low) differences within the strategies that schools adopted to 
respond to each program manifesting the demand for inclusivity. Since the three 
government programs had different specificity levels, it is therefore relevant to 
identify the role of the specificity level in this manifestation of the new, 
controversial demand. The remaining sections of this chapter present the role of 
these two institution-level determinants, respectively. 
 
6.1 The Role of Stereotypical Isomorphic Influence 
In general, the teachers and school managers in the observed schools had negative 
perceptions concerning the various prescriptions that would include academically 
vulnerable children, i.e., those from low-income families, underdeveloped regions, 
or those with disabilities. These negative presumptions were mostly following the 
strong belief in competition as the most appropriate school admission mechanism. 
Despite the emergence of the demand for inclusivity, traditional views and 
practices of school segmentation are still the mainstream. From their perspective, 
favorite public schools are only for children with high academic performance, non-
favorite public and private schools are for those who mostly have lower academic 




long-standing selection-based admission system, regularly and centrally 
administered by the city’s government, helped institutionalized such segmentation 
(OECD, 2015). As one senior teacher put it:  
“In the centralized admission system, children have the right to choose three 
alternative schools and sort them out as the first to the third choice. However, 
children with a lower score have limited options. They do not want to take a 
risk and tend to choose non-favorite public schools. Such schools are always 
occupied by few children intentionally choosing them and by many others who 
were not lucky and ‘thrown into’ their second or third choice.” (teacher, 
School G) 
 
Since the admission system results in student categorization based on 
academic achievement, the city’s public schools were traditionally occupied by 
students with a relatively homogeneous academic ability. Teachers in favorite 
public schools are more accustomed to serving students with high academic 
performance, while those in non-favorite ones are used to teaching students with 
lower academic ability. Despite this categorization, in general, all the public 
schools were occupied by more competitive students, perceived as a given 
advantage and essential trait of the public schools. The mainstream demand for 
selectivity cultivated a strong belief that competition is the best admission 
mechanism, which, consequently, created negative perceptions about the new 
demand for inclusivity and the people who would benefit from it.  
Because of its effect on the emergence of response similarity, both to the 
mainstream demand and the undesirable emerging demand, the mechanism is 
therefore considered as an institutionally stereotypical influence, i.e., a novel type 
of isomorphic pressure different from coercive, normative, and mimetic ones 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b). This conclusion is based on the aggregate 
dimension of the three critical themes identified from the interview transcripts, 
particularly those associated with school actors’ perceptions of the contradicting 
demands. The themes highlight the following institutionalized perceptions: (1) 
glorifying the long-institutionalized practice, (2) doubting the new demand’s 
prescriptions, and (3) stereotyping people who benefit from the new demand. 
Together, they form the circumstances that led to the homogeneity of the response 
bundle, that is, organizational responses to both the mainstream and the new, 




6.1.1 Glorifying the long-existing practices 
One of the themes that surfaced from the interviews with school actors is the 
glorification of the long-institutionalized practices of selectivity. Glorification 
here refers to a collective belief that the long-standing practices of selection-based 
admission are far better than other alternatives. Such beliefs were very easily 
identified during interviews with school actors, particularly when asked to explain 
the rationale behind the school’s response to the contradicting institutional 
expectations.  
Some school actors highlighted the advantage of the competition-based 
admission system long practiced at public secondary schools. The principal of 
School I, for example, praised the online system used by the local government in 
managing the admission of public secondary schools in the city. In so doing, he 
noted: 
“Actually, we already have a good system which is still used until now. 
Competition is the best way to guarantee fairness in admission. In this city, we 
have practiced RTO, [a real-time, online admission system managed by the 
local government], to facilitate children and their parents choosing schools. 
The city is one of the pioneers in using this web-based system. The selection 
process is open, fair, and much more efficient. Many people have recognized 
the value of this system.” (principal, School I) 
 
As quoted below, a vice-principal of School D outlined the benefit of the 
selection system, particularly for prospective students: 
“[There are] so many schools with varied quality and so many children with 
different academic abilities. Competition in the admission system can 
categorize children based on their ability and distribute them into suitable 
schools. It is efficient for schools and useful for students. The system will not 
make mistakes by ‘sending’ children with high academic abilities to ‘low-level’ 
schools or ‘sending’ children with low academic performance to favorite 
schools. Children will be accepted in schools where they can learn better. They 
will have friends with similar [academic] abilities. That is good for students 
since the gap [of academic abilities] is not too wide.” (vice-principal, School 
D) 
 
The practice of school tracking, i.e., grouping children based on their 




by most school actors as necessary for effective learning. A teacher’s statement in 
School H below represents similar accounts from many other teachers in different 
schools: 
“By grouping children with comparable [academic] abilities, learning 
processes will be effective and efficient. It is much easier for teachers to 
manage the classes containing students with similar abilities. The targets of 
learning activities will efficiently be met because students can start and arrive 
at the finish line at the same time. The current curriculum is rather tough, so 
the admission system [which is based on competition]) is helpful, particularly 
in conditioning the composition of students.” (teacher, School H) 
 
The glorification of the long-institutionalized practice was also reflected in 
school actors’ expectations of its full adoption. For instance, a vice-principal of 
School K stated that: 
“The competition should be a tight race. The existing system still provides a 
chance for each applicant to choose three [public schools] so that a school 
may still accept a student who does not really want to be admitted there. The 
single option will be much better for schools to get the best and most interested 
students.” (vice-principal, School K) 
 
Similarly, a senior teacher in School F enthusiastically asserted that: 
“The system would be better if the government allows schools, especially 
favorite schools in the city, to manage their selection tests so that the schools 
can determine the forms of the entrance examination and the passing 
standard.” (teacher, School F) 
 
Such aspirations reflect a strong desire of school actors to maintain the existing 
admission system and, moreover, to improve its application. 
Glorification can also be seen from school actors’ disappointment over the 
government’s efforts to adjust the system—or combine it with another. For 
example, a vice-principal of School G considered such efforts had damaged the 
advantages of the admission system. He argued the following: 
“The [competition-based admission] system should not be combined with 
other systems. It can spoil a well-established tradition. What is wrong with the 




their academic abilities, which is required for the success of the educational 
process in each school.” (vice-principal, School G) 
 
A senior teacher in School A also expressed a similar opinion. He emphasized the 
difficulties experienced by teachers in managing classes that contained students 
with significant academic ability gaps. He noted: 
“The teachers in this school are increasingly experiencing difficulties since 
they have to educate children with diverse academic abilities in some classes. 
It happens since the admission system is combined with non-selective 
systems.” (teacher, School A) 
 
 The representative interview quotes all express the glorification of the 
competition-based admission system. In general, the interviewed school actors 
admire the system’s advantages, mainly related to its procedural aspects (claimed 
as a fair, efficient, and transparent process) and its results, such as student grouping 
(considered as one required to enable efficient and effective learning activities).  
 
6.1.2 Skepticizing the new demand’s prescriptions 
A second theme identified from the interview data pertains to the skepticism 
surrounding the new demand for inclusivity. Although it was not explicitly asked 
during the interviews, many informants expressed their doubts about each 
program’s prescriptions that manifested the new demand for inclusivity. 
Interestingly, the worries about the three programs frequently followed the 
statements glorifying the competition-based admission.  
The school actors’ worries about the Affirmative Action Program were 
related to how the program selected and included Papuan students in schools 
located in better-developed provinces. As stated by a vice-principal of School G: 
“We fear that the program could endanger our school’s conducive learning 
environment. For a long time, until now, we have adopted a selection-based 
admission system. By using the IT system, we only accept children with high 
academic performance. Our learning environment is [therefore] always 
conducive because we only accept ones with high motivation to learn or 
become a champion, as indicated by their high academic score. It would be 
different if we include Papuan students through the Affirmative Action 
Program. We do not know how they were selected there. [There are] so many 




[that can] provide opportunities for high achieving Papuan children. If so, it 
is too dangerous to take part in that program, which is not well designed.” 
(vice-principal, School G) 
 
The school actors also criticized the implications of including Papuan 
students in the Public Schools in the city. A teacher in School D, for instance, 
stated that: 
“When a school decides to accept them, this school is responsible for 
everything, not only their studies but also their social and personal lives. They 
have much lower academic abilities, so teachers must be more patient. It must 
be difficult to handle a class containing one or two Papuan students. The 
[ability] gap between our students and Papuan students is very wide. And 
again, it is not only about academic matters. How [do we] change their 
negative habits; often get drunk, violent behaviors? How do we ensure that our 
other students are safe and not affected by their negative habits? Including 
them in public schools in this city is not a simple thing.” (teacher, School D) 
 
The Inclusion Program was also criticized. This program was considered 
to have ignored the risks faced by children with disabilities in regular schools. 
Furthermore, teachers at regular schools are not prepared to manage inclusive 
classes containing students with different physical abilities and mental health 
conditions. A vice-principal of School J argued that: 
“Please think about the risks potentially faced by them [students with 
disabilities]. They need more attention, need more recognition. What if they do 
not get what they need here? What if teachers do not understand what they 
need? What if they are not able to compete, or at least to adapt to conditions 
here? That will potentially damage their motivation and enthusiasm. Regular 
public schools, characterized by greater competition for achievements, are not 
suitable for them. The government wants to help them, but delegate it to 
[public] schools which are not suitable and do not have the preparations [in 
place] to do it.” (vice-principal, School J) 
 
Such risks were believed to be even greater when children with disabilities 
are included in favorite public schools as competition between students tends to be 
higher than in other public schools. Such criticism was reflected in the statement 




“Our school is publicly categorized as a favorite school and, therefore, the 
competition in our school admission is much tougher than in other public 
schools. […] Whether it would be more suitable and beneficial for such 
students [with disabilities] to join our school or, even, whether they are able 
to study here is still a big question.” (vice-principal, School A) 
 
Criticisms were not only expressed by teachers in the favorite schools, 
however. Many teachers in non-favorite schools also criticized the Inclusion 
Program by emphasizing the lack of government efforts to prepare teachers and 
regular schools in advance. The statement of a teacher in School E illustrates such 
criticism from the side of teachers: 
“We [teachers] do not have any knowledge and skills to teach them [students 
with disabilities]. Our colleagues in special schools have such skills—but we 
do not. This will result in a serious problem if the government pressures the 
schools to accept such students without making sure the schools are ready.” 
(teacher, School E) 
 
Even though all of the observed schools accepted students from low-income 
families through the Quota Program, it does not mean that the school actors 
considered the program better than the other two programs. Almost all school 
actors interviewed perceived the program negatively. They thought it had good 
intentions but resorted to the unfair means in helping children from low-income 
families. Furthermore, the program beneficiaries were considered to be the 
program’s main weaknesses, as stated by a vice-principal in School K: 
“Not all children from poor families have low academic abilities. In fact, some 
of them have outstanding academic achievements. The government should 
focus on this group of children. Financial aids or scholarships should be 
provided for such children, not those with low academic abilities or low 
motivation. […] In my opinion, the program wastes financial resources 
because we support children with either academic problems or psychological 
problems, or both. […] They are only a burden for schools.” (vice-principal, 
School K) 
 
Additionally, school actors were concerned about the potential impact of 
making it easier for students to be admitted to public schools. Many teachers 




harder. The quoted statement below, from a teacher in School J, is representative 
of such criticism:  
“This [Quota] Program may potentially coddle such children. They can be 
accepted without having a high score on national exams [at junior secondary 
school]. Those who are aware of this special treatment might always study 
harder to avoid failure—or even be a champion. It is, unfortunately, hard [for 
this] to happen. Because of the easiness, they become spoiled and are not 
motivated to study harder. The program will not help much.” (teacher, School 
J). 
 
The prescriptions of each program have attracted doubts and criticisms from 
the school actors. All of those reflect skepticism towards the three programs or the 
manifestation of the demand for inclusivity. As seen in the interview quotations, 
this skepticism was frequently expressed before or after the informants asserted 
the competition-based admission system’s excellence. This suggests that school 
actors preferred the long-established demand for selectivity over the emerging 
demand for inclusivity.  
 
6.1.3 Stereotyping people benefited from the new demand 
The third theme identified from the interviews with school actors is the negative 
stereotypes of the three programs’ beneficiaries. Each program has a specific 
beneficiary, and stereotypes were attached to each group of low-performing 
children from low-income families, children with disabilities, and Papuan 
students. These stereotypes were found to be the main reason behind the schools’ 
responses to the intra-institutional contradiction. 
Negative stereotypes of Papuan students were identified in the interviews 
with the school actors. For example, a teacher in School F shared his perception of 
Papuan students. He noted: 
“It is a typical characteristic of children who live outside Java Island, 
particularly those from Papua. They [Papuan students who are the program’s 
beneficiaries] might be the best in their habitat (Papua). However, when they 
go to public schools in this city, they tend to be in the bottom rank. Moreover, 
they would surely always experience difficulties during their study here.” 





The teacher’s statement above is an example of the common perceptions expressed 
by interviewed teachers and school managers. Table 6.1 below presents additional 
school actors’ perceptions of Papuan students when they were asked about their 
participation in the Affirmative Action Program, including the reasons (for 
participating or not participating) or the experiences (while taking part). 
 
Table 6.1 Characterizations of Papuan Students 
School categories Characterizations 
Participating in the Affirmative 
Action Program (School D and I) 
Negative:  
• “slow to learn.” 
• “cannot solve simple math.”  
• “have not mastered basic language skills.” 
• “need extra guidance.” 
• “some were lazy.” 
• “the girl cannot wake up early.” 
• “one child rarely went to school.” 
• “have a different religion.” 
 
Positive: 
• “good at playing basketball.” 
• “excited when singing.”  
• “some were friendly enough.” 





• “super lazy.” 
• “intoxicated.” 
• “criminal.” 
• “belligerent (warlike behavior).”  
• “aggressive.”  
Source: Own compilation, 2021. 
As indicated in Table 6.1, there are differences in perceptions expressed 
by those from two different groups of schools. Despite being limited, positive 
perceptions were expressed by school actors who had direct experiences with 
Papuan students. Furthermore, teachers and managers in the participating schools 
expressed negative images of Papuan students less excessively, but based on their 
direct experiences instead, e.g., not unintelligent, but slower in learning; not all 




administrators who did not have direct experiences with Papuan students tended 
to overstate their negative opinions. 
Most of the negative perceptions excessively expressed were neither 
supported by adequate knowledge nor based on prior experiences, therefore 
reflecting stereotypes. Despite having no information about and/or direct 
experience in interacting with Papuan students (particularly the Affirmative Action 
Program’s beneficiaries studying in other schools in the city), most interviewed 
teachers indicated their widely held prejudice. A teacher’s statement at School J 
below is an example of this stereotype or preconceived opinion: 
“We all know the character of Papuan people from TV programs, newspapers, 
social media, or on the streets. I do not see differences between those who are 
there [in Papua] and those living here, [mostly as] university students. We can 
see on the streets [when] they do not use helmets, violating traffic rules while 
intoxicated. We also often hear [from mass media] that they are involved in 
tribal warfare and violent behaviors. […] I teach civics, [where we] very often 
discuss the rights and duties of citizenship. I cannot imagine [what it would be 
like] if they are included here. It would be very chaotic. They do not know how 
to be good citizens.” (teacher, School J) 
 
The teacher’s statement above clearly shows that stereotypes of Papuan 
people are widespread in the country. The images of Papuan people represented 
and reproduced in media, i.e., by newspapers and popular media (novel and film), 
reflect the existing stereotypes. Critical discourse analysis conducted by 
Dalimunthe, Irawanto, and Budiawan (2020), for instance, shows how Indigenous 
Papuans are represented as a dangerous group in a local newspaper in Yogyakarta, 
an urban city where many Papuans go to university. Similarly, Papuan people are 
portrayed in movies and novels as aggressive, unfriendly, harsh, and inseparable 
from violence (Anggraeni, 2011); their primitive ethnic group (Larasati, 2014); as 
well as ignorant and malicious (Rosalia, Krisdinanto, & Fiesta, 2019). This 
demonstrates how the media confirm and strengthen Papuan stereotypes already 
widely accepted in society. 
Similar prejudices were also found against students with disabilities. In this 
case, however, the stereotype was expressed more subtly. In fact, this stereotype, 




reflected, for example, in the statement of a teacher in School B. She mentioned 
that: 
“It [the concept of inclusive school] is a good thing, actually. […] There are 
many types of disabilities. People with disabilities, however, have similarities 
in their behavior and psychological conditions. They do not have abilities like 
normal people [and can become] frustrated, prone to anger, and highly 
sensitive. In the educational context, such emotional conditions can hamper the 
learning processes of students with disabilities, or moreover, can disrupt the 
whole class. That is why special schools are more appropriate for them. Their 
needs for attention will be met there.” (teacher, School B) 
 
By emphasizing the importance of academic ability as the criterion for 
accepting students with disabilities, a vice-principal at School K considered that 
students with disabilities, particularly those without high academic ability, would 
experience difficulties in regular schools. He stressed that: 
“I do not think it would be a problem as long as they are academically eligible 
for acceptance. If they [students with disabilities] have a high academic score, 
it indicates they learned effectively and would be able to learn here. The 
academic requirement must be enforced to select and accept students with 
disabilities. If not, we all will be in trouble since they will not be able to take 
in the lessons well, only burdening the teachers.” (vice-principal, School K) 
 
The above interview excerpt is an example of a school actor’s perception of 
students with disabilities, i.e., children with low academic ability being a burden 
for teachers. Table 6.2 below presents more dictions used by teachers and school 
managers in interviews, particularly when answering questions related to the 

















Table 6.2 Characterizations of Students with Disabilities  
School categories Images of students with disabilities 
Ones that currently have, or 
previously had, students with 




• “difficult to socialize.” 
• “sometimes too sensitive (easy to cry).” 
• “a burden for teachers and other students.” 
 
Positive or neutral: 
• “some can be independent, although more often 
need others.” 
• “having a strong will.” 
• “can follow the lessons with certain assistance.” 
Ones that do not have students with 
disabilities (the other eight schools) 
Negative: 
• “very sensitive.” 
• “easily offended.” 
• “mentally unstable.” 
• “unfriendly.” 
• “having a low academic ability.” 
• “incompetence.” 
• “low-performing due to poor health.” 
• “always depending on the help of others.” 
• “a burden for teachers and other students.” 
• “unable to participate in learning activities.” 
• “unable to compete with others.” 
• “unproductive.” 
• “from poor families.” 
 
Positive or neutral: 
• “pathetic.” 
• “unlucky.” 
• “different to normal people.” 
Source: Own compilation, 2021. 
 
As shown in Table 6.2, negative images of students with disabilities were 
more identified from schools that historically or currently have not served such 
students. Their perceptions were based on very limited knowledge and experiences 
in different contexts, such as the behaviors of a neighbor with disabilities, or 
simply their assumptions and imaginations. A teacher in School J, for instance, 
expressed their opinion about the Inclusion Program based solely on the story of 
their friend who was an administrative staff in a special school. However, teachers 




that their prior assumptions about such students were not always accurate, still 
expressed stereotypes of students with disabilities—including negative ones—in 
interviews. They did not only describe the characteristics of specific students with 
disabilities, but also made generalizations regarding the typical characteristics of 
such students. 
The beneficiaries of the Quota Program were also stereotyped. However, 
this kind of characterization was somewhat different from the stereotypes towards 
Papuan children and students with disabilities. Since the program had a high level 
of specificity and was strictly enforced, all teachers in the observed schools had 
direct experiences teaching students from low-income families, particularly those 
accepted with low academic abilities. However, they inaccurately presumed that 
all children accepted through the program would have the same tendencies, as 
expressed by a teacher in School A: 
“There is a significant difference (between students accepted through regular 
admission system and ones accepted through the Quota Program) in terms of 
their ‘rhythm’ of learning [and in understanding the lessons.] I am a 
homeroom teacher, [so] I know their performance in the class. While I had my 
previous assumptions, I now believe that they [poor students with low academic 
ability] are difficult to be included in highly competitive schools, just like here 
in our school. They all tend to be the same.” (teacher, School A) 
 
However, in several schools, the expressed stereotypes were more 
associated with the beneficiaries’ attitudes and behaviors. As stated explicitly by a 
vice-principal in School C: 
“It is fine to help children from poor families […] [since] some of them have 
good academic standing. However, it is different if the government pressures 
schools to help low-performing children from poor families. They must be lazy. 
That is why they have low academic achievements. [They can be] 
troublemakers [and] have no enthusiasm to learn. We often visit their home 
[and realize that] their parents do not give them adequate attention. We then 
understood why their children are like that. So, it is like a template. If the 
scheme of the program is not fixed, students accepted [through the program] 
will remain the same.” (vice-principal, School C) 
 
While low academic performance was stressed in the schools assigned to accept 




“laziness” were highlighted more often in the schools with larger quotas. Although 
there was a difference in emphasis, similar stereotypes of the program’s 
beneficiaries were expressed by school actors in both categories of the observed 
schools (Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3 Characterizations of the Quota Program’s Beneficiaries 
School categories Images of the Quota Program’s beneficiaries 
Ones with a small quota (School 
A, F, G, and K) 
Negative:  
• “low-performing children.” 
• “academically incompetent.” 
• “always ‘at the bottom’.” 
• “slow learner.” 
• “having lower enthusiasm in learning.” 
• “not fit to be in a competitive environment.” 





Positive or neutral: 
• “some can be high achievers.” 
• “do not have financial resources to excel in learning.” 
Ones with a larger quota (the 




• “frequently absent from school.” 
• “unmotivated.” 
• “troublemaker.” 
• “lower academic achiever.” 
• “cunning.” 
 
Positive or neutral: 
• “having inattentive parents.” 
Source: Own compilation, 2021. 
 
The fact that the program beneficiaries typically were low-academic 
performing students only strengthened the stereotypes of children from low-
income families and their ability. The problem is that such perceptions went 
beyond facts by generalizing the beneficiaries’ attitudes and behaviors, as seen in 
Table 6.3. Another negative implication of stereotyping can be seen when the 
program’s beneficiaries are called “cunning,” which refers to an assumption that 




public school through the Quota Program. Actually, students from low-income 
families (i.e., the actual targets of the program) were victims suffering from the 
few cases of manipulation of program administration requirements in the past. 
Several interviewed school actors used the past manipulation cases as a reference, 
or justification, of their resistance to the Quota Program, and moreover, to 
stereotyping poor children. 
As mentioned, the local government made some efforts to ensure that the 
new demand for inclusivity goes hand-in-hand with the mainstream demand for 
selectivity. These efforts included establishing a limited quota for poor students to 
be accepted through special admission and gradually adding the number of schools 
assigned as the inclusive ones. However, the schools’ resistance to the new demand 
endured. This case suggests that the long-institutionalized practices of 
competition-based admission have not only established positive beliefs about it but 
also reinforced reluctance to accept new demands with opposing prescriptions. 
Since the competition-based admission system was structurally maintained by the 
government and widely practiced in the field, it consequently formed similar 
beliefs and negative perceptions toward the emerging demand for inclusivity—and 
academically vulnerable children as the beneficiaries. These beliefs and 
perceptions, as previously mentioned, then led to isomorphic responses to both 
sides of the contradicting institutional demands.  
Because the shared beliefs in this case study were formed by a structural 
cause, i.e., the long-institutionalized practice maintained through governmental 
policy and widely accepted by society, it can be said that an institutional influence 
played an important role in leading to homogeneous responses in the field. This is 
in line with recent works on stereotypes and discriminations, which increasingly 
give significant attention to social structure and institutional settings as 
deterministic factors (see Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). As 
highlighted by Burn (2011), the concept of structural discrimination argues that 
stereotypes and exclusions are not only a matter of interpersonal relationships but 
also relate to institutional issues. In any social environment, there are always 
institutional prescriptions manifested in government regulations, mechanisms, 
societal norms, or legitimized category systems, which intendedly (or 
unintendedly) institutionalize stereotypes and/or discriminatory treatments toward 
certain groups of people (Burn, 2011; Rupande, 2015). Brubaker, Loveman, and 




“individual attitudinal predilections” but rather “socially shared knowledge.” 
resulting from institutional mechanisms (Burn, 2011; Dovidio et al., 2010; Stevens 
& Görgöz, 2010).  
The institutional mechanism playing an influential role in the case study 
was no longer the government regulation with its coercive pressure. Instead, the 
long-institutionalized practice reproduced socially shared knowledge that glorified 
the long-established demand. Moreover, it negatively stereotyped the newly 
emerging demand that imposed opposite prescriptions. The competition-based 
admission system represented the legitimized category system, providing a much 
larger opportunity for children with high academic achievements to access public 
schools. From ecological and institutional perspectives, categories are “socially 
constructed” (Greenwood et al., 2017) and “not purely cognitive, but socio-
cultural,” reproduced and embedded in social environments (Glynn & Navis, 
2013). However, this practice not only marginalized children with low academic 
performance but also stereotyped certain groups of vulnerable children—such as 
students from low-income families, those with disabilities, and children from 
backward regions—as academically at-risk (Larose & Tarabulsy, 2014). 
Moreover, the new institutional demand for inclusivity, which prescribes 
affirmative actions for such children, was perceived as rather controversial by 
school actors. These conditions point to the existence of stereotypical isomorphic 
influence as an institutional mechanism leading to homogeneous responses to the 
intra-institutional contradiction. 
 
6.2 The Influence of the Controversial Demand’s Specificity Levels  
The next research query explores how complexity levels of intra-institutional 
contradiction specify certain strategies of resistance to the controversial emerging 
demand and, in turn, determine the variability of resistance levels in the local 
organizational field. The findings presented in Chapter 5 indicate that, as expected, 
the variability of resistance strategies adopted by the schools was different in the 
face of the three programs. Each program’s prescriptions manifested the new 
demand for inclusivity with different levels of specificity. 
The observed schools exhibited low variation in response strategies or 




either the Inclusion Program with moderately strict prescriptions or the 
Affirmative Action Program with loose prescriptions). In contrast, when facing a 
program with a high specificity level (i.e., the Quota Program with tight 
prescriptions), the schools’ response strategies showed a high variation. The 
following sub-sections illustrate how specificity levels play a critical role in 
determining the variability of resistance strategies. 
 
6.2.1 The new demand and its ambiguous prescriptions 
Teachers’ and school managers’ negative perceptions of the controversial new 
demand did not automatically lead to low variability or homogeneous strategies in 
responding to programs manifesting it. Homogeneity in the field was only found 
to occur when the schools faced a less complex contradiction; that is, when 
prescriptions associated with the new demand imposed into the schools contained 
either looseness or ambiguity (i.e., those with either loose or moderately tight 
prescriptions). Under these circumstances, there were two main advantages 
obtained by school actors: the opportunity available to avoid internal conflicts 
stimulated by the intra-institutional contradiction while resisting the controversial 
perceived prescriptions of the new demand.  
Internal conflicts were absent in each school because the local actors were 
not necessarily polarized into different positions regarding their perceptions 
toward the new institutional prescriptions. As a vice-principal at School H 
explained: 
“No one here wants to do that. No one wants new problems. We are 
experiencing many other problems—and we have worked hard on those issues. 
We do not want to burden ourselves by accepting them (Papuan students), who 
would be much more difficult” (vice-principal, School H). 
The absence of such a conflict occurred not only in non-favorite schools 
like School H but also in favorite schools such as School F. The principal of School 
F highlighted that both himself and the teachers doubted the possibility of 
including Papuan students in the school.  
“I have told the teachers here, then they replied, ‘Please rethink it, sir. Is it 
possible?’ […] I do not know whether the positive traits we have here can be 
transmitted to them [Papuan students]. Or, otherwise, all those things 




uncomfortable to study here. We cannot make speculations. That was the 
teachers’ response, which I need to consider seriously.” (principal, School F) 
 
The absence of internal conflict also occurred when the schools faced the 
demand not to reject students with disabilities. At School K, for example, a vice-
principal noted, 
“We must always encourage our students to compete for academic 
achievement because it continuously stimulates them to study hard. However, 
if we accept students with disabilities in our school, we really do not know how 
to handle them. Can they compete with others? It is not about the readiness of 
teachers, as the teachers said, and I agree with them, but rather the readiness 
of children with disabilities to become students here.” (vice-principal, School 
K) 
The question of whether certain students can compete with others indicates that 
the logic of competition has been widely institutionalized. This, in turn, determines 
how school actors perceive and manage educational services. Competition has 
become the central instrument in learning activities at the expense of the inclusion 
of children with disabilities. 
Similar conditions were found in other observed schools. For example, a 
teacher working for School J, who was a member of the committee of school 
admission in 2015, recounted her experience when a parent accompanying their 
son with disabilities wanted to enroll in the school. She said: 
“I asked her to meet the principal directly to explain her desire. At that time, 
to be honest, we thought and worried that the principal would accept the child. 
But we were wrong; he politely asked the mother to choose another school.” 
(teacher, School J). 
 
The principal confirmed this, but he denied that he had rejected the child. 
He argued that he only asked the parent to reconsider because the school was not 
ready to serve students with disabilities. He noted:  
“[…] the school building is not ready yet, [and] some classes and facilities are 
on the second floor. The teachers are also not ready, I guess. […] I know that 
[the local government] rule [does not allow schools to reject students with 
disabilities]. Until now, this school is not on the list [assigned as an inclusive 





These words signal that, despite knowing the rule, the principal of School J decided 
to avoid conflicts with his colleagues, preferring not to accept children with 
disabilities. 
Ambiguity is manifested in both programs, albeit differently. The 
Affirmative Action Program was perceived as “an open invitation” or “a voluntary 
action,” meaning that it represented a loose demand or risk-free offer. The 
interview with an official at the Provincial Office of Education, as quoted below, 
reflected the program’s looseness. 
“I really [understand that] they have something else to prioritize more. Despite 
the little possibility for a positive response, we always ask them [public 
schools] to participate in this program by showing the participating schools’ 
experiences, just to make sure that they are well informed about this program.” 
(government official, Provincial Office of Education) 
 
A school principal, assigned as the coordinator of participating schools in 
the city, indicated the program’s leniency: 
“Although I have a good relationship with almost all other principals in the 
city, I do not want to force them to take part in this program. As mentioned by 
the government, it is a voluntary service. Those with a great willingness to 
voluntarily participate would be better in serving Papuan children, rather than 
those that are forced to do it; I am sure about this. […] Educating Papuan 
students is just part of the worship; that is our main motivation.” (principal 
and coordinator of participating schools) 
 
Both teachers and principals, who naturally have similar stereotypical perceptions 
of the new demand for inclusivity,24 relished the occasion to freely ignore or turn 
down the program without the fear of losing legitimacy. The principals were not 
under intense pressure to open their schools to Papuan children. Therefore, they 
did not feel it necessary to take a different position from the teachers who were 
reluctant to include ethnic minority children in the school.  
Under this circumstance, it makes sense that the schools favored defiance 
strategies, reflecting a high level of resistance. When there was no institutionally 
 
24 The institutional logic of selectivity/competition has for a long time underpinned the 
prevalent practices in school admission. Therefore, the school actors tended to have 





stimulated conflict between school actors, organizational attributes differentiating 
the schools such as power structure, decision-making mechanisms, status, and 
organizational identity were not necessary conditions shaping organizational 
responses. Instead, the absence of such conflict allowed the other institutional-
level determinants (i.e., stereotypical isomorphism) to take center stage, which in 
turn enabled a homogeneity of resistance strategies across the entire field. 
A similar condition occurred when the schools were under pressure to 
support the implementation of the Inclusion Program. In this case, the difference 
was that this program was perceived as a rather ambiguous one. On the one hand, 
the government stated that the so-called inclusive schools were only those 
officially assigned to accept students with disabilities and educate them together 
with other students. However, on the other hand, the government set annual targets 
that the number of inclusive schools in the city would continuously increase and, 
therefore, consistently encouraged all regular schools not to reject such students as 
the starting point to become an inclusive school. In describing this contradictory 
expectation, a local government official mentioned, 
“It is true that some schools have been assigned as inclusive ones—we can see 
this on the list. But it does not mean that the other [regular] schools can reject 
students with disabilities. Gradually, all the [regular] schools in the city will 
be inclusive ones. No exception. Those which have not yet been included in the 
list are also encouraged to start becoming inclusive by not rejecting such 
children.” (government official, Local Agency of Education) 
 
School actors, however, perceived the ambiguous prescriptions differently. 
As reflected in the interview with a vice-principal at School G below, many school 
managers and teachers argued that the schools were not allowed to refuse children 
with disabilities when they can fulfill the academic requirement:  
“We must understand the rules carefully. […] Since there is no special 
admission mechanism for such children, they must follow the regular 
admission rules. They will be accepted if they have high academic abilities. 
Schools make a mistake when they reject children who have already met 
academic requirements, regardless of their physical abilities or disabilities. All 
children have the same rights. As expected by the rule, we cannot treat them 




Such interpretations indicated that the prevalent logics of selectivity or meritocracy 
influenced how school actors perceived the demand for inclusivity manifested in 
the Inclusion Program. As a result, the access of children with disabilities to 
quality schools remains low. Those with low academic abilities were screened 
prior to official admission, while those categorized as high-performing children 
were accepted but did not receive adequate, friendly, or customized services. 
A teacher in School F who had been part of a committee for school 
admissions (from 2014 to 2016) indirectly mentioned schools’ common practices 
in refusing children with disabilities.  
“What if there are no children with disabilities trying to register? During the 
admission period, some parents of children with disabilities often try to collect 
information [and] identify the possibilities for their children to be accepted 
here. However, we do not count them when they decide not to continue the 
process of admission. How can we accept or reject them?” (teacher, School F) 
Because of the Inclusion Program’s ambiguity, school actors perceived that 
they would face a higher risk of losing legitimacy when refusing the demand for 
including children with disabilities. However, at the same time, they also realized 
that the program had a loophole, providing them with a chance to avoid the demand 
without losing legitimacy. An avoidance strategy with various tactics was, 
therefore, adopted by the schools. Despite the widespread aversion to comply with 
the demand for inclusivity, avoidance as a lower resistance strategy has been 
selected by most schools when responding to the Inclusion Program.   
 
6.2.2 The high specificity prescriptions of the new demand 
As mentioned, the Quota Program expressed the new controversial demand with 
either tight prescriptions or a high specificity level. As written in the Decree of the 
Head of the Local Agency of Education and announced to the public, the local 
government set several prescriptions, including a strict quota (i.e., the number of 
poor children with low academic scores to be accepted) for each public school, 
schedules, registration procedures, and requirements. Since everything was strictly 
regulated, there was no room for discretion in its implementation. Furthermore, the 
schools faced a high risk of losing legitimacy if they refused this strict program. 
This can be inferred from the following interview with an official of the Local 




“It is a government policy and must be obeyed because it has clear purpose, 
criteria, mechanism, schedule, and quota. All of these have been stated 
formally in the Decree of the Head of the Local Agency of Education. The 
consequence [of the offense] is also clear. The public schools are owned and 
financed by the government, the teachers are paid by the government, and the 
principals are assigned by the government. So, they have no reason to refuse 
it.” (government official, Local Agency of Education) 
 
In the face of this strict program, internal conflicts stimulated by 
institutional contestation were much harder to avoid by organizational actors in 
each school, especially between the principals and teachers. Such tensions were 
easily revealed in each observed school, as expressed by a vice-principal at School 
D: 
“My question is why [the poor students with low academic abilities] were not 
placed in other schools. Why this school? Is it because this school has a timid 
headmaster, who was always afraid to do something, afraid to say no? Or 
because the teachers always feel pessimistic because of our school’s position 
as a non-favorite school in the city? We always became the victim; pressured 
to accept […] more children with low academic performance, and many other 
things.” (vice-principal, School D) 
 
Because the principals are appointed and evaluated by the government, they 
were strongly expected to be obedient to the government’s institutional demands. 
It was hard for the principals to go against the government’s expectations, 
regardless of their controversies. Although they had negative perceptions and 
skepticism toward the program, as perceived by the teachers, the principals 
realized that they were government agents assigned to ensure the program’s 
successful implementation or institutionalization. As a result, the principals 
experienced not only a role conflict regarding their position (see Lane, 2006) as 
both the government agents and organization leaders but also internal conflicts 
with teachers at their schools (for comparison, see Loder & Spillane, 2005; Msila, 
2012; Selznick, 2011). The principal of School B indicated such difficulties: 
“I really understand what the teachers are worried about. I am also still a 
teacher. We face difficulties. It is a fact. However, this is a government policy 
that must be implemented. All things have been ruled, [such as] the 




the rules. Many teachers have been complaining. I know, I understand. It is 
really challenging.” (principal, School B) 
 
Just like the principals, the teachers are also governmental agents who have 
similar tasks regarding program implementation. However, as the leading school 
manager, principals faced stronger, direct pressures from the government.25 
Ensuring that teachers fully support the program was one of their essential tasks. 
In doing so, principals were often in conflict with teachers who did not comply 
with the new program’s prescriptions (for theoretical discussion, see March & 
Olsen, 2006; Tolbert & Zucker, 1999). While internal conflict could be avoided in 
the two other program implementation cases, the Quota Program implied that 
institutionally stimulated conflicts at each school were unavoidable. 
The conflict sparked by the institutional contradiction consequently 
activated the role of organizations’ attributes in specifying resistance strategies. 
Based on the interview data, schools with different attributes were found to have 
distinct preferences regarding particular strategies and different abilities in 
handling the (higher) risk. One of the pivotal organizational attributes found was 
the schools’ status or position in the organizational field. The critical role of this 
attribute in determining organizational responses has been highlighted by several 
prior works (e.g., Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Marquis et al., 
2017). 
The position or status of a school influenced the school’s way of reacting to 
the program, resulting in variations in schools’ responses. Teachers in favorite or 
elite schools, who previously always served the brightest children, were 
consequently more reluctant to include the Quota Program’s beneficiaries, that is, 
children from low-income families, particularly those with lower academic 
achievements. 
 
25 Sanctions for violating school actors were not stated in the Quota Program documents. 
However, in Indonesia, teachers and principals of public schools are part of the state civil 
apparatus, strictly required to comply with the regulations, evaluated and paid by the 
government. According to government regulations on the state civil apparatus (Law No. 
5 of 2014 and its derivative rules), public servants who commit violations will be 
sanctioned, e.g., mutation, suspension, demotion, and even dismissal. Especially for 
teachers and school principals (according to Law No. 14 of 2005), penalties can also 




“[…] No student with a score below 2026 has ever been accepted in this school. 
I am sure that people in the city understand [that] they would test themselves 
before choosing this school. We do many social activities in the community, 
such as community services in villages, charity, or our students’ programs that 
invite junior high school students’ participation. On these occasions, we 
present what our school looks like. […] It is really to motivate them to join us. 
We need them to know our achievements, facilities, and learning programs. 
We want children who are interested in this school, academically eligible, and 
ready to compete or study hard.” (principal, School F) 
 
Although having more students with high performance is preferred, 
teachers in peripheral or non-favorite schools have become accustomed to serving 
students with lower academic achievements. This condition made the peripheral 
schools less resistant to the program, as stated by a vice-principal at School E: 
“That is why the government sets more quotas for such students [to be accepted 
in this school]. The government’s reason is that the [score] gap between those 
accepted through regular and special admission is not so wide; it will not be 
problematic. Still, their academic performance here is lower than regular 
students. However, the [performance] gap here is not as bad as those at 
favorite schools.” (vice-principal, School E) 
This variation in organizational status contributed substantially to determining 
organization actor perceptions of the Quota Program and filtering the 
organization’s response to it, resulting in heterogeneous resistance strategies 
among the observed schools. 
As described further in Chapter 7, other organizational attributes affecting 
the selection of response strategies include power structure, identity, and the 
decision-making mechanism frequently practiced. The influence of each attribute 
was also observed more clearly when the schools experienced the demand for 
inclusivity with high specificity, i.e., in the Quota Program. When the principals 
and teachers were in conflict caused by the contradicting demands, both the school 
actors’ power structure and the schools’ decision-making mechanism determined 
their differentiating response strategies. 
The following statement of a teacher in School C indicates how those two 
attributes determined the response strategies adopted by the school: 
 




“[The principal] is still young but very assertive. When the vice-principals, 
who are much more senior than him, are likely to disagree with him or reluctant 
to comply, he always makes decisions by himself [without consulting with the 
vice-principals]. He prefers to do activities [related to the consequences of his 
decision] by himself or by encouraging young teachers to support him [or] to 
be the committee of school admission, for instance.” (teacher, School C) 
 
The above statement was given when asked about the reason for the 
acceptance of more students with lower academic abilities at this school than those 
accepted at other favorite schools through the Quota Program. That statement 
indicates disagreements between the principal and the vice-principals or senior 
teachers over the Quota Program’s implementation. The principal of School C 
confirmed the situations he faced: 
“In the K3S meetings (i.e., between the school principals and the Education 
Office), we are always warned to obey the rules of program implementation. 
Schools that have committed violations always got into trouble in the meetings. 
Harsh reprimands are common, but social punishments are much crueler. […] 
Some principals face difficulties in carrying out the program in the way that 
the government expects. Including in this school, I faced a very challenging 
condition here [since] some senior teachers have negative perceptions of the 
program. I can cope with this issue, however.” (principal, School C) 
 
Those two interviews also indicate a balanced power structure and a 
command decision-making mechanism at School C. Hence, the conditions 
associated with those two organizational attributes partly explain the adoption of 
avoidance strategies (i.e., concealing and decoupling tactics) at School C, 
particularly when responding to the Quota Program. 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, such internal conflict was neither 
observed at School C nor the other schools when dealing with the two other 
programs. Both the Inclusion Program and Affirmative Action Program had lower 
specificity levels and, therefore, provided more space to resist the demand for 
inclusivity. The Affirmative Action Program’s looseness enabled more 
opportunities for most schools to adopt high-level resistance strategies, such as 
defiance by ignoring the program or by managing organizational perception as the 




chances for adopting moderate-level resistance strategies (i.e., avoidance with 




























Chapter 7  
The Role of Organizational Attributes 
 
 
How organizations experience and cope with institutional complexity and 
contradictions have become institutionalist scholars’ central concern in the last 
decade. The literature on organizational responses to such circumstances typically 
describes that similar organizations in a field tend to exhibit response 
heterogeneity (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Bjerregaard, 2011; Kraatz & Block, 
2008). Such a variation may occur because organizational attributes determine 
how organizations perceive imposed institutional pressures and thus construct a 
possible range of responses to such demands (Greenwood et al., 2011; Y.-K. Yang, 
2016). 
Although various organizational attributes have been identified as 
influential filters through which the complexity and contradictions are perceived 
and interpreted, they were assessed separately as single attributes in previous 
works. Kodeih and Greenwood (2014), for instance, have highlighted how 
organizational actors consider their identity both in framing the institutional 
complexity they experience and in specifying their responses. The role of other 
single attributes in such circumstances has also been studied, such as field position 
(e.g., Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and internal power structures (e.g., Pache & 
Santos, 2010).  
Since every organization has interconnected and functional attributes, it is 
crucial to understand the role of organizational characteristics as configurations 
(Fiss et al., 2013) in determining response strategies and their resistance levels, 
which is still poorly understood. By taking a closer look at the influencing 
combinations of organizational attributes, one can identify the necessary and 
sufficient ones and their joint mechanisms in specifying resistance levels. This 
work is, therefore, an attempt to fill this knowledge gap. 
The findings described in Chapters 5 and 6 show that organizational 
characteristics play a significant role in specifying types of resistance strategies, 
enabling variations in the level of resistance across the schools in the field. This 




(tight demand) rather than moderate or low specificity (moderately tight or loose 
demand).  
This chapter presents the influences of organizational attributes in 
determining strategies, particularly in responding to the Quota Program, which 
expresses the emerging demand for inclusivity with a high specificity level and no 
room for discretion. As explained in Chapter 5, the observed schools embraced 
various strategies with different resistance levels in responding to that strict 
program. This chapter is guided by two questions: (1) What are the organizational 
attributes individually influencing organizational resistance to a controversial 
demand that ignites institutional complexity? (2) How do certain organizational 
attributes play their collaborative role as necessary and/or sufficient conditions to 
determine resistance levels? 
 
7.1 The Influencing Organizational Attributes 
As mentioned in the method section (4.1.1), the within-case analysis undertaken 
during the data collection and earlier data analysis identified five school 
characteristics that determine the selection of resistance strategies. These emergent 
findings of organizational attributes include: (1) organization status or position in 
the field; (2) power balance structure between opponent and proponent of the 
emerging institutional demand for inclusivity; (3) the relevance of organizational 
identity (OI) to the more established institutional demand; (4) the strength of OI; 
and (5) governance, specifically referring to decision-making mechanism. 
 
7.1.1 Organization status 
In this thesis, organizational status relates to the schools’ position in the local field, 
i.e., either favorite or non-favorite schools. Favorite schools, referring to those 
highly competitive in school admissions (i.e., the number of applicants choosing 
the school as their first choice during regular admissions in 2010-2016 reached 
85% to more than 100% of the school’s capacity), were categorized as central 
organizations. In contrast, those with a lower level of competition, or non-favorite 
schools, were classified as peripheral organizations. Based on these criteria, 
Schools A, B, C, F, G, and K were categorized as central organizations, while 




The data show that the schools’ position or status influences how the 
schools respond to the specific program, resulting in variations across the observed 
schools. Teachers in favorite schools, who typically serve students with high 
academic abilities, were generally more reluctant to include children from low-
income families, particularly those with much lower academic achievements than 
those accepted through the regular admission system. As expressed by a teacher in 
School A, 
“[…] some of them [the Quota Program’s beneficiaries] are clearly different 
from those accepted through the regular admission; difficult to compete with 
others. All the teachers [in School A] realize that gap”. (teacher, School A) 
Furthermore, a vice-principal in School A confirmed that:  
“[…] when such children accepted in this school have low national exam 
scores, the teachers are worried […] that they will not be able to serve them 
properly. Because of the school’s status as a favorite school, we always educate 
top-tier students who can learn faster. In fact, we very often accept ones with 
the highest score in the city, or even in the province. That is why some teachers 
said, ‘If possible, we do not have to accept such students [through the Quota 
Program] who may be a hassle.’” (vice-principal, School A) 
Widely recognized as the competitor of School A, School F also had a 
similar preference when accepting students. As a favorite school in the city, School 
F expected the program beneficiaries to consider the school’s status when choosing 
a school. This can be inferred from the statement of a teacher at School F below 
when explaining why students from disadvantaged backgrounds accepted in the 
school through the Quota Program had relatively good academic achievement. 
“Such negative cases never occur in School F [meaning that all poor students 
accepted in School F through the Quota Program successfully passed and 
moved on to the next grade]. […] They should not consider registering here if 
their academic score is too low. They must already know the excellence of 
School F, and they should consider their abilities; [and see] whether they 
would be able to attend the school.” (teacher, School F) 
This indicates that the school actor(s) also determined the school’s status and used 
it as an advantage in selecting their response strategy. Showing off their current 
students’ academic excellence was the school's attempt to influence the program 




School status or position was also an important aspect considered by School 
K in selecting a response strategy. This is reflected in the following school 
principal’s statement: 
“Favorite public schools in the city are always more competitive and vied for 
children with higher academic achievement. However, because of the [Quota] 
Program, we are forced to accept children with much lower academic scores. 
A wide gap inevitably exists in the school: the lowest academic score of 
students accepted through the regular system reached 36 [the maximum is 40], 
while those accepted through the Quota Program may only have 20. […] 
Including such children in a very competitive environment is problematic for 
teachers when organizing their classes. It is also problematic for such children; 
they would feel inferior, and so on. This reality is an important consideration 
for us.” (principal, School K) 
 
Because of the wide gap in academic abilities that resulted from the incompatibility 
between the existing advantage of the school’s position and the beneficiaries’ 
privilege provided by the program, the school’s actors employed two strategies to 
cope. As mentioned, School K adopted an avoidance strategy with a decoupling 
tactic in the early years of program implementation but then replaced it later on 
with a manipulation strategy by employing an influence tactic. This tactic was 
done by actively encouraging the local government to make several adjustments 
to program prescriptions. 
In contrast, schools with lower competitive admission or peripheral 
organizations were less resistant to the Quota Program. For example, a vice-
principal in School E admitted that: 
“[…] we have been accustomed to teaching students with low academic 
achievement. Those accepted through the Quota Program are still tolerable 
[…] the achievement gap [between those accepted through the special quota 
and the regular system] is, sometimes, not so observable.” (vice-principal, 
School E) 
 
Another vice-principal at School E added their opinion: 
“Honestly, we always need to motivate students accepted here because this 
school was not their first choice in the admission process. They typically place 
the school as either the second or the third option. We are not a favorite school. 




[…] Some of them [the low score students accepted through the Quota 
Program], however, have a bad attitude. We can identify their academic 
abilities based on their scores in advance [i.e., at the admission process], but 
how about their attitudes? We only know about it after they have been 
accepted.” (vice-principal, School E) 
 
The statements above imply that school position is a critical determinant in 
selecting a response strategy, in which teachers and managers working for a non-
favorite school indicated a low level of resistance towards the Quota Program. 
The concerns expressed were related to the potential for negative student 
behaviors rather than low student academic achievements per se. 
A teacher at School D was also concerned about the attitude of several 
students accepted through the Quota Program. He said: 
“It is fine if they have low academic abilities. However, some of them are 
troublemakers. That is the problem. […] How can we help them if they do not 
show commitment to learning, are often absent in the lessons, always get low 
scores, and fight with other students. If they do not take their learning seriously 
and continuously make problems, should we continue to help them?” (teacher, 
School D) 
Similarly, a vice-principal of School H mentioned that expelling children is 
sometimes unavoidable. He argued that: 
“[…] children whose grades are low because of their [academic] abilities can 
still be helped. If their low grades are caused by their negative characters, 
[such as being] lazy, not respecting their teachers, not being serious with their 
education, skipping school—then that is a different story. [There are] no other 
choices anymore.” (vice-principal, School H) 
In contrast to teachers at favorite schools, those employed at non-favorite schools 
were more tolerant of students with low academic abilities. The responses 
exhibited by these schools to the Quota Program, therefore, tend to show less 
resistance. 
School position or status can determine the condition of school input, i.e., 
quality of accepted students, which in turn affects the quality of outcomes. When 
schools with different statuses compete for outcomes, field position becomes an 
essential consideration for managing the input. This is reflected below in a 




“For parents who emphasize academic achievements for their children, then 
our school is not their first choice. Their first choice is schools with a higher 
level in the city27. But, in the quota-based admission system, poor children with 
lower academic abilities tend to avoid such schools. It is our challenge. We 
need to work harder to increase our students’ achievements, despite the lower 
input. We continue to strive to prove that our school is also the best choice. 
[…] Input [students accepted] and process [learning activities managed by the 
school] are the two critical factors determining the quality of outcome, 
however.” (vice-principal, School I) 
 
An avoidance strategy with a decoupling tactic was adopted by School I to ensure 
that students accepted through the Quota Program were those with acceptable or 
tolerable academic abilities, i.e., quality input. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
variations in organizations’ status in the local field fundamentally contributed to 
determining actors’ perceptions of the Quota Program and filtering the 
organizational responses. This, in turn, resulted in heterogeneous resistance 
strategies across the field. 
 
7.1.2 Power structure 
The second influencing attribute relates to the power balance structure between 
opponents and proponents of the emerging demand for inclusivity. In the school 
cases, the principals were aware of the roles expected by the government for the 
success of the Quota Program in their schools. This positioned the principals as 
the “local/school-level” proponents of the emerging demand for inclusivity, 
despite their negative perceptions of the program. In each school, however, the 
principal faced the emerging demand’s internal opponent: individuals or groups of 
teachers.  
Schools characterized by a group of teachers (including ones assigned as 
vice-principals) who counterbalanced the principal’s role in decision-making were 
categorized as schools with a balanced power structure. Meanwhile, schools 
characterized by the absence of such groups were classified as schools with an 
unbalanced power structure, meaning that the principal was the dominant school 
actor. Seven schools (A, C, D, F, I, J, and K) were categorized as belonging to the 
 




former, while the four remaining schools (B, E, G, and H) were categorized as 
belonging to the latter group.  
As quoted below, the School K principal’s statement indicated a balanced 
power structure at the school. He admitted that: 
“The practice [of rejecting poor students with low academic achievement in 
the pre-admission process] was a mistake, a bad practice. But I understand 
the reasons behind it. I must hear teachers’ aspirations and understand the 
difficulties they face.” (principal, School K) 
A teacher at School K confirmed that reality by saying that: 
“As a leader, he [the principal] must hear the aspirations [and the] problems 
we face. That is a good character of a leader. […] When the principal has 
doubts, Mr. X [a senior teacher assigned as a vice-principal] always convinces 
him. […] [For instance], how to deal with students with low abilities—and the 
Quota Program. He seriously struggled to convey our aspirations to the Head 
of Education Office, the mayor, and [members of] the local parliament. […] 
Mr. X has worked for this school for a long time; he is a senior teacher and 
has more experience. That is why he is assigned as a vice-principal here. Some 
teachers are comfortable with him because he understands the problems here. 
[…] [Meanwhile], the principal is ‘the newcomer’ from another school, who 
is assigned here [by the government], [and it is] his first assignment.” 
(teacher, School K) 
 
A balanced power structure was also identified at School D. A vice-
principal of the school recounted his experience directly protesting the previous 
principal’s acquiescence to the local government’s demand. He also made a 
comparison between the previous and current principals, as quoted below: 
“Our [new] principal is much better than the previous principal. He always 
hears us; he can understand us. He is different from the previous principal, 
who was always submissive and said ‘yes’ to all the government’s demands, 
[such as] accepting children with much lower [academic] abilities, or children 
with disabilities. What next? Why can’t we say ‘no’? [That was what] I said 
directly to her […] At that time, many teachers had similar worries, and some 
also protested. […] We were also supported by the school committee chairman, 
who previously had a high position in the local government. […] Now, the vice-
principal of academic affairs always asks the teachers, [i.e.,] homeroom 
teachers, to evaluate the performance of students accepted through the 




from the school and sent back to their parents or another school. I agree with 
him [the vice-principal of academic affairs]. The [current] principal can also 
understand this. It did not occur in the past. She [the previous principal of 
School D] was difficult, but we always criticized her.” (vice-principal, School 
D) 
Both the open criticism of the former principal and the compliment to the new 
principal indicates that the teachers as a group of actors balanced the principal’s 
power at this school. Moreover, as mentioned in the interview excerpted above, 
the new principal tended to allow the practice of expelling the underperformed 
students—particularly ones with problematic behaviors—which can be 
categorized as a form of resistance strategy in responding to the Quota Program. 
Different conditions were found in the schools categorized as ones with an 
unbalanced power structure, in which the principals were the dominant actor. A 
statement by the principal of School B confirms such a condition: 
“It is a common thing, one or two teachers did not understand, [or tried] to 
be an outlier […] I just needed to approach them personally. They needed to 
understand the government’s goal. […] It is a public school, a unit of service 
managed by the government. [Thus], obeying the rules is mandatory.” 
(principal, School B) 
A vice-principal at School B confirmed that: 
“Previously, in the school meetings, there were always teachers complaining 
[about the program]. But recently, they do that outside the meeting and only 
grumble among [themselves as] teachers. That means more people have 
understood. […] Maybe they hesitate to [criticize] the principal [as] he is a 
senior teacher from a more favorite school. But I am sure that the complaints 
remain.” (vice-principal, School B). 
The principal’s domination was perceived negatively by some teachers at 
this school. For example, as quoted below, a teacher at School B criticized the 
principal’s approach: 
“[…] his way in leading the school is really like people who are splitting a 
large stick of bamboo into two parts by using the traditional way: stepping on 
the bottom while lifting the top to break it apart. In this case, the teachers are 
the bottom part. [They are] pressured to follow his desire and, at the same 
time, his reputation as the principal and the school’s position in the city must 




political issues; people in different levels obtained ‘points’ [seen as person in 
good standing], the actual benefits. The beneficiaries are not [only] children 
from poor families who have low academic abilities but also the local mayor. 
The city can attract more public attention; [and the attention] from the central 
government because of a positive image in helping poor children. The 
principals [are also the beneficiaries of the program], particularly those who 
want to build a positive image.” (teacher, School B) 
The above statement reflects the unbalanced power structure at School B. Teachers 
who boldly expressed opposing opinions, including the negative implications of 
the Quota Program and its beneficiaries, were suppressed. Moreover, the 
informant also criticized the Quota Program, which was implicitly perceived as 
ineffective and benefiting certain people rather than children from low-income 
families. 
Such a condition was also found at School G, another favorite public school 
in the city. Several of the interviewed teachers mentioned the principal’s 
dominance, indicating that the school had an unbalanced power structure. A 
teacher assigned as the committee for school admissions characterized the 
principal’s leadership style.  
“He has been the school’s principal for two periods28. Moreover, he has 
worked at this school for a long time since he was a teacher. He also became 
a vice-principal several times. [That is why he] really understands the 
school’s conditions. […] He prefers to be accompanied by young vice-
principals. Some task forces are also dominated by young teachers, [such as] 
the school admission committee, curriculum team, and many others. He fully 
controls these teams. Almost every day, the team leaders are always invited 
by him to report the work progresses. […] Although there are three vice-
principals, he very often supervises the teams directly. […] He just asked me 
to report the daily data [of school admission], how many children have 
registered, and about their scores. I did the same things [i.e., providing the 
oral reports] in the Quota Program, [which] ended last week. We must report 
the problems we faced. […] When I have doubts, I would consult with him 
directly. Last week, for instance, I consulted with him first before I made a 
decision. It was about a poor child who wants to apply through the Quota 
 





Program. The total score is acceptable, but she has a low math score.” 
(teacher, School G) 
The above informant pointed out the conditions in which the principal is the 
dominant actor at the school. The informant’s statement implicitly indicated that 
the principal ensured that the teams consisted of people who could be controlled 
and fulfill his expectations. During the interviews, a situation that distinguished 
this school from other observed schools was that almost all interviewed teachers 
either had just met, had an appointment to meet, or were suddenly called by the 
principal. Such conditions indicated the principal’s dominating power, signaling 
an unbalanced power structure. 
Unbalanced power structures were not only found at favorite schools but 
also non-favorite ones. School E was a peripheral school characterized by its 
unbalanced power structure. The principal, who was a senior teacher previously 
assigned at a favorite school in the city, was the dominant internal actor. The 
statement below points out the principal’s awareness that teachers at the school do 
not dare to complain or protest openly. This implicitly indicates that he 
understands his dominant power at the school or firmly expects that all teachers 
follow his direction. 
“It is prevalent for teachers in this school to deal with low-performing students. 
Only two or three teachers complain about the program, as I heard indirectly 
from other [teachers]. But they never talk to me directly or in the school 
meetings. [They would] not dare to do that. It is because I always assert that 
conforming to the rule is our obligation as civil servant teachers paid by the 
government.” (Principal, School E) 
The principal’s attitude, which ignored several teachers’ complaints 
regarding the Quota Program,29 reveals the reluctance or unwillingness to listen 
to teachers’ voices. There is no doubt that the principal was required to comply 
with government demands. However, to ensure that the program was implemented 
in the school as expected by the government, the school principal consciously 
 
29 The school principal’s dominance was also identified from the Affirmative Action 
Program implementation at School E. None of the teachers interviewed knew the reasons 
why schools participated in this ‘optional’ program, and all indicated that it was solely 
the will of the principal. Despite a number of complaints, the principal also did not 
provide any opportunity for the teachers to share their experiences in teaching Papuan 




chose to neglect the teachers’ issues rather than encourage teachers’ enthusiasm or 
simply explain the program’s rationale. The principal also did not try to figure out 
the teachers’ difficulties and find practical solutions. Moreover, the absence of 
open protests from teachers indicated that a balance of power in the school did not 
exist. 
A statement of a vice-principal at School E, which frequently quoted the 
principal’s expressions,30confirms that the school’s power structure was 
centralized in the principal. 
“[…] because the criticism was only by a few teachers, the principal told me 
[things like]: ‘just ignore it,’ ‘it is not significant,’ [and] ‘the rule is the rule.’ 
All teachers here should understand that this school has become the last choice 
for students who want to attend public school. We have long been a place for 
children from poor families and those with low academic abilities. Those are 
the main characteristics of most students here, honestly. ‘We cannot avoid the 
fact,’ the principal always mentions this. After we accept them, it will be seen 
whether they have the will to learn or not. If they are not serious, cannot be 
educated, then we can take action. […] We have expelled several children; they 
were the worst, cannot be helped. […]  We are allowed to do that; we have 
reasons, and [we also have] authority to do that.” (vice-principal, School E) 
The informant’s statement above also indicates how this unbalanced power 
determines the school's response to the Quota Program, in which the principal 
played a dominant role in specifying the chosen strategy. The phrase “not 
significant” used by the principal shows that he has determined the power dynamic 
between his colleagues. Furthermore, the principal’s decision to ignore the 
teachers reflects his dominant control in the school, i.e., that there was nothing to 
worry about from the teachers’ silent protests. The silent protesters’ powerlessness 
can be inferred from a teacher stating that they no longer submitted complaints 
knowing the consequences. 
 
30 The relation between the school principals and vice-principals could indicate the 
schools’ power structure. Three vice-principals in the schools with an unbalanced power 
structure, i.e., School B, E, G, and H, were appointed and, therefore, tended to be easily 
controlled by the principals. This tendency differed from that in the seven other schools, 
where the vice-principals were mostly elected by the teachers to support the principals 
assigned by the Local Office of Education. The latter tended to be the balancing groups 




The unbalanced power structure in this school can also be recognized from 
the way some teachers perceive certain questions as sensitive. Some teachers 
interviewed at this school frequently used short answers, particularly when they 
were asked about the school’s response to the program. Examples include: “It 
would be better if you ask the principal directly,” “that question can only be 
answered by the principal,” or “have you met the principal?” Such answers reveal 
that these teachers were hesitant to provide information about school-level policy 
and reluctant to disagree with the principal. These conditions reflect a paternalistic 
culture, one of the prevalent characteristics of Indonesian bureaucracy, which was 
influenced by society’s cultural values and social structure before and during the 
colonial periods. To some extent, paternalism still exists today (for further 
explanations, see Dwiyanto et al., 2006). 
 
7.1.3 The decision-making mechanism 
The next key attribute delves into the decision-making mechanism most 
frequently used by the schools. It was identified that (the principal of) the school 
used either a persuasion mechanism or command mechanism. A persuasion 
mechanism, in which the decision for how to respond to external prescriptions to 
some degree involved “the exchange of ideas and information in a deliberative 
manner” (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 9), was identified in Schools F, I, J, and K. As 
presented later, the selection of response strategies in these schools was not 
determined unilaterally by the principals but was discussed and agreed upon 
among the school actors. Consequently, the internal opponents of the demand for 
inclusivity who could balance the principal’s power contributed significantly to 
the determination of the school’s strategy in responding to the Quota Program. On 
the contrary, the principals in the other seven schools typically adopted a command 
mechanism, in which compliance to demands imposed by higher-level structures 
was the most preferred practice. In other words, the principals in these seven 
schools played a dominant role in determining response strategies. 
This attribute is closely related to the power structure. Schools with an 
unbalanced power structure tended to have a command decision-making tradition. 
However, it was identified that schools with a balanced power structure did not 
automatically have a persuasion “decision-making” mechanism. Only four schools 




and a persuasion mechanism. In contrast, the rest had a command “decision-
making” mechanism. 
School K was an example of schools with a persuasion mechanism. A vice-
principal (who is more senior than the principal) shed light on how the school 
decided on the strategy used to respond to the Quota Program. The following 
excerpt highlights the principal’s approach in dealing with teachers’ complaints 
about the program: 
 “The principal always mentions that it is a governmental policy [so that] we 
cannot refuse it. However, he is always willing to discuss with us [and] hear 
our voices. The [Quota] Program imposes several arrangements, while the 
school has certain conditions needed to consider in responding to that 
program. Suggestions, [and] complaints, from the teachers were listened to. 
We discussed [in order] to find solutions. Finally, that [the avoidance 
strategy] was adopted as the best [alternative]. It does not mean that we refuse 
children with low academic achievement who are from low-income families. 
[We] just gave understandings for such children and their parents. We do not 
want them to regret their decision to study here.” (vice-principal, School K) 
 
Instead of forcing teachers to comply with all program requirements, the school 
principal listened to teachers’ wishes and grievances and tried to find common 
ground. Although he was aware that what had been initiated by senior teachers and 
had been done in the early years of program implementation showed the school’s 
non-compliance with the program, the principal did not try to prevent that 
resistance tactic.  
When asked about this, the principal of School K emphasized the other 
strategy employed by the school. He said:  
“I am the principal. I have an obligation to implement each government 
policy, not only the [Quota] Program. However, I must consider the existing 
conditions of our school. I need to discuss with the teachers here. I pointed 
out the policy’s purpose and then identified what we should do. […] Schools 
are government agencies. It is, of course, difficult to refuse policies. I 
consulted with some senior teachers here [and] vice-principals [as well], and 
we decided to propose some adjustments to the government to make the Quota 




As mentioned in Chapter 5, School K was the only school that adopted a very high 
resistance strategy. Some school actors, particularly the principal and a vice-
principal, actively raised complaints, protested, and even proposed several 
adjustments to the program prescriptions whenever the opportunity arose. 
School F was yet another school with a persuasion ‘decision-making’ 
mechanism. As it occurred at School K, decision-making at School F was not 
dominated by the principal. Almost all the interviewed teachers provided positive 
testimonies about the principal’s management of the school. Although he initiated 
many new programs and innovations, the initial ideas were always openly 
presented, and teachers were allowed to discuss and criticize them. Such a 
democratic approach was also used when the school worked to overcome critical 
issues. For example, when several teachers complained about the Quota Program, 
the principal explained the approach as follows: 
“I told the teachers that it is a government policy with a good purpose, despite 
its weaknesses. I do understand their complaints because they face such 
children directly in the classroom. But I continue to show my understanding 
and motivation to them. Their experiences [and their complaints] became 
critical inputs for us in deciding what we should do.” (principal, School F)  
He then explained his agreement with the teachers regarding the orientation of 
response strategies adopted by the school. Creativity, effectiveness, and not 
violating the main rules were mentioned as principles considered in the strategy 
selection. He noted that: 
“The key is how to understand teachers’ concerns, then try to find the 
solutions—something effective without breaking the rules. […] The main 
issue is how to find and attract children from low-income families with an 
outstanding achievement to enroll in this school; [so that we can] fulfill the 
quota.” (principal, School F). 
The principals’ persuasive approach at Schools K and F welcomed the 
participation of other school actors in decision-making. Consequently, the 
response strategy selection was influenced by the internal opponent of the demand 
for inclusivity, i.e., teachers who negatively perceive the Quota Program. In these 
schools, the internal opponents’ contribution to specifying response strategies was 
more significant because they could balance the principal’s power. Although such 




also increase the possibility of adopting response strategies with higher resistance 
levels. 
In contrast, schools with the combination of a balanced power structure and 
a command mechanism, i.e., Schools A, C, and D, were observed to have an 
apparent internal conflict resulting from the intra-institutional contradiction. The 
statement of a vice-principal at School A, as quoted below, indicates the existence 
of such a conflict. 
“The principal was not originally from this school, but from another—non-
favorite one31. […] Many things are entrusted to us [i.e., the vice-principals]. 
However, on the other side, especially for something related to policies or 
regulations, the principal becomes very rigid. In meetings, the principal always 
brings very thick documents of regulations and always says, ‘These are the 
rules, we must do this, not that,’ and so on; ‘schools only need to implement 
them.’ In this school, we cannot accept that model [that is, the command 
mechanism]. Hence there were often conflicts because of such a managerial 
approach.” (vice-principal, School A) 
The principal of School A confirmed that an uncompromising attitude was taken 
to make sure that the Quota Program’s objectives could be achieved. As expressed 
below, she had predicted that the local teachers’ reluctance would be higher than 
at other schools.   
“It has been my task to always remind the teachers here that accepting poor 
students with low academic achievement is a must. ‘Do not reject such 
students’; that is what I always say to the teachers assigned to be on the 
admission committee. […] I knew that the school is a favorite one; 
[consequently], students accepted here must be those with high academic 
abilities. Many of them are typically from wealthy families. When all the public 
schools, including this school, are required to accept children from poor 
families, including those with low academic abilities, teachers in this school 
reacted negatively. [They are] not allergic to poor students, but students with 
below-average academic abilities. That is the problem. That is why I am strict; 
[because] there is indeed a reluctance here. […] When the government 
transferred me here, I felt something like, […] ‘Oh my goodness! God, please 
give me the strength.’” (principal, School A) 
 
 




A similar condition occurred at both Schools C and D. As indicated in 
Chapter 5, internal conflicts involving the principal and local teachers, particularly 
those triggered by the intra-institutional contradiction, were observed at these two 
schools. The principals’ command mechanism, particularly in deciding the 
school’s response to the Quota Program, was found to have escalated the internal 
tensions. As a result, these schools’ response strategy reflected either a kind of 
mutual concession or the absence of understanding between the principal and the 
opposing group(s).  
At School A, an avoidance strategy with a decoupling tactic was only used 
in the early years of program implementation and then replaced by another 
strategy, i.e., perception management or filtering at-risk children by emphasizing 
organizational identity. The decoupling tactic was carried out in the former 
principal’s era and continued into the current principal’s second year. Under the 
new principal, the first strategy was adopted when there was no understanding 
between the principal and the opposing group. The principal was aware of the 
decoupling tactic at the school but was unable to prevent it. Mobilized by several 
senior teachers, the strategy was employed without the principal’s support. As a 
result, internal conflicts triggered by the intra-institutional contradiction 
continuously occurred during this time.  
The replacement of the first strategy followed a mutual concession between 
the principal and the opposing group by agreeing that the decoupling tactic is a 
form of violation and will not be practiced anymore. The use of perception 
management as the alternative response strategy was more acceptable for the 
principal because of its softer approach. A vice-principal confirmed: 
“The initiator, a senior teacher, has retired. That [decoupling tactic initiated 
by the senior teacher] happened a long time ago [2010-2013], which was no 
longer allowed. […] We want children from poor families with high academic 
abilities [to choose our school] to fulfill the quota. […] People should not 
think our school is only for children from rich families. It is okay if children 
with low scores are reluctant to choose this school. That is good. However, it 
is dangerous if people still think that this school is a bourgeois school. […] 
the principal said, ‘That is fine.’” (vice-principal, School A) 
The statement, ‘it is dangerous…’ indicates a safe margin for their resistance to 




favorite schools is understandable, rejecting children from low-income families 
could attract public attention and is therefore a riskier course of action.  
Similar conditions related to the decision-making mechanism at School C 
led to a decoupling tactic as the first response strategy, which was then replaced 
by a concealing tactic. This approach meant accepting low-achievement students 
from low-income families without filtering actions and without providing support 
services for them. The latter was conditioned by a conflict between the principal 
and internal opponents and represented a mutual concession. A compromise 
strategy with a balancing tactic adopted by School D—accepting low-performing 
children from low-income families and expelling academic underperformers and 
troublemakers—reflected such a mutual concession. Thus, it can be inferred that 
the schools that combined a balanced power structure with a command mechanism 
tended to employ response strategies with low to medium levels of resistance or 
another strategy with high resistance but a softer approach. 
Meanwhile, silent internal conflicts were identified at the remaining four 
schools (i.e., B, E, G, and H), which combined an unbalanced power structure with 
a command mechanism. In these schools, teachers who previously criticized the 
Quota Program typically remained silent because of pressures from the schools’ 
principals. As confirmed by the principal at School B: 
“Teachers’ complaints must be solved internally at the school [and] not 
exposed publicly. […] I approached such teachers to make sure that they 
understand the importance of this program, that we must accept and serve such 
students. I knew those [difficulties experienced by teachers because] I still do 
teaching tasks. But we cannot and are not allowed to reject them. […] I 
emphasized that we must be wiser in educating them. Do not treat them 
normally as other students [because] they are different. They have lower 
academic achievement and tend to feel socially inferior. […] They are from 
poor families with inadequate learning facilities, so we must understand their 
lack [of support]. If we only pressure them without giving special support, they 
will not want to learn here. They will withdraw themselves from school 
activities, as occurred several times here. But, more importantly, this is the rule 
we must obey, despite its weakness. We need to compensate for its weakness.” 
(principal, School B) 
This statement reflects the school’s primary consideration regarding the 




strategy through a decoupling tactic but then decreased its resistance level by 
adopting a compromise strategy with a pacifying tactic instead. Under the current 
strategy, School B accepted poor students with low academic scores through the 
Quota Program without any filtering actions and provided several supplementary 
programs for such students, such as psychological counseling and additional 
learning services. The school expected that, by providing such supports, the low-
ability students could fulfill the school’s expected learning outcomes. This strategy 
represented what the principal wanted to do, even though it meant suppressing 
criticism and extinguishing internal conflicts. 
However, instead of disappearing, such conflicts simply remained out of 
view, as illustrated by a teacher at School B: 
“[I] said ‘yes’ to him (the principal), ended the conversation quickly, and left 
his room immediately. Many questions are always on my mind, and other 
teachers have the same questions. […] Sometimes, we meet up just to share 
what we experienced, [that is] our struggle in teaching students accepted 
through the quota system. One student always receives very low scores in my 
subject. I have done many things […], but nothing changes. There is something 
wrong with the program [and] with the school in accepting them. […] I just 
do my job professionally [and] control myself during school meetings [and] 
school evaluations. Evaluations for what? Everything must follow his [the 
principal’s] will. [But even] an ant would get angry when stepped on!” 
(teacher, School B) 
 
A similar condition was also found at School G. A vice-principal shared the 
decision-making mechanism frequently used by the principal while emphasizing 
that:  
“[…] here, the principal has absolute power. The vice-principals do difficult 
tasks, have a difficult position, hear varied voices from teachers, try to 
accommodate all things, and prepare alternatives. However, the principal 
often refuses them. […] He wants us to follow the rules, to believe that children 
[with low academic achievement] know the best fit for them and the risks of 
their choices. They have [their own] filter, [the school, therefore] does not 
necessarily need to filter them. […] He said, ‘Because the opportunity to 
choose schools is open, we just need to make sure that people really know 
School G [and] would not make a mistake in choosing the school.” (vice-




The informant indicated that School G’s principal played a dominant role in 
managing the school, including determining its response to the Quota Program. 
This confirms that, in schools with a command “decision-making” mechanism and 
unbalanced power structure, the principal alone determined the response strategy. 
Most strategies adopted were therefore characterized by low-level resistance or 
high resistance with a softer approach.  
 
7.1.4 Organizational identity 
The fourth and fifth attributes identified as the organization-level determinants 
were related to organizational identity (OI), especially its strength and alignment 
to the mainstream demand for selectivity. A school was classified as one with a 
strong OI when the school’s unique characteristics (i.e., the school’s allure) were 
not only widely realized and expressed by the principal and teachers (insiders) but 
also well recognized by students before they enrolled at the school (outsiders). 
Meanwhile, schools were categorized as having weak OI when the school’s unique 
qualities were only perceived, or still only aspired, by the principal and some 
teachers—or it was still an object of debate among the internal community. 
Schools A, F, G, and I were characterized by a strong OI, while a weak identity 
was, in contrast, identified in the remaining seven schools. 
School A was identified as one with strong OIs. This school’s condition is 
reflected in interviews with teachers and school managers. 
“The quota [for poor children with low academic performance] annually set 
by the government is rarely fulfilled [in this school] because they [the target 
of the program] feel inferior first. ... [They] worry that they would not be able 
to follow the lessons well. [They must be] feeling inferior because other 
children accepted through the regular admission have a much higher 
academic score and can be accepted in prestigious universities […] [In 
addition] most students here are publicly seen as ones from wealthy families. 
[That is why] they [the program’s beneficiaries] worry that they would 
struggle to make friends and so forth. […] But, as I know, those in a very small 
number accepted here [through the Quota Program] were not inferior and 
could mingle with other students. They do extracurricular [non-academic] 
activities such as conducting social events, just like other students. In fact, 
they are not seen as poor students. Despite their lower academic performance, 




already knew the characteristics of our school and realized what they should 
do to be a successful learner here.”  (vice-principal, School A) 
The above statement indicates that the typical students who dominate 
School A—ones with high academic abilities, a strong interest in student 
organizations and non-academic activities, and from wealthy families—have been 
well recognized by people in the city. As the informant mentioned, when poor 
children accepted by the school through the Quota Program can successfully adapt 
to the school’s social environment, it can be assumed that they had already known 
the school’s characteristics and the consequences of being a student there. In short, 
poor children enrolling at this school through the Quota Program were those ready 
to attend it, as expected by the teachers and school managers. The school’s OI was 
widely recognized by outsiders (i.e., prospective students and their parents), 
confirming its reputation. As presented further in Chapter 8, this is confirmed by 
students previously categorized as school’s outsiders, i.e., prospective students. 
School I was also found to possess strong OI. While School A was 
recognized as a ‘secular’ public school, School I was widely identified as an 
‘Islamic’ public school. A senior teacher at School I described the characteristic of 
the school as follows: 
“Parents who are religious and want their children to get a good education, 
that stimulate children not only to be smart but also to be religious, must be 
choosing this school. Despite our school’s status as a public school [or not a 
faith-based school], many people include our school as a Muhammadiyah 
school32. This term is initially and widely used by many people outside—[in] 
the society, not by us. They are enthusiastic […] to send their children here 
because they expect their children to become polite, obedient, and religious 
children. A smart child is easier to develop, while educating a child to be a 
sholeh child (i.e., a religious child) is much more difficult.” (teacher, School 
I) 
School I’s popular image as an ‘Islamic’ school required internal solidity and 
consistency in managing the school, including its daily activities. What 
distinguishes School I from other public schools is the shared belief guiding the 
insiders in operationalizing learning activities at the school. Although it was not a 
 
32 Private religious schools managed by Muhammadiyah—one of the largest Indonesian 




formal status, the label of ‘a Muhammadiyah school’ demonstrated that people 
acknowledged that Islamic values are truly attached to the school’s activities.  
School I was also found to have a strong identity with the ambition to 
become excellent in academic terms, which can be juxtaposed with the label of 
“favorite” schools in the city. This ambition can be seen in the school's consistent 
and above-average efforts to increase students’ academic achievements, 
particularly in the final examination. As presented further in Chapter 8, these extra 
efforts and their results are advertised to the public to strengthen the school’s 
attractiveness, although the outcomes still fall short of the school actors’ 
expectations. 
Schools F and G were two other schools with strong OIs. Although it was 
known as a public school with a social environment characterized by strong 
Islamic traditions, School F can be differentiated from School I in its academic 
achievements. School F is consistently categorized as a favorite public school 
because many of its graduates are successfully accepted at the country’s best 
universities. Relatively comparable achievements are held by Schools A and G. 
Excellence in academic achievement has differentiated these three schools (A, F, 
and G) from other public schools in the city. Furthermore, this characteristic 
reflects a shared belief that motivates teachers to maintain or even improve school 
performance. 
The remaining seven schools identified as ones with weak OIs had varied 
conditions, all indicating the early stages of identity emergence processes, 
following Ashforth’s (2016) categorization of “I think” and “we think” levels. 
While an in-depth description of each school OI condition is provided in Chapter 
8, two examples of weak OI found at two different schools are briefly described in 
the following paragraphs.  
School’s C claim as a research school was identified as a weak OI, as 
indicated by its principal: 
“[The practices as] a school of research may distinguish our school from 
others that emphasize score-oriented learning, grades, and exams. We do not 
want to merely pursue academic achievements such as good grades, but rather 
strengthen students’ understandings through research activities as the main 
learning program. In the conventional learning model, students find it difficult 




lesson’s materials, be successful in the examinations, or receive a high score. 
Through research-based learning activities, they can learn more deeply and 
come to greater understandings because they see the real things, not just 
memorizing learning materials. […] The results [of the research-based 
learning activities] must be better […] obtain better scores, but it is not the 
main purpose. Ironically, many teachers [at the school] criticize the research 
school’s essence. If I could choose teachers to be assigned here, 
[reinforcement of research-based learning practices] would be done more 
quickly. But, of course, I am not allowed because this is a public school. […] 
We can only develop what we already have [through] gradual development.” 
(principal, School C) 
Teachers’ perceptions of the practices of the research school diverged. Some 
teachers had a criticism (e.g., research activities are beyond the curricula 
expectations or learning targets; burdening the teachers), while others indicated 
their lack of understanding (e.g., “it is only relevant for academic Olympics33”) or 
lack of ability (e.g., “it requires high creativity, while I only know the standardized 
learning activities”). These diverse perceptions indicated that the research school 
was only the principal’s OI aspiration, which was only supported by some teachers 
but challenged by others. As described in Chapter 8, this identity aspiration was 
intended to maintain what had been more successfully developed in the past.  
A condition found in School K reflected another weak OI. Even though it 
recently became a favorite school, School K does not have a unique characteristic 
distinguishing it from other favorites in the city. The principal of the school 
explained that identity aspirations were still objects of internal debate at the school. 
Reflecting Ashforth’s (2016) “I think” category, School K teachers had numerous 
identity aspirations. 
“Indonesia still has a serious problem associated with public officials and 
parliament members’ corrupt behaviors. So, we want our graduates to be 
people who are not only academically competent but also have high integrity. 
That is the idea I continuously communicate with the teachers in order to have 
mutual understandings and collective actions in developing relevant learning 
programs. However, the teachers have different aspirations: some want to 
strengthen students' nationalist and religious characters, while others told me 
 
33 Academic Olympics here refers the national competitions in various academic subjects, 





that whatever we choose, it should be intended to strengthen students’ 
academic achievements. It is a challenge [and] we need more time to reach a 
mutual understanding.” (principal, School K). 
 
A weak OI was also found at School J. The school provided a unique 
entrepreneurship extracurricular, which helped differentiate the public school from 
others and attract more Quota Program beneficiaries. However, the school’s 
special characteristic was still interpreted differently by insiders, as pointed out by 
a teacher: 
“Some teachers enthusiastically run the program, while others criticize it by 
saying that our general school has turned into a vocational school. Some 
teachers still have a narrow view that the school’s learning program is limited 
to what is stated and determined by the national curriculum. Based on the 
[new] 2013 curriculum, the learning activities should be more flexible. For 
instance, in the economics course, we as teachers may encourage students to 
learn by practice. So, our ‘vocational-like’ learning programs are, in my 
opinion, suitable. Then someone said it could be risky if many children from 
poor families with low academic abilities favor our school.” (teacher, School 
J) 
Regarding the second dimension of OI, i.e., identity alignment, it was 
identified whether or not the identity—established or in current and future 
development—is aligned with the demand for selectivity. Schools A, C, F, G, I, 
and K were characterized by the existence of OI (identities or identity aspirations) 
aligned with the demand for selectivity even though each of these schools 
emphasizes certain features. The remaining five schools (B, D, E, H, and J), in 
contrast, were found to have an identity that was either not aligned with the demand 
for selectivity or even more aligned with the demand for inclusivity. 
As described previously, Schools A, F, G, and I had strong OIs related to 
academic excellence. Consequently, these four schools prefer prospective students 
with higher academic abilities. It means that the OIs of these schools were more 
relevant or aligned with the demand for selectivity. Despite their weak condition, 
identity aspirations emerging and developing in both School C (as a research 
school) and School K (multiple aspirations, such as a school of integrity or a 
nationalist, religious school) were still relevant. Additionally, both School C and 
K did not eliminate the schools’ priority of academic excellence. Such identity 




high academic abilities and are, therefore, more aligned with the demand for 
selectivity. 
Meanwhile, an identity recognized in School B represented one not aligned 
with the demand for selectivity. Its principal, who was internally perceived as the 
dominant actor at the school, intentionally promoted the adoption of art-based 
learning activities. Despite its role as a complementary learning system (not 
replacing the conventional system), the strengthening of practices linked to this 
learning model indicated that their learning processes were not focused solely on 
academic matters. The principal of School B expressed the following approach:  
“We want to be a public school that is not only academically oriented but also 
excels in non-academic [areas, such as] art skills. I believe that art-based 
learning builds positive character [in students]. [In this school], students are 
encouraged and facilitated to learn and practice Javanese culture34 through 
gamelan35, classical dances, and Indigenous language. Javanese culture is […] 
characterized by typical attitudes and interpersonal relations such as being 
calm, polite, and peaceful. We want our students to have such positive 
characters [and] who respect others, by conditioning through Javanese art-
based learnings. Although some teachers still [have] doubt, we hope those 
activities can balance academically-oriented demands. […] society needs to 
realize that this school produces not only academically intelligent children but 
also ones with good manners. Other schools often overlook this. […] Life is 
not only about academic achievement.” (principal, School B) 
Since the learning orientation at School B was not solely to achieve high academic 
scores, the reluctance to accept academically at-risk children was lower. It means 
the school’s OI was more aligned with the demand for inclusivity, despite its weak 
condition (i.e., characterized by insiders’ divergent perception of OI).  
School J was also identified as one with an identity not aligned with the 
demand for selectivity, as indicated by a teacher. 
“This school is a favorite one for children who are eligible to enroll through 
the Quota Program. […] We have an attractive program for them. Through 
this program, we train such children to become entrepreneurs, such as 
craftsmen or in food-related startups. It is different from programs in 
 
34 The culture of the Javanese ethnic group, an Indonesia ethnic with the largest 
population. 




vocational schools. Our programs are like extracurricular activities that can 
be integrated into relevant school lessons. If they cannot continue their study 
at university, they already have entrepreneurial skills to start their own 
business. That is why they are interested in joining us.” (teacher, School J) 
The existence of this special program reflected the school’s concern for children 
from low-income families. Moreover, the school portrayed an identity not aligned 
with the demand for selectivity because it demonstrated its willingness to accept 
academically at-risk children. Although it has been running for several years, this 
program has not yet received full support from all teachers, suggesting that the 
identity was still in a weak condition. 
As presented above, each dimension of OI (i.e., identity strength and 
alignment) determined the schools’ selection of response strategies. When these 
two dimensions are considered together, as Besharov and Brickson (2016) suggest, 
it is expected to be a more robust indicator of OI conditions leading to either high 
or low resistance to the emerging demand. The conditions representing the two 
dimensions of OI were thus merged into a single condition termed identity-based 
resistor; that is, whether the characteristics of OI strongly resist the emerging 
demand or not.  
Schools A, F, G, and I were categorized as having a strong identity resistor 
as their identities were strong and aligned with the more established demand. The 
interview excerpts below exemplify a strong identity resistor of schools I and A. 
The two schools’ identity was aligned with the demand for selectivity, and insiders 
had a convergent perception of its core. 
“We have a very clear purpose and strategies to preserve it [the school’s 
academic achievement]. The teachers really understand what they should do, 
and prospective students and their parents recognize this. Those [efforts, 
achievements, and public recognition] could finally attract more students 
with higher achievement. […] For children with low academic abilities, 
particularly those from poor families, [it depends on] how much they want to 
study hard; the desire to be anak sholeh (i.e., a pious child). […] The school 
can consider it.” (vice-principal, School I).  
 
“People see School A as a favorite, always sought after by high-performing 
children from within and outside the city. This [school status] is firmly 




schools in the city, our students are not interested in the OSN36. The children 
here are more interested in self-development activities, fostering leadership, 
and organizational skills. That is why we emphasize that ‘leadership’ is the 
identity of our school. It is relevant to the students’ interest and to strengthen 
student excellence. The teachers here provide more spaces and opportunities 
for children to develop themselves through student organizations and 
extracurricular activities. We do not restrict and require them to only focus 
on academic matters. [...] [The teachers] already understand the 
characteristics and orientation of our students. That is what makes them more 
attracted to School A than other public schools. However, please do not think 
that we want students here to have a strong interest in leadership and 
organizations, while their academic abilities are weak. Academic ability 
remains the basic requirement to succeed here.” (vice-principal, School A) 
 
The statements above implicitly point out how a strong identity resistor fostered 
school actors’ intentions and preferences in school admission, namely, to attract 
more prospective students with higher academic abilities and/ or to avoid 
academically at-risk children, including the Quota Program’s target group. 
Chapter 8 presents and elaborates on how the school actors strategically manage 
organizational perceptions in particular ways to maintain their preferences. 
Conversely, a school is included in the group of schools with a weak identity 
resistor if and when: a) it has an identity that is characterized as both weak and 
aligned with the established demand for selectivity (Schools C, H, and K); b) it has 
an identity that is both weak and aligned with the emerging demand for inclusivity 
(Schools B, D, E, and J); or c) it has an identity that is both strong and aligned with 
the demand for inclusivity (no observed cases).  
Statements by a teacher and a vice-principal at School H below indicate a 
weak identity resistor. Although the local government has officially assigned the 
school to provide special classes for children who excel in a particular non-
academic field, the informant was concerned that an inappropriate image of the 
school could form. 
 
36 OSN refers to the Indonesia National Science Olympiad, an annual science competition 




“Wrongly, people identify our school as one with excellent non-academic 
achievements37. Some of us [teachers] enjoy the label, but many others do 
not. […] It has decreased the school’s ranking; we have so many talented 
students in that field with low academic performance. […] We want another, 
more appropriate, more advantageous label to highlight something different 
from other public schools, which encourages us to increase our [academic] 
ranking. Divergent ideas [about school identity] have been contested.” 
(teacher, School H) 
Differences in teachers’ perceptions and aspirations about the school’s 
organizational identity clearly point out a weak condition regarding its OI. A vice-
principal at the same school added the following: 
“The group of social science teachers raised an important aspiration; [that 
is] expecting this school to have excellent academic achievements in social 
studies, in school competitions [and] in student scores in the national exams. 
[…] Some of our graduates were also successfully accepted by UGM, [one of 
the prestigious public HEIs in Indonesia], in Social and Political Sciences, 
the Faculty of Law, and the Faculty of Cultural Studies. […] That indicates 
the school’s academic achievement. While the favorite schools in this city 
excel in the natural sciences, maybe we can have an advantage in social 
studies in the future. When more children who are interested in social studies 
join us, that will be a possibility. However, we know such students are 
inappropriately but commonly perceived as ‘second class citizens,’ students 
with lower academic abilities [comparing to those who excel in the natural 
sciences], and so on. That is the challenge.” (vice-principal, School H). 
In the above quotations, both informants highlighted several points that indicate a 
preference for academic matters.  
Another informant at School H, a senior teacher, provided information 
about the school’s history, highlighting that it was a part of a favorite school in 
the city well recognized for its academic excellence. By highlighting the story, the 
informant signaled that the prevalent identity aspiration emerging at this school 
was about academic excellence and, thus, more aligned with the demand for 
selectivity.  
Such a school preference can also be inferred from two other schools (C 
and K) with the same identity-based resistor conditions. Weak OIs trying to be 
 
37 The informant mentioned a specific field. At the beginning of the interview—before 




developed, or re-developed, at these two schools aligned with the institutional 
demand for selectivity. There are two potential implications of such conditions. 
First, the OI may or may not attract the most desirable prospective students, 
depending on the public’s recognition of the school’s OI (see Chapter 8). Second, 
the OI could not be managed to block most undesirable students, meaning that 
other resistance strategies ranging from low to very high are required (see Table 
7.1; the results of csQCA; and Chapter 8).  
The remaining four schools (B, D, E, and J.) also had a weak identity 
resistor with different configurations, namely, a weak OI that was not aligned with 
the institutional demand for selectivity (or more aligned with the emerging 
demand for inclusivity). Because of OI's internal divergent perceptions (the OI’s 
weak condition), the OI’s alignment with the institutional demand for inclusivity 
could not prevent the schools’ resistance to the Quota Program. Despite the 
School B principal’s desire to strengthen its identity as the (Javanese) art school, 
internal resistance to the Quota Program was still observed.  
“I believe that there are no unintelligent people. Many children have bad 
behaviors, but [they are] not stupid, I am sure. They are just crying out for 
attention, … [and] need recognition for their existence; [They are] full of 
energy. We just need to channel their energy toward positive activities. We 
chose art-learning activities for that purpose. When they can be managed, 
they calm down, and then we can effectively educate them. That takes time, of 
course. […] That is why I said, ‘It is no problem for us to accept such 
children.’ I believe that they can be managed. […] Maybe in small numbers 
at first. […] because some teachers still do not understand [and] question its 
relevance.” (principal, School B). 
The principal’s identity aspiration—which had been operationalized into school 
programs and activities—has not yet received full support from the teachers. The 
above excerpt also implicitly infers that School B’s weak identity resistor led to 
the adoption of a low resistance strategy in responding to the Quota Program, as 
described in Chapter 5.  
Table 7.1. below summarizes the organizational attributes described above. 
By pairing the attributes to each school’s resistance level (as presented in Chapter 
5), organizational attributes’ roles in specifying school resistance levels can be 
identified and categorized. A closer look at the data indicates that these public 




organizational attributes. Furthermore, as described above, schools with specific 
organizational attributes tended to have certain resistance levels, suggesting that 
the attributes played their role in combination(s) rather than individually. Based 
on these findings, the next section presents a systematic analysis to identify the 
role of organizational attribute configurations in determining resistance levels. 
 





















School A Central Balanced Command Strong Aligned Strong High 
School B Central Unbalanced Command Weak Not aligned Weak Low 
School C Central Balanced Command Weak Aligned Weak Medium 
School D Peripheral Balanced Command Weak Not aligned Weak Low 
School E Peripheral Unbalanced Command Weak Not aligned Weak Low 
School F Central Balanced Persuasion Strong Aligned Strong High 
School G Central Unbalanced Command Strong Aligned Strong High 
School H Peripheral Unbalanced Command Weak Aligned Weak Low 
School I Peripheral Balanced Persuasion Strong Aligned Strong High 
School J Peripheral Balanced Persuasion Weak Not aligned Weak Medium 
School K Central Balanced Persuasion Weak Aligned Weak Very high 
Source: Own compilation, 2021. 
 
 
7.2 Organizational Attribute Configurations for High and Low 
Resistance 
A more systematic comparison using crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(csQCA) was undertaken to identify general patterns throughout the cases (Marx, 
Cambre´, & Rihoux, 2013; Marx & Duşa, 2011). The analysis processes and 




7.2.1 Preparing the data 
As the basis of the csQCA analysis, a dichotomous data table summarizing the 
qualitative data of conditions (i.e., the identified organizational attributes) and 
outcomes (i.e., resistance levels) was built based on within-case insights captured 
from interviews and secondary data. Because the outcome or dependent variable 
considered here (i.e., the levels of resistance to the emerging demand for 
inclusivity; symbolized as “R”) were originally classified into four levels, it was 
necessary to transform them into dichotomous data as required by csQCA (Rihoux 
& Ragin, 2009). This was done by merging the very high and high resistance levels 
into the broader category high resistance (coded as “1”). In comparison, the low 
and moderate levels of resistance were recategorized into the broader category low 
resistance (coded as “0”). The recategorization resulted in the cases being split 
into five high-level resistance schools (Schools A, F, G, I, and K) and six other 
schools with low-level resistance (Schools B, C, D, E, H, and J). 
As mentioned, two attributes related to organizational identity (OI), i.e., OI 
strength and OI alignment, have been merged into a single, composite one named 
identity-based resistor or identity resistor. Given the small number of the observed 
cases (11 schools), as suggested by Berg-Schlosser and Meur (2009), this merger 
is also required in the use of csQCA to keep the number of factors (traditionally 
called conditions in QCA terminology; see Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) quite low. 
There are, therefore, four organizational attributes considered as the conditions 
leading to either low or high resistance level, including organization position or 
status, power balance structure, decision-making mechanism, and identity 
resistor.  
Regarding organization position or status in the local field (symbolized as 
“P”), each school was categorized as either a central organization (coded as “1”) 
or peripheral organization (coded as “0”). The second influencing attribute was 
the power balance structure between opponents and proponents of the emerging 
demand for inclusivity (symbolized as “B”). Schools with a balanced power 
structure are coded as “1,” while those with an unbalanced power structure are 
coded as “0.” The third attribute is about the schools’ decision-making mechanism 
(symbolized as “M”). The schools were classified into two: the ones in which the 
principal used either the persuasion mechanism (coded as “1”) or the command 




the schools into two groups, i.e., ones with a strong identity resistor (coded as “1”) 
or with a weak identity resistor (coded as “0”). 
Following the csQCA protocol, the necessity and sufficiency analyses are 
carried out based upon a truth table that presents certain combinations of 
conditions related to a given outcome representing both observed cases and non-
observed cases or logical remainders (Rihoux & Mour, 2009). The Tosmana 
software program (Cronqvist, 2016) processed the data of the resistance levels (the 
outcome) and the four organizational attributes (the conditions) of the schools 
observed (the cases) into the truth table that makes their relationship more 
apparent. The number of logically possible configurations in the truth table is 
automatically determined by the formula “2k,” where k is the number of conditions 
(Grofman & Schneider, 2009). In this thesis, k represents the number of 
organizational attributes assessed. Thus, the truth table here consists of 24, that is, 
16 logically possible configurations (see Table 7.2).  
The truth table reveals that, out of 16 logically possible combinations, five 
are linked as the conditions for high resistance schools (R = 1, rows 1–5), and six 
others are linked to low resistance schools (R = 0, rows 6–10). Despite having 11 
schools in the data set, the truth table also revealed that not all logically possible 
combinations are empirically observed, known as “the logical remainders” 
(Rihoux & Mour, 2009), i.e., the six cases in rows 11–16. These six logical 
remainders were plausible or could exist in reality and thus could be included in 

















Table 7.2 Truth Table of High Resistance Schools and the Four Conditions 
Row Conditions Outcome 
P B M I R n Case Labels 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 School F 
2 1 1 0 1 1 1 School A 
3 1 1 1 0 1 1 School K 
4 1 0 0 1 1 1 School G 
5 0 1 1 1 1 1 School I 
6 0 0 0 0 0 2 Schools E and H 
7 1 0 0 0 0 1 School B 
8 1 1 0 0 0 1 School C 
9 0 1 1 0 0 1 School J 
10 0 1 0 0 0 1 School D 
11 0 0 1 0 remainder 0 - 
12 0 0 0 1 remainder 0 - 
13 0 0 1 1 remainder 0 - 
14 0 1 0 1 remainder 0 - 
15 1 0 1 0 remainder 0 - 
16 1 0 1 1 remainder 0 - 
Note: P = central position/ elite status; B = balanced power structure;  
M = persuasion “decision-making” mechanism; I = strong identity resistor;  
R = high resistance school 
 
7.2.2 Analyzing the configurations 
The necessity and sufficiency of the four organizational attributes leading to either 
high or low resistance levels were assessed using a counterfactual analysis. By 
using the Tosmana software program, the csQCA sequentially produces both 
descriptive formulas (reflecting the configurations of conditions based on the 
empirical cases) and parsimonious formulas (reflecting the logically possible 
configurations resulted from the inclusion of the non-observed cases in the 
analysis), which are considered to interpret the findings (Rihoux & Mour, 2009). 
The latter shows combinations of organizational attributes considered the 
necessary and sufficient conditions that would lead to high or low resistance. Table 
7.3 shows the two steps of csQCA analysis with Boolean algebra to obtain the 







Table 7.3 The Stages of Configurational Analysis 
Steps Results 
1 Using Tosmana Program for 
minimizing the configurations 
leading to each of the two 
outcomes (without logical 
remainders) 
1a. the descriptive formula for the high resistance 
outcome 
P*B*M + B*I*M + P*I*m → R  
(Schools F, K) (Schools F, I) (Schools A, G) 
1b. the descriptive formula for the low resistance 
outcome 
i*m + p*B*i → r; it can be reduced into i (m + p*B) 
(Schools B, C, D, E, H) (Schools D, J) 
2 Using Tosmana Program for 
minimizing the configurations 
leading to each of the two 
outcomes (with logical 
remainders) 
2a. the parsimonious formula for the high resistance 
outcome 
I + P*M → R 
(Schools A, F, G, I) (Schools F, K) 
2b. the parsimonious formula for the low resistance 
outcome 
p*i + i*m → r; can be reduced into i (p + m) → r 
(Schools D, E, H, J) (Schools B, C, D, E, H) 
Main conventions and operations of Boolean algebra (Rihoux & Mour, 2009):  
• The uppercase letter represents the “1” value for the binary variables (see Table 7.2). 
• The lowercase letter represents the “0” value for the binary variables (see Table 7.2). 
• The multiplication symbol (*) represents logical “AND.” 
• The addition symbol (+) represents a logical “OR.” 
• The arrow (→) expresses the (usually causal) link between a configuration of conditions 
and the outcome. 
 
Formula 1a shows that a high resistance level to the emerging demand (R) 
is demonstrated by schools with the following combinations: 
▪ Combination 1: a central position in the field (P), a balanced power 
structure (B), and a persuasion “decision-making” mechanism (M); or 
▪ Combination 2: a balanced power structure (B), a strong identity resistor 
(I), and a persuasion “decision-making” mechanism (M); or 
▪ Combination 3: a central position (P) with a strong identity resistor (I) 
and a command mechanism in decision-making (m). 
 
These long descriptive formulas present the observed empirical cases and cannot 
be reduced into simpler ones. Therefore, the next step of the analysis was to 




formula presenting the configuration of conditions leading to high resistance 
(Formula 2a).  
The result shows that a high level of resistance is present in schools with the 
following combinations (see Figure 7.1, presenting the categorization of the 
schools based on their resistance level and condition configurations): 
▪ Combination 4: a strong identity resistor (I), i.e., a composite condition 
consisting of two conditions of organizational identity (i.e., identity 
strength and identity alignment); or 
▪ Combination 5: a central position in the field (P) and a persuasion 
“decision-making” mechanism (M). 
 









Note: the figure was produced by the visualizer tool, TOSMANA 1.5.2 software. 
Meanwhile, as presented in Formula 1b (Table 7.3), the low-level resistance 
schools were characterized by the following combinations:  
▪ Combination 6: a weak identity resistor (i) and a command “decision-
making” mechanism (m); or 
▪ Combination 7: a peripheral position (p) with a balanced power structure 
(B) and a weak identity resistor (i). 
 
Based on the observed cases, these descriptive configurations show that field 




elite status or a central position were found to be adopters of low resistance 
strategies. These two configurations were then reduced into “i (m + p*B),” in 
which a weak identity resistor seems to act as a necessary condition for low 
resistance, yet not as a sufficient condition per se as it always needed to be 
combined with other attributes. By including the logical remainders (or the non-
observed cases) in the analysis, the minimization operator run by Tosmana 
simplified the descriptive formula into a minimal solution containing 
configurations of organizational attributes leading to low-level resistance 
(Formula 2b). It shows that a low-level resistance is conditioned by the following 
combinations (see Figure 7.2 presenting the categorization of the schools based on 
their resistance level and condition configurations): 
▪ Combination 8: a peripheral field position and a weak identity resistor  
▪ Combination 9: a weak identity resistor and a command mechanism in 
decision-making.  
 
A weak identity resistor is identified as the only necessary condition for a low-
level resistance to occur. However, as presented by the simpler formula “i (p + 
m),” this attribute was found not to be a sufficient condition for promoting low-
level resistance and thus needed to be combined with two other attributes, namely: 
peripheral position in the field (p) and command tradition in decision-making (m). 
 














7.2.3 Evaluating the results 
The fit of the QCA results to the underlying data can be assessed by measuring 
their consistency and coverage (Ragin, 2006). The consistency measurement is 
done by calculating the proportion of the cases with a given condition or 
configuration of conditions (X), which are stated in the solution formulas produced 
by the software program and are followed by the occurrence of a particular 
outcome to all cases with that exact condition or combination of conditions (Y) 
(Grofman & Schneider, 2009). A high consistency score (> 75 percent or 0.75; see 
Ragin, 2006) indicates that a causal condition or combination of conditions is 
necessary for a particular outcome to occur. Meanwhile, the coverage 
measurement only makes sense when applied to conditions identified as consistent 
and sufficient for the outcome (Ragin, 2006). The coverage score indicates the 
proportion of cases with a particular path to the outcome (X) to the total cases with 
the outcome (Y). Grofman and Schneider (2009, p. 665) suggest that “the higher 
the coverage score for X, the more cases displaying Y are covered by this sufficient 
condition.” 
Table 7.4 shows that all four cases with a strong identity resistor also 
display a high level of resistance as the outcome; thus, the consistency of a strong 
identity resistor as the condition for a high resistance is one hundred percent, 
meaning entirely consistent. As mentioned earlier, an identity resistor is a 
composite condition representing two single conditions: identity strength and 
identity alignment. Therefore, a strong identity resistor in Track 1 cannot be seen 
as a single condition and should be viewed as a compound condition of a strong 
organizational identity aligned with the more established institutional demand. 
The combination of central position (P) and persuasion in decision-making (M) in 
Track 2 was also found to have perfect consistency as a sufficient combination of 
conditions for a high-resistance outcome. It demonstrates that the evidence is 
consistent with the argument that the two set-theoretical relations exist. However, 
Track 1 has a higher unique coverage score (60 percent) than Track 2 (20 percent). 
Therefore, it is substantial to indicate the fit of the connection between a strong 








Table 7.4 Consistency and Coverage of Conditions for High Resistance 
Crosstab Showing “I” as a Sufficient Condition 
for High-Resistance School (Track 1) 
Not I I  
Not 
R 
6 0 6 
R 1 4 5 
 7 4 N = 11 
 Consistency of “I”  
(4/4 = 100%) 
Raw coverage of I 
(4/5 = 80%) 
Unique coverage of I 
(5/5 - 2/5 = 60%) 
 
Crosstab Showing “P*M” as a Sufficient 
Condition for High-Resistance School (Track 2) 
Not P*M P*M  
Not 
R 
6 0 6 
R 3 2 5 
 9 2 N = 11 
 Consistency of “P*M”  
(2/2 = 100%) 
Raw coverage of P*M 
(2/5 = 40%) 
Unique coverage of P*M 
(5/5 - 4/5 = 20%) 
Crosstab Showing the combinations (I or P*M) 





I or P*M  
Not 
R 
6 0 6 
R 0 5 5 
 6 5 N = 11 
 The solution consistency 
(5/5 = 100%) 
The solution coverage 
(5/5 = 100%) 
Note: I = strong identity resistor (a composite condition); P*M = the combination of central 










Similarly, the result of the same measurement for the sufficient conditions 
potentially leading to the low resistance level, as presented in Table 7.5, shows 
that both tracks have a consistency score of one hundred percent as sufficient 
configurations for low-resistance schools. However, the unique coverage score of 
Track 2 (i.e., the combination of weak identity resistor and command “decision-
making” mechanism) is higher than that of Track 1 (i.e., the combination of 
peripheral position and weak identity resistor). The consistency measure results 
indicate that the set-theoretical argument, i.e., that the combination of a weak 
identity resistor and a command style of decision-making is necessary for low-
level resistance, is entirely supported by the representative cases. The coverage 
measure also ensures that the combination covers a substantial number of cases 
with low-resistance practice. Therefore, it is substantial enough to show that the 
set-theoretic relation of the combination of the two conditions and the low 
resistance practice exists. 
 
Table 7.5 Consistency and Coverage of Conditions for Low Resistance 
Crosstab Showing the combination “p*i” as a 
Sufficient Condition for Low-Resistance School 
(Track 1) 
Not p*i p*i  
Not r 5 0 5 
r 2 4 6 
 7 4 N = 11 
  Consistency of “p*i”  
(4/4 = 100%) 
Raw coverage of p*i 
(4/6 = 66.6%) 
Unique coverage of 
p*i 
(6/6 - 5/6 = 16.6%) 
Crosstab Showing the combination “i*m” as a 
Sufficient Condition for Low-Resistance School 
(Track 2) 
Not i*m i*m  
Not r 5 0 5 
r 1 5 6 
 6 5 N = 11 
  Consistency of “i*m” 
(5/5 = 100%) 
Raw coverage of i*m 
(5/6 = 83.3%) 
Unique coverage of 
i*m 




Crosstab Showing the combinations (p*i or i*m) as 




p*i or i*m  
Not r 5 0 5 
r 0 6 6 
 5 6 N = 11 
 Solution consistency 
(6/6 = 100%) 
Solution coverage 
(6/6 = 100%) 
Note:  
p*i  : the combination of peripheral position and weak identity resistor. 
i*m : the combination of weak identity resistor and command “decision-making” 
mechanism. 
r  : low resistance level. 
 
In summary, the above analysis revealed the different ways in which 
organizational attributes play a prominent role in specifying the levels of 
organizational resistance to a controversial emerging demand imposed by an 
institutional actor. A strong identity resistor was identified as the necessary and 
sufficient (composite) condition for high-level resistance, while a weak identity 
resistor and a command mechanism as the combination of conditions and a low-
level resistance as the outcome were found as a set-theoretic relation. These two 
set relations of high and low resistance exhibit an asymmetric causality, i.e., the 
path to each outcome is not identical, as emphasized by QCA (Ragin, 2006, 2008). 
Showing an equifinality (Fiss et al., 2013; Marx & Duşa, 2011; Ragin, 2006), there 
is an alternate path with a combination of conditions for each outcome. It is 
therefore clear, as first hypothesized, that organizational attributes do play a 
significant role when combined rather than as separate (single) attributes. 
However, based on the csQCA results characterized by an asymmetric causality 
and an equifinality, the hypothesis stating that an identity-based resistor is the key 
attribute needs to be modified for further assessment in future studies (for a more 




























Chapter 8  
Zooming in the Identity-based Response Strategy 
 
 
Like many other public schools at the senior secondary level across Indonesia, the 
observed schools compete for the most desirable prospective students—and they 
continuously strive to attract such high performers. A strategy commonly used by 
these schools is to resort to organizational perception management, i.e., by 
developing school reputation or image. However, in the special context of facing 
the intra-institutional contradiction of school admission (selectivity vs. 
inclusivity), such a strategy was also intentionally used to discourage undesirable 
prospective students (i.e., academically at-risk children). This response reflects a 
resistance strategy to the emerging demand for inclusivity, which was perceived 
as controversial. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this tactic represents high resistance. 
The schools adopting this tactic expressed their identity by signaling an alignment 
with the long-institutionalized practice of competition-based admission and its 
incompatibility with the inclusion expectation. Moreover, the tactic indicated that 
the adopters embraced the long-existing institutional expectation while resisting 
the Quota Program or the manifestation of an emerging institutional demand 
perceived as controversial.  
This chapter presents and discusses variations in the schools’ efforts to 
manage external perceptions, particularly those categorized as the intentional 
responses to the controversial demand. Furthermore, it elaborates on the influence 
of organizational identity-image configurations on the orientation of perception 
management strategies. Schools with the opportunity to employ perception 
management as a resistance strategy can be recognized based on their 
organizational identity conditions. Moreover, this can also explain why other 






8.1 Organizational Perception Management by the Schools 
Four variations in the orientation of perception management practiced by the 
observed schools were identified: a) both attracting and blocking; b) attracting but 
not blocking; c) not attracting but blocking; and d) neither attracting nor blocking. 
These variations were structured based on insiders’ and outsiders’ perceptions of 
the schools, which will be explained in the next subsection.  
Figure 8.1 presents both the configurations of organizational perceptions 
and the variations in the orientations of employing perception management. Four 
schools (A, F, G, and I) were identified as managing their organizational image to 
block, or deter, undesirable prospective students. In comparison, the seven other 
schools’ perception management either was not oriented toward or could not 
hinder such students. Interestingly, substantial differences between schools in each 
category, particularly as regards their attractiveness to prospective students, were 
found. As explained below, these variations are determined by the strength of the 
identity resistor and the congruence of internal-external perceptions.  
Figure 8.1 The Orientations of Perception Management 
 






8.1.1 Attracting and blocking 
Organizational images, both attracting the most desirable prospective students and 
deterring the undesirable ones, were identified at three schools (School A, F, and 
G). In these schools, school actors were attentive regarding the expectations of 
both existing “customers” (i.e., students and their parents represented by the school 
committee) and outsiders (i.e., prospective students and their parents) in order to 
preserve the school identity as the high performing school in the city. The principal 
at School F, for instance, explained this reasoning: 
“The members of the school committee also play their role as school 
advertisers. They help us to spread positive information about the school to the 
public. […] If we can satisfy their demand regarding the number of our 
graduates who are accepted to medical school (i.e., one of most favorite 
programs in universities), [for instance], they would tell the public that the 
school is great. As a result, parents who want to send their children to such 
programs at universities would choose our school [to achieve their goal].” 
(principal, School F) 
 
School actors in these schools, therefore, consistently maintained an image 
based on what external stakeholders expected (i.e., a construed external image). 
To preserve the organizational image as the best schools in the city, the three 
schools more focused on the “indicator” used by the public, rather than by the 
government, in measuring school performance: the number of graduates accepted 
at public HEIs through the SNMPTN, based on academic achievements during 
senior high school period. In this case, the government’s school performance 
parameter, i.e., the school-level average of national final exam scores, was less 
important to these three schools. At Schools A and G, strategies were based on 
early identification and mapping students’ interests in certain public HEIs and their 
study programs. To increase their acceptance in HEIs, students were guided into 
suitable study programs by considering their existing academic achievements. 
Furthermore, the schools compiled and arranged students interested in the most 





“We need to avoid internal competition among our students so that we could 
have a higher number of students accepted through SNMPTN38. Prospective 
students and their parents will primarily look at school’s achievement on 
SNMPTN, rather than the average scores (i.e., school-level average) of 
national exams, as the main consideration in choosing a school.” (principal, 
School G) 
 
Disseminating information about school achievement has been a central 
action of organizational perception management. These three schools used similar 
strategies to influence public audiences’ perceptions of the school, that is, by 
exposing the school achievements. As a senior teacher at School A noted: 
“We shared our achievements in a meeting with the school committee 
members and parents. We pointed out the number of our graduates accepted 
at UGM, UI, ITB— [the three best HEIs in Indonesia]. They would then 
circulate such information to the general public so that everyone knows [the 
quality of our school]. Almost all applicants choose School A because of this.” 
(teacher, School A) 
 
A vice-principal at School A added that, through social media, they share whatever 
they are proud of, such as students winning national or international competitions. 
Such achievements have become a magnet for the school, as indicated by a student 
when telling her experience: “Everyone, like junior-high-school teachers, already 
know that Schools A and F were the great paths to the best universities. 
[Therefore,] we were directed to [choose] these schools.” 
By repeatedly signaling the school’s reputation (and image) to outsiders, 
school actors intentionally worked to attract the most desirable prospective 
students. When the schools were required to accept a certain number of children 
from low-income families, these three schools used perception management to 
attract children from such families with remarkable academic achievements and 
prevent low-performing ones. To accomplish this, School F empowered a student 
council or group of students to organize social and/or academic events targeting 
 
38 SNMPTN is one of nationally integrated systems of public university entrance in which 
the selection is based on academic achievements of participants during their study period 




junior high school students. In these events, student committees were given the 
perfect opportunity to sell their school to prospective students. 
Moreover, the schools use such events to especially attract the most 
desirable group of prospective students. A student who was a coordinator of such 
an educational event in School F explained that the event organizer always did 
jemput bola to make the list of potential participants of the events, including those 
from low-income families. Jemput bola, an original term used by the informant, 
refers to being proactive in looking for the best students by giving special 
invitations to the top junior-high-school students from favorite schools in the city. 
The informant mentioned that 60 percent of the participants were priority guests 
and thus free of charge, while the rest were general registrants who needed to buy 
tickets to participate. They were provided with all information about the school 
during the event: the school’s achievements (including the data of graduates 
accepted to favorite HEIs), facilities, and academic and non-academic programs.  
This approach has always attracted the most desirable prospective students, 
who felt challenged and motivated to join such schools. However, at the same time, 
such actions also created more anxiety for low-performing children to engage in 
such a highly competitive environment. Those from disadvantaged families with 
high academic scores but low self-esteem were particularly persuaded to register 
through the Quota Program. As noted by a teacher counselor at School G: 
“In our school, the number of applicants in the Quota Program was very often 
low. The applicants were only those who realized the challenges they would 
experience here, and they mostly had high academic scores”. (teacher, School 
G) 
 
Another teacher added, 
“Some of them [poor children with solid academic achievement] were great, 
actually. They lacked confidence and needed to be convinced to join us. They 
had the [academic] ability. I know at least two ex-students who were accepted 
into public universities. That is the proof [that] they can survive. […] Not 
always, but in some cases. We just need to look for such children. […] The 
[Quota] Program should help such students [albeit] more selectively.” (a 





Meanwhile, those students who have the same right to benefit from the 
Quota Program but have lower academic performance were left feeling hesitant, 
as experienced by a student at School D: 
“I participated in several events held by different schools, i.e., Schools A, F, 
and J. Actually, I wanted to continue my study at School A. After knowing what 
the school looks like [exactly], I was reluctant to enroll there. The students 
must be clever children, and many of them seem to be from wealthy families. 
When I attended the event, I felt insecure after watching their presentations, 
video displays, and stories. […] I finally decided to choose another school, 
although my parents tried to persuade me to enroll there through the quota 
scheme.” (student, School D) 
 
8.1.2 Attracting but not blocking 
Perception management actions producing organization images that attracted 
desirable prospective students without blocking others were observed at four 
schools: School B, C, K, and J. The first three schools were categorized as 
belonging to the second tier of favorite schools, while the fourth was on the upper 
tier of the least favorite schools in the city. They were attractive not only because 
of their position in the field but also because school actors took symbolic actions 
to affect public perceptions of the schools. What differentiated these schools from 
the previous group of schools was that their public image did not block the Quota 
Program’s target group. A vice-principal at School B explained why and how the 
school creates its identity as an arts and culture school: 
“[…] it is impossible to compete with them [Schools A, F, and G] on the 
academic front. [...] Students with top academic scores would always choose 
them. Therefore, we look for another interesting field. The school of art and 
culture was chosen because we won art competitions several times, such as 
karawitan [Javanese song], [and] traditional dance. The school also has 
relatively complete facilities to support students in learning art, the Javanese 
art39. […] We always expose our skills so that many children and parents see 
and like them. We are here not only to master science or to pursue high 
academic scores. We need a balance, and we are prepared for it. I believe 
that practicing the arts can stimulate our motor skills and sensitivity, which 
is important for developing multiple intelligences.” (vice-principal, School 
B) 
 





While School B worked to develop its new identity and image, 
organizational actors at School C tried to preserve its construed external image as 
a “research school.” As one of the favorite schools in the city, School C has 
distinguished its identity from other (favorite) schools by having students learn 
through research activities. For several years, the school successfully attracted 
prospective students, especially those interested in academia, by advertising how 
research activities can make education a more engaging process. However, the 
sustainability of this strategy depends on initiators and key supporters. A teacher 
at School C, who was a member of the admissions committee, depicted a history 
of the strategy’s development and the challenges to nurture it: 
“When Mr. R (the initiator’s initial) was here, the practices of the research 
school were great. Students participated in both national and international 
[research] competitions. Teachers were also encouraged to develop and 
practice research-based learning activities. […] However, now it is difficult 
to continue such good practices [since the government transferred Mr. R to 
another school]. […] The good thing is that it is still embedded in people’s 
memory. Some of the applicants and parents asked me: ‘What does the 
research school really mean? Do the students learn in the labs every day?’ I 
really liked such questions, as it shows that they support the idea of the 
research school. However, it is much tougher to preserve this identity. […] 
[Since teachers rotate frequently], not all of them have recently supported it. 
However, the identity must be preserved. It makes our school attractive.” 
(teacher, School C) 
 
Meanwhile, organizational actors at School J also exercised what they 
claimed as their (new) identity, which differentiated them from other public senior 
secondary schools. To compete, especially with other non-favorite schools and 
attract prospective students with slightly higher academic performance, School J 
developed a new identity as a “school for entrepreneurs.” A teacher at School J 
described the following:  
"What differentiates us from many other public senior secondary schools is 
our entrepreneurship programs. Besides providing learning programs as 
regulated by the curriculum, we also invite students to learn how to make 
cookies or handicrafts and then sell them creatively. Not every student will 
continue their studies at university, of course. [That is why] we prepare them 
to face that possibility so that they have hope and another opportunity to be 





By piquing the interest of children from low-income families, School J 
could gather more applicants for the special quota admission. As a result, the 
special admission through the Quota Program became more selective. The school 
could, therefore, accept poor students with better academic records. Also, students 
accepted through the quota scheme were genuinely interested in the school and 
placed it as their first choice. They were not the students rejected elsewhere or who 
ranked the school lower on their list. However, this school image could not deter 
disadvantaged children with excessively low academic scores enrolled through the 
Quota Program. A teacher at this school indicated the use of the other strategy to 
avoid accepting such children. She said,  
“The number of poor children with high academic scores increased so that 
the system selected the ones with higher scores. […] However [what if] all 
poor children enrolling through the program are those with academic scores 
that are too low? We have anticipated this. Not to reject them, only informing 
them about better alternatives [redirecting them to more suitable schools]. A 
better strategy [would be] to increase their chance to successfully enter a 
public school through the program.” (teacher, School J) 
 
Strengthening the school image as a school for entrepreneurship was also not 
directed to block children with low academic achievements from higher-income 
families in the regular admission system. A vice-principal at the school who 
initiated the entrepreneurship programs explained that:  
“Having entrepreneurship skills would be more important and more relevant 
for the future. It is not only to help poor students but also to help students [in 
general] to face competition in a changing world. Having academic 
achievements will not be enough.” (vice-principal, School J) 
 
The “attracting but not blocking” image was also observed at School K. As 
a relative newcomer in the list of top schools in the city40, School K actively 
promoted its achievements to the public. A vice-principal at the school stressed the 
following: 
“It is important [to promote the school’s reputation continuously] since people 
need to know the fact that there is an alternative place to send their children. 
They must know that many of our graduates were accepted by favorite 
 
40 School K obtained a reputation based primarily on its academic achievements in the 




universities through SNMPTN; some were accepted into prestigious programs 
such as economics, business, and medical school. […] Our graduates’ NEM 
[the school-average score of national exams] was also high, sometimes as high 
as those obtained by School G [another favorite school].” (vice-principal, 
School K) 
Regarding the emerging demand for inclusivity manifested by the implementation 
of the Quota Program, however, another vice-principal at School K added: 
"Among the schools at the top level, School K is the most disadvantaged by the 
Quota Program. Those who do not dare to choose Schools A, F, or G [the top 
three schools in the city], for sure, would choose our school. The three schools 
have had a reputation for a much longer time, and children with great 
academic standing always choose them. As a school recently included on the 
top list, we suffer as a consequence. [Meaning, we] tend to be favored by 
students who want to study in a top school but do not have high academic 
scores. They think that competition among students here is not so fierce. … [but 
they are wrong], they would be disappointed with the reality.” (vice-principal, 
School K) 
 
In contrast to school actors at the three other schools mentioned earlier, in 
which the unblocking effect of the schools’ image was found not to matter, many 
teachers, including the managers of School K, expressed their disappointment with 
the effect, which is represented by the vice-principal’s statement above. In 
addition, the absence of the unblocking effect can also be indicated from 
experience by a student accepted in School K through the Quota Program: 
"Using the right as a holder of the card [an identity card indicating a low-
income family registered in the local government’s database] and choosing 
public schools through the Quota Program was an easier path. However, I 
knew that both School A and F are always dominated by ‘burank’41; it was 
impossible to consider even applying there. [That is why] I chose the other 
schools, [namely] Schools K and C. And surprisingly, I was accepted here. 
(student, School K).” 
 
 
41 ‘Burank’, which stand for pemburu ranking (in English: rank hunter), is a particular 
term commonly used by school-aged children in the city which is referring to children 




8.1.3 Not attracting but blocking 
The only school managing its image with the “not attracting but blocking” 
orientation was School I, one of the non-favorite schools in the city. Like others, 
School I pragmatically strived to attract more prospective students with higher 
academic scores as an instant effort to improve school academic achievements. As 
a part of image management, the school actors propagated the school’s 
achievement as evidence of the school’s excellence. Moreover, they want School 
I to be considered equal to the favorite schools in the city. As a senior teacher 
explained:  
“In choosing a school, people primarily look at its academic achievements, 
[especially] the number of graduates accepted in public HEIs. […] 
Nevertheless, we have a strong motivation to show the public that we are also 
a good school. We always received lower input [i.e., accepting more students 
with lower academic scores]. However, sometimes we released higher output 
[i.e., the school-average score of the national final exams], even compared to 
the favorite schools. We show this information to the parents, and the public 
should also see it. This [the school’s academic performance] indicates that 
the education here is also great.” (teacher, School I) 
 
A vice-principal at the school also added: 
“Indeed, it needs [more] time. We always post the school’s activities [and 
school achievements] on social media. […] We ranked the sixth or seventh for 
the input, but our output has been ranked the third or at least fifth. One day, 
our society will recognize this.” (vice-principal, School I)  
 
Compared to the other schools, School I was still very serious in preparing 
students to face the national examination to obtain a higher school average score42. 
The vice-principal for curriculum at the school mentioned that, to succeed in the 
national exams, School I always prepared the students from Grade 10 (three years 
before the national exams) onward by conducting initial preparation activities. 
Other preparations included more in-depth learning programs for Grade 11 and 12 
every morning before the official class begins. For Grade 12, there are evaluation 
 
42 Since 2015 the national final exam is no longer a standard of education completion and 
only aimed to map and analyse students’ competences in every region. Since then, schools 
particularly at senior secondary level are no longer pursuing high average scores on the 
national exam results. Instead, schools’ learning activities are focused on preparing 




tests followed by tutorials, extra learning activities for low-performing students, 
early start and accelerated learning activities in the second semester, and a 
simulation test. These substantive arrangements by the school can also be 
categorized as actions aimed to build positive perceptions of the school. 
Rather than highlighting the number of graduates selectively accepted in 
HEIs through the SNMPTN, a measure of school quality more widely used by 
society, School I was found to prefer another indicator, as mentioned by a teacher 
above. Although the government still uses the national exam scores to evaluate 
school performance, this indicator is no longer considered by the public as relevant 
in assessing the quality of senior secondary schools in Indonesia. 
The identity that differentiates School I from the other schools is one that 
has officially been authorized by the government as a model in Islamic education. 
As described by a vice-principal at the school: 
“Everyone has recognized our school as a model in delivering Islamic 
education by practicing the Islamic values in daily life—during school time. 
[…] Every morning before the lesson begins, we require Muslim students to 
do ‘tadarus,’ [a mass recital of the Al Quran]. They also must do ‘sholat 
Dhuhur’ [one of the five daily obligatory prayers for Muslims] together and 
even ‘sholat sunnah Dhuha’ [a non-mandatory prayer]. […] All those 
activities are intended to form students with good habits and characters. That 
is our motivation, not only to produce intelligent children but also those with 
positive characters based on Islamic values.” (vice-principal, School I) 
 
A senior teacher at School I very proudly mentioned a particular term used 
by the public to name the school, i.e., a Muhammadiyah public school. The school 
was perceived to be the same as, or even exceeding, Islamic private schools 
because of the Islamic traditions practiced at the School. She said, “Parents who 
desire their children to be ‘sholeh’ (i.e., pious and devout children), they would 
certainly send their children to our school.” 
However, what has been internally regarded as a positive image or unique 
identity was perceived negatively by many children. The alternative indicator of 
academic excellence used and echoed by the school was not perceived as attractive. 
Moreover, the apparent identity as an Islamic public school and persistent efforts 




resulted in a blocking effect. The perceptions expressed by a student from another 
school below confirmed the existence of such an effect.  
“I am a Muslim, wearing a hijab, but I am not comfortable [if I have] to 
attend School I or School F that are identical to the Islamic school. Even 
though my [national exam] score was high, I did not choose School F and 
preferred to attend School A or C because of its pluralistic and ‘free’ social 
environment. The main objective is to learn science. We also study religion 
as well but not in strict and restraining ways” (student, School C) 
 
8.1.4 Not attracting and not blocking 
Three schools (D, E, and H) were found to use perception management actions that 
neither attracted nor blocked prospective students. Although typically placed as 
the second or the third choice by students, these three schools are still preferable 
compared to private schools. Because of their reputation as “peripheral schools” 
among public senior secondary schools in the city, they must always work harder 
to attract prospective students with higher academic achievements. Moreover, the 
schools’ managers and teachers always need to motivate new students in their first 
weeks of school. A vice-principal at School E explained why: “Many of them often 
feel discouraged because this school was actually their second or even third 
choice.” This indicates that the three schools were considered less attractive by 
children. The schools could not overcome public perception, which casts them 
aside as the last option in the public school admission system. 
Despite their differences in content, the three schools’ perception 
management actions were identical. For instance, some teachers in School H 
indicated their inconvenience with the school’s image, which has already been 
constructed as a sports school, and attempted to show that this particular image 
does not reflect the school’s entirety. A vice-principal clarified that “as one of the 
schools assigned by the local government to provide educational service for 
school-aged athletes, we only have two special classes for them. It does not mean 
that this school is a sports school. People should realize that.” A teacher at the 
school thus lamented: 
“Because of it, [the inaccurate image], we are stereotyped by the public that 
our school is only a place for such students [athletes], who commonly have 




academic achievement are now coming here because of it.” (teacher, School 
H) 
 
At every opportunity, school actors made clarifications, such as in parent-
teacher conferences or open events hosted by the school. In addition, in efforts to 
enhance its attractiveness, such as on the school’s website, the school highlighted 
its history (i.e., that School H was historically a part of, and therefore had shared 
resources and practices with, another school which is now perceived as a favorite 
school with outstanding academic achievement in the city) and students’ 
achievements in non-academic matters. 
Similar actions were also taken by School D. The school actors repeatedly 
highlighted the existence of a historical building inside the school founded by the 
Dutch in its colonialism era, which became a silent witness to the history of the 
Indonesian youth’s role in fighting for national independence. This focal point was 
meant to build an image of the school’s long contribution to national development 
through education. Additionally, information about the school’s non-academic 
achievements, and a small number of graduates accepted at universities through 
the SNMPTN scheme, was circulated to attract public interest.  
Another similarity among these three schools relates to their current search 
for a more relevant and interesting identity that could distinguish them from other 
(public) schools and generate more local interest. Teachers and managers at these 
three schools engaged in debates regarding their identity search, which signaled 
that the school’s identity is still weak or in the early phase of its development. For 
instance, as described by a vice-principal at School E:  
“Since we always have so many students from poor families, the chairman of 
our school committee, who was the former school principal, proposed that 
being a ‘school for the poor’ could be a relevant identity. Some teachers think 
that it could be formalized, but others refuse it.” (vice-principal, School E) 
 
Another vice-principal at the school who doubted that particular idea tried to 
propose an alternative one: 
“We are located in a tourism hub [and] could drive the school development as 
‘an entrepreneurial school’ focusing on tourism. […] Students could practice 
their English on the streets, [and] at tourist destinations. In Economics, [they 




promoting and selling them to tourists. […] However, it is difficult to make 
teachers understand that this challenge is good for us.” (vice-principal, School 
E) 
 
8.2 Identity-Image Configurations 
At this juncture, it is relevant to trace the causes of the different orientations of 
perception management actions taken by the schools (i.e., intended image). This is 
done by focusing on two substances. The first is the configurations of organization 
identity (i.e., the identity resistor—the combination of two conditions of 
organization identity: identity strength and alignment). The second is the 
congruence between construed image and reputation (whether an organization is 
perceived to be the same or different by insiders and outsiders). 
 
8.2.1 The attractive schools 
The illustrative interviews above show that schools are perceived as attractive 
when they have an excellent academic reputation (i.e., many of their graduates are 
successfully accepted into HEIs, particularly through the SNMPTN path); have an 
interesting identity (or identities) that distinguish them from other schools; or are 
quite capable of maintaining public expectations or construed external image. 
Moreover, there was an agreement between insiders and outsiders about what the 
school looks like (image congruence), meaning that either outsiders admitted what 
insiders wanted their organization to be seen as or insiders followed what outsiders 
expected. In each school, the internal actors actively propagated school 
trustworthiness (Elsbach, 2003, 2006), i.e., having abilities to achieve desired 
goals, namely, to send more graduates into universities through the SNMPTN 
path—or without taking admission written exams (Schools A, F, G, K, B, and C); 
to develop multiple intelligences (School B, “arts and culture school”); to facilitate 
learning comprehension through more fun learning activities (School C, “research 
school”); or to supplement students with practical entrepreneurship skills (School 
J). 
However, among these attractive schools, it was also found that there were 
three schools (A, F, and G) with a strong identity resistor while the rest possessed 
a weak identity resistor. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the former was characterized 




demand for inclusivity. This identity was indicated by teachers and school 
managers alike, without any doubt and internal contradiction. During the 
interviews, they also characterized their respective schools and differentiated them 
from the others. This identity guided the school actors in developing strategic and 
routine programs, including responding to the emerging demand. 
The competitive school identity was a central reason for schools’ actors to 
use perception management not only to attract children with high academic 
achievements but also to prevent those who should be the target group of the Quota 
Program. By highlighting the image as a highly competitive school, the three 
favorite schools intentionally sent the message that their schools are not suitable 
for students with low academic abilities, even though the government gives them 
the right and enables them to attend. 
Meanwhile, a blocking effect was not found to result from the intended 
image managed by other attractive schools with a weak identity resistor. Two 
different configurations characterized this weak identity resistor. The first, which 
was found in School C and K cases, represented the substance of school identities 
unaligned with the institutional demand for inclusivity but in weak condition in 
terms of the solidity of insiders’ perceptions about the core differentiating it from 
other schools. The second, as found in Schools B and J, indicated that the school 
identities were aligned with the emerging demand for inclusivity but in weak 
condition. Both in Schools B and J, their core identities were still an object of 
internal debates and, therefore, internal refusal or support towards the institutional 
demand for inclusivity had not been established. 
Because of its weak condition, perception management actions were either 
not directed (as found in the cases of Schools B and J) or were not able (in Schools 
C and K) to prevent undesirable students from choosing these schools. The images 
of School B as the arts and culture school, which highlighted the importance of 
academic-and-non-academic balance in learning activities and outputs, impressed 
students with lower academic ability, thus attracting those from low-income 
families. Similarly, such children were also interested in School J as the 
entrepreneurship school that prepares its students with hands-on business skills. 
Despite their identity aligned with the institutional demand for selectivity, 




students. Conversely, such children were interested in these two schools not only 
because of their status as favorite schools in the city but also due to their attractive 
images. The research school was seen as a school with more exciting and valuable 
learning activities that would help students with lower academic abilities overcome 
their difficulties. As a public school recently included in the four most excellent 
schools academically, School K was perceived by such children as the alternative 
favorite school with less competition, both in terms of admission selection and 
learning activities. 
 
8.2.2 The unattractive schools 
The four schools categorized as unattractive, i.e., Schools D, E, H, and I, were all 
characterized by a mismatch between the organizational image desired by insiders 
and the one perceived by outsiders. These unattractive schools were unable to 
accomplish what most expected from public schools, such as a promising path to 
universities without written admission tests. While the school actors attempted to 
highlight other advantages of their school, such as being included in the list of 
schools with high academic achievements based on an alternative indicator, as a 
school with critical historical importance, or one with excellent non-academic 
achievements, they were not considered the first choice by most students with 
strong academic standing. 
However, a strong identity resistor possessed by School I differentiated it 
from the other unattractive schools. The school’s identity has directed the school’s 
actors not only to attract the most desirable students (despite its failure) but also to 
deter undesirable ones. Several efforts systematically followed School I’s strong 
desire to be considered equal to other schools with outstanding academic 
achievements. These included: promoting school achievements by alternative 
measurements of school performance; managing systematic programs to meet the 
school’s target based on that alternative measurement; and preferring students with 
more acceptable academic achievements. The latter automatically established the 
filter for students with low academic scores.  
Recognizing that children with juvenile delinquency tend to have low 
academic performance, School I strengthened its identity as an Islamic school by 
developing strict Islamic traditions to build students’ positive character. The 




figure, was intended to support the school’s ambition to improve students’ 
academic achievements. Therefore, the school also reinforced the efforts by 
implementing more programs to achieve academic targets. These two concerns 
became the school’s safeguard in preventing children with such behavioral 
problems from being interested in the school. As a result, the Quota Program’s 
target group, especially those with such behaviors and require special attention, 
tended to exclude School I from their list of school choices. In fact, that identity 
and image made the school unattractive for non-Muslim children or those who 
desire more space for freedom during their school-age.  
Meanwhile, a weak identity resistor identified in the remaining three 
schools (D, E, and H) did not encourage the school actors to use perception 
management to block the Quota Program’s target group. Identity aspirations 
mentioned by school actors in these three schools were not all aligned with 
institutional demand for selectivity. In addition, the school actors’ divergent 
perceptions of their school characteristics indicated their weak school identities. 
Such conditions caused difficulties for the schools to attract students with high 
academic achievements. Moreover, these schools must accept the reality of being 
the last resort for children who want to attend a public school in the city. 
 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, this chapter reveals the mechanism of reciprocal identity-image 
interrelationship in perception management, which revealed the processes in which 
schools adopted a type of soft-but-high-level resistance strategy in the face of 
institutional complexity. The core of this resistance strategy is in the strategic use 
of organizational images, developed or maintained based on either the current OI 
or identity aspiration to signal organizations’ acceptance of an institutional demand 
on the one hand and to avoid direct refusal of an undesirable or controversial 
demand on the other.  
The empirical cases show that the insiders (i.e., school actors) disseminated 
the intended images containing “hidden messages” to reach targeted outsiders. In 
this way, the target was not the institutional actors imposing demands but rather 
the program beneficiaries whose interests to the organization are influenced by 
such demands. When an outsider’s perception of an organization is influenced by 




particular outsiders, such undesirable individuals would voluntarily stay away. 
Based on the empirical findings of this thesis, such actions were intended to ensure 
that the organization’s compliance with the undesirable demand is no longer 
relevant. 
Thus, this chapter provides novel empirical evidence of the links between 
the extant literature on managing organizational perceptions (i.e., organization’s 
image, identity, and reputation) and institutional theory. The thesis provides 
empirical evidence of the interplay between macro, meso, and micro levels, 
following several previous works (e.g., Ashforth, 2016; Besharov & Brickson, 
2016; Besharov & Smith, 2014). It makes contributions to institutional theory by 
highlighting the interlinkages between institutions (the influence of contradicting 
institutional demands on organizational responses), organizational factors (how 
organization characteristics determine organizational responses to institutional 
contradiction), and individuals (how organizational actors create and communicate 
their organization images as a response strategy, and how outsiders perceive it).  
Furthermore, the thesis confirms the influence of organizational identities 
(as developed by organizational actors) in shaping organizational images that 
represent outsiders’ perceptions of the organization, as theorized by previous 
works (see Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019). However, while previous work has 
primarily focused on the effect of impression management on organizational 
attractiveness, i.e., to attract potential job applicants (Dineen & Allen, 2016; 
Turban & Cable, 2003) or prospective students (Pampaloni, 2010; Sung & Yang, 
2008), this chapter draws attention to the use of perception management not only 
for such intentions but also for discouraging those perceived as undesirable or not 
aligned with organizational identity. As shown above, such a strategy is adopted 
by organizations with a strong identity resistor, i.e., having both an identity 
incompatible with an institutional expectation and insiders’ convergent 
perceptions of the organization’s identity. The theoretical discussions regarding 
interrelations between organization identity, image, and reputation in the use of 











Unpacking the Empirical Findings 
 
While the empirical findings are presented in the four previous chapters (Chapter 
5-8), Chapter 9 provides further elaborations on the main findings focused on the 
five theoretical traditions and literature identified earlier, namely; (i) stereotypical 
isomorphism as isomorphic general responses in the context of intra-institutional 
contradiction; (ii) complexity levels and their role in enabling variability of 
responses to the emerging demand perceived controversial; (iii) the role of 
influencing configurations of organizational attributes; (iv) perception 
management as a novel type of resistance strategy; and (v) the reciprocal identity-
image interrelationship in perception management. The contributions of this thesis 
to new institutional theory and organizational studies are highlighted in the 
following subsections. 
 
9.1 Stereotypical Isomorphism 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on isomorphism (see Ashworth et 
al., 2009; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) by revealing 
that isomorphism can occur within institutional complexity. Answering 
Boxenbaum and Jonsson’s (2017) call for research that explores the relationship 
between institutional contestation and isomorphism, this work proposes the notion 
of stereotypical isomorphism to comprehend isomorphic responses occurring in 
the context of intra-institutional contradiction, a particular circumstance of 
institutional complexity.  
As empirically demonstrated in this work, stereotypical isomorphism can be 
differentiated from the three traditional ones: coercive, normative, and mimetic 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, the notion suggested here is not the fourth 
pillar or element of institution; it does not add another element to Scott’s (2014) 
three pillars framework—regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements 
of institutions. Instead, stereotypes following glorifications of long-existing 




6, represent other symbolic and activity-based carriers of the cultural-cognitive 
element of institutions, which will be elaborated upon below. 
Following the theoretical explanations of current studies on stereotypes and 
prejudices43 (see Burn, 2011; Correll, Judd, Park, & Wittenbrink, 2010; Dovidio 
et al., 2010; Stangor, 2016; Stevens & Görgöz, 2010), stereotypical isomorphism 
here refers to the homogeneity of practices across organizations in an 
organizational field or population, that is primarily caused by negative beliefs in 
practices prescribed by, and the groups of people benefited from, the new demand 
that runs counter to the long-standing one. Such convergent practices are 
characterized by the glorification of long-institutionalized practices prescribed by 
a mainstream demand. At the same time, the compliance with the established 
demand is followed by the resistance to a new institutional demand perceived as 
controversial. As found in the empirical cases, most of the school actors tended to 
have taken-for-granted perceptions and preferences for prescriptions derived from 
the widespread institutional demand. Simultaneously, they negatively perceived 
all things that contradicted the mainstream demand or schema, i.e., questioning the 
newly emerging schema and stereotyping groups of people disadvantaged under 
the mainstream schema or benefiting from the alternative schema. Therefore, 
without any objective reasons or sufficient knowledge, the organizational actors 
are likely to resist prescriptions from the controversial demand imposed later by 
the government.  
The glorification of the long-held practice reflects that taken-for-
grantedness has been a basis for compliance and that constitutive schema is a basis 
of the order, both of which are principal dimensions of the cultural-cognitive 
element of institutions mentioned by Scott (2014, p. 60). The organizational actors’ 
preference for embracing the mainstream schema could be perceived as 
acceptable, natural, and legitimate actions that followed a widely held cultural 
belief (see Ocasio et al., 2017; Scott, 2014; Thornton et al., 2012), or the logic of 
appropriateness (see March & Olsen, 2006), regarding school admission. The 
 
43 In general, social psychologists define stereotypes as category-based generalizations 
that link category members to typical attributes (Correll et al., 2010, p. 46). Furthermore, 
Dovidio et al. (2010, p. 7) highlight that stereotypes not only promote discrimination by 
systematically influencing perceptions, interpretations, and judgments, but they also arise 




schema was taken for granted because it has long been institutionalized in the 
organizational field and society. 
However, glorification of a long-held practice here should be differentiated 
from predisposition, an activity-based carrier of institutions mentioned by Scott 
(2014, p. 96). Glorification as an institutional carrier is more than “habitualized 
action,” “routines,” “standard operating procedures,” and “repetitive patterns of 
activity” identified by Scott (2014, pp. 100-102); “distinctive repertoires of activity 
providing templates or models” as highlighted by Clemens (1993); or “habitual 
disposition” proposed by Gronow (2008). Like those other activity-based carriers, 
glorification can also become a central feature of an institution. However, as found 
in the empirical cases, glorification indicates an excessive preference for 
routines—perceived as “the best” and irreplaceable—despite the awareness of the 
negative implications. Moreover, this tendency is followed by skepticism toward 
the opposing schema introduced later by the institutional actors to eliminate the 
mainstream schema’s negative effects.  
Glorification also tends to strengthen stereotypes of people disadvantaged 
by the established mainstream schema, e.g., regarded as less competent, less 
motivated, or undesirable. When the alternative schema challenges the mainstream 
and benefits the undesirable disadvantaged parties, such stereotypes can be the 
primary fuel for resistance by affecting organization actors’ perceptions and 
behaviors. Therefore, this work proposes stereotypes as another symbolic carrier, 
similar to categories and typifications already listed in Scott’s (2014) symbolic 
systems as institutional carriers. 
Like categories and typifications, stereotypes reproduce a particular 
category of people and shape interpretation and perception about them. However, 
stereotypes also influence emotion, cognition, and behavior (Dovidio et al., 2010; 
for comparison, see Scott, 2014), and distortion and bias are very likely (Stangor, 
2016). While categories or classifications are made by employing particular 
considerations, such as purposes (Zuckerman, 1999), minimum standards (King & 
Whetten, 2008), prototypes (Rosch & Mervis, 1975), the extensions of causality 
and goal-orientation (Durand & Paolella, 2013), and socio-cultural reasoning 
(Glynn & Navis, 2013), typifications rely on general knowledge and common 
sense (Kim & Berard, 2009). In contrast, stereotypes reflect oversimplified 




groups of people44 (see, e.g., Dovidio et al., 2010; Graham & Lowery, 2004; 
Kunesh & Noltemeyer, 2019; Sacks, 2018). Social psychologists increasingly 
view that “relatively mild stereotypes and biases are automatically elicited by 
salient social categorizations and identities,” and in turn, enable “the more virulent 
manifestations of prejudice and discrimination” (Duckitt, 2010, p. 41). 
Glorification, skepticism, and stereotypes fundamentally represent cultural-
cognitive elements of institutions (Table 9.1). While glorification should be 
included as the other kind of activity-based carriers, skepticism and stereotypes can 
be added into symbolic carriers. These extensions are relevant to new 
institutionalists’ emphasis on cognitive elements rather than regulative and 
normative elements, highlighting the primary attention on the effect of cultural 
belief systems (Lindenberg, 1998; Meindl, Stubbart, & Porac, 1994; Phillips & 
Malhotra, 2017).  
 
Table 9.1 Institutional Pillars and Carriers 
Carriers Pillars 
















• Governance systems 
• Power systems 
• Regimes 




Activities • Monitoring 
• Sanctioning 
• Disrupting 
• Roles, jobs 
• Routines 
• Habits 











Source: Scott, 2014, p. 96, with extensions proposed (marked with bold, italic words). 
 
44 This work provides empirical findings of how the school actors’ stereotypical perceptions 
of academically at-risk students determined the schools’ responses to the new institutional 
demand requiring the schools to include such students. How stereotypes of particular groups 
of people affect discriminatory behaviours of public servants have also been confirmed by 
many other studies, such as in the education sector (e.g., Kunesh & Noltemeyer, 2019), law 






The three additional carriers show that institutions and institutionalization 
are not only related to those widely known or cultural-cognitively accepted. At the 
same time, particularly when a schema or an institutional logic has been accepted 
and practiced for a long time, ones regarded as unacceptable or counter-normative 
have also cognitively been established. As Scott (2014, p. 57) mentions, 
“Institutions exhibit stabilizing and meaning-making properties because of 
the processes set in motion by regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
elements. These elements are the central building blocks of institutional 
structures, providing the elastic fibers that guide behavior and resist 
change.” 
 
In the second edition of The SAGE Handbook of Organizational 
Institutionalism, a book compiling current institutional theories of organizations, 
Scott (2017, p. 855) reflects that “[…] effective and robust institutional 
frameworks are likely to involve an admixture of all three elements. The elements 
are associated with diverse mechanisms—coercive, normative, and mimetic—that 
work in different ways and varied combinations.” However, the interlinkage and 
interaction between the three mechanisms have not been studied in-depth 
(Greenwood & Meyer, 2008). This thesis provides an empirical example of 
institutional contradiction involving the two conflicting logics or demands 
established through different mechanisms and various elements. 
While stereotypical isomorphism differs from coercive isomorphism, they 
had interactive effects in the studied case. Coercive isomorphism occurs when 
coercive pressures—such as politically exerted by authorities or culturally 
expected by society—are widely accepted and practiced by organizations to secure 
legitimacy, leading to homogeneity in a field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Frumkin 
& Galaskiewicz, 2004; Scott, 2014). In the public sector, the government typically 
uses coercive mechanisms to institutionalize the desired practices by pressuring 
agencies to comply with regulations. Those same mechanisms can be applied to 
change institutionalized practices or to implement new practices in a field. In the 
education sector, several prior works provide empirical evidence of isomorphism 
at various levels (e.g., Anafinova, 2020; Levitt & Nass, 1989; J. W. Meyer, Boli, 




Such a practice occurred in this study’s case. In the observed schools and 
across Indonesia, merit-based admission was widely applied and became common 
practice initially due to coercive pressures through government regulations. As a 
result, the practice was institutionalized and led to isomorphism. However, when 
this practice became taken for granted, meaning that the institutionally expected 
practices happen without question or deviation (see Hirsch, 1997), the coercive 
mechanism was no longer the cause. Instead, cultural and cognitive elements were 
more dominant than the regulative element, and isomorphism occurring under the 
intra-institutional contradiction was, as argued in this work, caused by a cultural-
cognitive mechanism. This points to the effect of multiple mechanisms in 
institutionalization processes.  
Because of the dominant cultural-cognitive element, the government faced 
challenges when introducing the new institutional demand for inclusivity through 
coercive mechanisms. Despite dependence on the government resources and legal 
authority to change admission rules, the schools’ response bundles—embracing 
the mainstream schema while resisting the new one—points to the relative 
powerlessness of the new demand’s coercive influence. These empirical conditions 
indicate that DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) coercive isomorphism fails to explain 
why pressures intended to create compliant and homogenous responses to new 
institutional demands—especially those conflicting with the mainstream—do not 
always work.45 
This empirical finding is not particularly surprising. As institutional 
pluralism receives greater attention from institutionalists, more current works on 
the education sector confirm the absence of isomorphism (see, e.g., Bertels & 
Lawrence, 2016; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). Moreover, the notion of DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) coercive mechanism, representing a top-down structural 
perspective, has been criticized by other institutionalists. The institutional logics 
perspective offers the following prominent criticism that highlights embedded 
 
45 Prior works including the classics have provided theoretical predictions and empirical 
evidence of organizations’ symbolic compliance with coercively institutional demands 
by employing various resistance strategies (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). 
However, this thesis differs from previous works in term of both its focus and the context 
faced by the observed organizations, i.e., studying both isomorphism (homogeneity) and 
heterogeneity of organizations when facing the co-existence of contradicting institutional 
demands. As presented, the nature of isomorphism and the variation in responses can be 




agency principles: under circumstances of institutional pluralism and complexity 
(see Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2017; Yu, 2015), the amalgamation 
of both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms is more likely to occur, meaning that 
agentic actions can shape or be shaped by social and cultural structures (Ocasio et 
al., 2017). 
Following Zucker’s (1991) concern with institutions’ cognitive aspects and 
the micro-level foundation of institutionalization processes, Phillips and Malhotra 
(2017) deliver more philosophical criticism. Without rejecting the role of coercive 
and normative pressures in creating social orders and causing isomorphism, they 
doubt whether these mechanisms produce real institutions. Phillip and Malhotra 
(2017) highlight that institutions should be taken-for-granted and widely practiced 
without any forces, sanctions, and inducements (the features of coercive 
mechanism) or social obligations (the basis of compliance of normative 
mechanism). As Zucker (1991, p. 86) argues, “the act of sanctioning may indicate 
that there are other possible, attractive alternatives.” In short, criticism of the 
coercive pillar centers on its neglect of agency roles and institutions’ cognitive 
aspects.  
Moving beyond coercion, the homogeneity of the schools’ responses 
neither reflects normative isomorphism nor mimetic isomorphism. Normative 
pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) representing the currently expected 
educational practices, e.g., “education for all,” “inclusive education,” and “child-
friendly school,” were not found as significant influences that led to isomorphic 
responses in the empirical case. Instead, stereotypical beliefs drove the schools’ 
actors to perceive and respond to the new demand. In this sense, as mentioned by 
Ashworth et al. (2009, p. 169), “organizations may converge on the ‘wrong’ form, 
that is around (the) alternative institutional logic,” in which undesirable behaviors 
(e.g., resistance to policy) as found in this study, and negative behaviors such as 
corruption (Venard, 2009; Venard & Hanafi, 2008) and bribery (Chen, Yas¸ar, & 
Rejesus, 2008; Gao, 2010), have become increasingly common in the public 
sectors. Therefore, Scott (2017, p. 867; see also Scott, 2014, pp. 273-274) suggests 
that institutionalists need to examine actions that can either improve or jeopardize 
organizations. 
In the case study, imitations among the schools were also not observed. The 




ambiguity or uncertainty, they tend to imitate others seen as the ideal model, which 
leads to homogeneity in a field (Akbar, Pilcher, & Perrin, 2015; Deephouse, 1999; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). The 
empirical findings show that the Inclusion Program’s ambiguous prescriptions did 
not encourage schools’ mimetic practices in responding to the program. The 
schools’ responses to the contradicting institutional demands were affected by 
actors’ perceptions of each institutional expectation, rather than by actors’ 
intention to imitate others as suggested by the literature (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Haveman, 1993; Joseph & Taplin, 2012; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; M. 
Yang & Hyland, 2012).  
Competitive pressure, an alternative cause of mimetic behaviors (see, e.g., 
Beckert, 2010; Hsieh & Vermeulen, 2014; Klenk & Seyfried, 2016), also did not 
play a role in the observed cases. Despite the existence of school competition both 
for input (accepting more children with higher academic achievement) and 
outcome (academic test scores, graduation rate, and university acceptance rate), 
schools’ imitative behaviors in both embracing the long-existing institutional 
expectation and resisting the new demand, as predicted by the literature, were not 
found empirically. Prior research findings highlighting that organizations emulate 
other similar organizations (Greve, 1998), competitors (Gao, 2010), or ones 
considered successful and prestigious (Haveman, 1993; Joseph & Taplin, 2012; 
Still & Strang, 2009) were not confirmed in this study. Even though school 
principals and teachers in the city are connected through professional networks at 
the local level with regular meetings, as well through periodic tours of duty among 
principals and teachers administered by the Local Office of Education, these 
factors did not facilitate mimetic behaviors in responding to the institutional 
contradiction (for comparison, see Jonsson, 2009; Kraatz & Moore, 2002). 
Each school’s organizational attributes played an essential role in 
determining school responses, meaning that school actors considered their school 
characteristics such as identity and status, rather than copying the actions taken by 
other schools with different characteristics. Also, the schools’ responses to the 
institutional contradiction mainly considered socially constructed beliefs inherent 
in school actors’ cognition, i.e., the actors’ subjective interpretation shaped by 
broader belief systems and external cultural frameworks as emphasized by 
institutionalists who have paid considerable attention to cultural-cognitive 




1986; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2014, 2017; Simon, 2013; Zucker, 
1991). The absence of a mimetic mechanism in the empirical case indicates that 
an alternative cognitive mechanism can lead to isomorphism. As mentioned, 
glorification, skepticism, and stereotype have played an essential role as carriers 
of the cognitive institution (for comparison, see Scott, 2014). Considering the 
prominent role of stereotypical beliefs, as empirically found in the studied case, 
stereotyping is argued here as a variant of cultural-cognitive mechanisms that can 
give rise to isomorphism. This is consistent with Scott’s (2014, p. 69) statement 
that “cultural-cognitive (pillar) points to the power of templates for types of actors 
and scripts for action” (emphasis added). However, mimesis is not the only 
mechanism for establishing templates, and stereotyping is argued in this thesis as 
the alternative. 
The notion of stereotypical isomorphism is more relevant to and suitable 
with the prevailing circumstances of institutional contradictions. It can provide 
explanations of organizational compliance and homogeneity under such situations, 
particularly when counter-normative practices are introduced, and conflicting 
institutional logics (the mainstream vs. the emerging ones) coexist in management 
or social policies determining citizens’ access to public service provision. 
 
9.2 Complexity Levels and the Variability of Resistance Strategies 
As presented in Chapter 6, school actors across the field held positive perceptions 
of the well-established demand, that is, one that had been fully institutionalized 
(Oliver, 1992; Scott, 2014). However, this was followed by skepticism towards 
both prescriptions and practices challenging the mainstream demand and 
stereotypical beliefs about the people benefited by them. As aforementioned, these 
isomorphic beliefs became the initial factor leading to resistance. 
Both organizations’ preferences in resistance strategies and variability of 
resistance levels in the organization population were found to be dependent on the 
level of complexity experienced by the schools. In the face of an intra-institutional 
contradiction with less complexity, in which the specificity level of prescriptions 
within the new demand is either loose or moderately tight (meaning that inherent 
ambiguity exists), school actors still have an opportunity to avoid internal conflicts 




deactivated the role of organizational attributes in specifying resistance strategies 
(as visualized in Figure 9.1), which in turn generated homogeneous resistance 
levels across the population. 
 













Source: the author’s illustration, based on the empirical findings. 
Under these circumstances, the resistance strategies adopted by similar 
organizations were determined by the levels of risk associated with a potential loss 
of legitimacy. A high level of resistance (i.e., defiance) was found as the preferred 
resistance strategy when the organizations experienced intra-institutional 
contradiction with a low risk of delegitimization. In contrast, a moderate resistance 
(i.e., avoidance) was detected as the typical strategy when the organizations faced 
an intra-institutional contradiction with a medium risk of losing legitimacy. 
These findings confirm that legitimacy is a central concept in organizational 
institutionalism, influencing organizations’ behaviors (Deephouse et al., 2017; 
Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Drori & Honig, 2013). As similarly found in prior 








The absence of 
internal conflict  
no moderating effects 
The potential moderating role 
of organizational attributes 
Less Complexity 
- The more preferred demand vs. the emerging demand 
perceived as controversial with ambiguous prescriptions. 
- Lower risk (medium or low) to obviously resist the emerging 
demand. 
The specificity levels of the 
emerging demand & the risk levels 
of resistance specify resistance 
strategies 
Homogeneous 
resistance strategies in 









behind the adoption of response strategies, as it represents the organizations’ 
survival mechanism in the face of institutional pressures. Deephouse (1996) 
provided empirical evidence that organizational isomorphism, i.e., following other 
organizations that conform with government regulations, is related to and increases 
organizational legitimacy. However, as highlighted by more recent studies (e.g., 
Scherer et al., 2013), the observed organizations in this study experienced typical 
institutional conflicts and, therefore, faced more complicated legitimacy 
challenges. In such situations, organizations encounter a dilemma since they may 
lose legitimacy when defying any contradicting demands.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by revealing that 
organizational isomorphism can also occur in the circumstance of institutional 
contradictions, particularly in those characterized by less complexity, i.e., in which 
the new demand’s prescriptions are less tight and contain ambiguity. This finding 
answers Boxenbaum and Jonsson’s (2017) call for further empirical work 
exploring the relationship between institutional contestation and isomorphism. 
Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that organizational isomorphism is not only 
relevant for the process of institutionalizing legitimate practices (Caravella, 2011; 
Deephouse et al., 2017) but also for the resistance to such institutionalization (see 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1999; Zucker, 1991). 
However, a high variability of response strategies in the field was observed 
when internal conflicts among organizational actors could not be avoided (Figure 
9.2). These instances were the consequence of experiencing an intra-institutional 
contradiction with high complexity, enabling relevant organizational attributes to 
take important roles in specifying resistance strategies. This finding supports the 
earlier assumption that varied organizational responses result from the interaction 
between institutional demand characteristics and organizational attributes 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). Furthermore, the findings 
highlight a particular condition under which organizational attributes play an 
essential role in generating variations of response strategies in a field. In so doing, 
it suggests the importance of considering complexity levels of institutional 


















Source: the author’s illustration, based on the empirical findings. 
 
While isomorphism or homogeneous response in organizational fields 
received significant attention in the new institutional theory’s earlier phase 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; J. W. Meyer et al., 1997; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 
1977), research in the last decade has instead focused on the role played by 
institutional complexity in assessing variations in organizational responses to 
institutional pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2017). 
Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2017) review this development by concluding that 
“empirical work on contested practices has (continuously) increased, while studies 
on isomorphism as an outcome have decreased” (p. 86).  
Beckert (2010) and Hüther and Krücken (2016) propose an alternative view 
that all mechanisms mentioned by Powell and DiMaggio (1983), i.e., coercive, 
normative, and mimetic, can potentially cause either homogenization or 
divergence. Similarly, this work’s empirical findings suggest that both 
organizational isomorphism and divergence can coincide in an organizational field 
or population. By combining the notion of institutional isomorphism with the 
concept of nested organizational fields, Hüther and Krücken (2016) shed light on 
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the same phenomena of simultaneous processes of homogenization and 
differentiation among European universities. Hüther and Krücken (2016) explain 
that homogenization and differentiation of organizations result from their 
embeddedness in multiple fields (i.e., international, regional, national, and local). 
In contrast, this thesis provides evidence that the simultaneity of isomorphism and 
divergence can be exhibited by similar organizations in a single field, located in 
the same geographic area, while experiencing the same institutional pressures. 
These findings are also relevant to public administration literature 
concerning discretion and willingness (or resistance) to implementing policies (see 
Evans & Hupe, 2020a; Lipsky, 2010; Tummers, 2013; Tummers & Bekkers, 
2020). Those studies, however, largely highlight the positive effects of discretion 
while neglecting its potentially harmful effect (Tummers & Bekkers, 2014; see 
also Evans and Hupe, 2020; Sandfort, 2000). The present work particularly 
examines a circumstance in which organizations experience conflicting 
institutional expectations involving a new, controversial demand manifested in 
three different programs with varying levels of specificity. As highlighted by 
organizational institutionalism scholars, when facing conflicting institutional 
demands, organizational actors’ preferences tend to be determined by both their 
alignment with the institutional logics underlying the demands and their 
organizational attributes. The implication is that discretion in a public service 
provision can result in a negative effect, such as discrimination against a particular 
group of people, as found in this study. 
Despite the different analysis levels, the present work’s findings confirm 
predictions concerning discretion’s effect on willingness to implement a policy. 
Varying resistance levels were identified when the observed schools faced the 
Quota Program, a new institutional demand with high specificity, meaning that 
school actors had no discretion in its implementation. However, the rest of the 
findings do not match policy alienation propositions, in which resistance behaviors 
were also exhibited by the observed schools when facing the two other programs 
with lower specificity levels. These findings indicate that the presence (or the 
absence) of discretionary power is not the only determinant of resistance.  
In many cases regarding public service delivery, the influence of public 
service providers as organizations are often greater than that of a public servant as 




influential on policy success or failure. Therefore, in such cases, examining 
resistance at the organizational level would make a worthwhile contribution to the 
research stream. This thesis suggests that institution-level factors (i.e., institutional 
logics, expectations, or demands), organizational attributes (e.g., identity, status, 
power structure, and governance), and institution-organization alignments should 
be considered in studying resistance behavior. By using this approach, one can 
more carefully study the variations in resistance strategies and levels. Furthermore, 
as highlighted by the institutional logics perspective (Ocasio et al., 2017; Thornton 
et al., 2012), individual perceptions and behaviors are shaped by institution and 
organization influences, despite the potential agentic role of the individual in 
shaping organizations and, even, institutions. In this sense, as discussed further in 
the next subsection, organizational resistance levels are determined by 
combinations of organizational characteristics, in which the role of individuals (as 
local proponents and opponents of particular institutional logics) is inherent. 
 
9.3 The Role of Organizational Attributes as Configurations 
The findings, as presented in Chapter 7, reveal that neither OI strength—the extent 
to which the core of OI is widely shared and densely articulated among members 
(Besharov & Brickson, 2016)—nor OI alignment—the alignment between the 
content of OI and the institutional demand (Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014)—are 
sufficient single dimensions for determining how organizational actors perceive 
and respond to institutional demands (Greenwood et al., 2011). As a composite 
attribute reflecting those two dimensions of OI, the strength of the identity resistor 
is suggested here as a more sensitive condition of OI in determining organizational 
resistance to a new institutional demand igniting institutional conflicts (for a 
comparison, see Besharov & Brickson, 2016). 
The notion that OI may restrict innovation or change has been highlighted 
in prior research (Anthony & Tripsas, 2016; Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007), for 
instance, when there is a mismatch between the existing OI and innovative 
practices introduced in the organization. By proposing the notion of the identity 
resistor, the findings here suggest that the level of organization resistance is 
determined not only by the lack of alignment between OI and new institutional 
demands but also by the strength of the OI itself. Furthermore, this study highlights 




resistor may require no other attributes to exercise high-resistance strategies. This 
suggests that the combination of identity-alignment and identity-strength play a 
decisive role in determining how organizational actors perceive and respond to 
controversial expectations. In this sense, there is an interesting alignment between 
the findings of this thesis and Kodeih and Greenwood’s (2014) as well as Raffaelli 
and Glynn’s (2014) insights on the central role of OI as a condition for either 
organization resistance or compliance when it comes to emerging institutional 
demands.  
As a component of the identity-based resistor, strong OI influences other 
organizational attributes. In this vein, organizational actors establish “what their 
organization is” (Ashforth, 2016) or “what it wishes to become” (Kodeih & 
Greenwood, 2014) by embracing selective institutional logics and resisting others 
either thought to be controversial or seen as threatening to organizational goals, 
values, and identities (Besharov & Brickson, 2016). In organizations with strong 
OI, organizational actors have a more convergent perception of the viability of 
institutionalizing emerging institutional demands (Ashforth, 2016). When OI’s 
content is not aligned with an institutional demand; therefore, it makes sense that 
its power structure and decision-making mechanism become less relevant. 
Moreover, in organizations with convergent OI perceptions, it is not easy for a 
leader to force organizational members to embrace a controversial demand. This 
finding indicates that a strong identity resistor can be both the necessary and 
sufficient condition for high-level resistance when organizations experience and 
respond to a new institutional demand conflicting with the mainstream demand. 
In such organizations, organizational actors were found to be active agents 
in persuading expectant stakeholders (i.e., prospective students and their parents; 
see Baldi, Bartel, & Dukerich, 2016) to see or perceive the school in a particular 
way (Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Brown et al., 2006). By successfully attracting 
more prospective students with above-average academic ability, the schools could 
leverage their ability to manage or even increase their status in the field.  
These findings are aligned with previous works suggesting that 
organizations with different statuses within a field (i.e., whether central or 
peripheral) may have different motivations for the same direction they take in 
responding to a new institutional demand. For instance, the adoption of the new 




status in the field (see Compagni, Mele, & Ravasi, 2015; Kodeih & Greenwood, 
2014). This study sheds new light on the fact that organizational identity is a 
possible factor for organizations with different statuses to adopt the same direction 
in responding (either embracing or resisting) to a new institutional demand. More 
specifically, this study suggests that identity resistor may be the central reason for 
both central and peripheral organizations to resist a controversial institutional 
demand. 
A weak identity resistor, which was characterized by insiders’ divergent 
perception of OI, was found to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
low-level resistance. As demonstrated empirically, a weak identity resistor needs 
to be combined either with a command “decision-making” mechanism or a 
peripheral field position to promote low resistance. A weak identity resistor 
enabled variation in insiders’ interpretations of the controversial institutional 
demand and, consequently, opened up the possibility for organizational responses 
with low resistance levels. However, low-level resistance was exhibited by schools 
possessing a weak identity resistor only when: (1) these schools were led by 
principals applying a command “decision-making” mechanism, forcing teachers 
to embrace the controversial demand; or (2) the schools were categorized as non-
favorite ones (peripheral organizations), meaning that they experienced less 
internal conflict when facing the two conflicting institutional demands. 
It is important to highlight decision-making mechanisms here as another 
critical attribute. In line with the studies showing that an organization’s command 
mechanism is critical in the adoption of a new institutional demand, for instance, 
in the implementation of NPM-inspired reforms in healthcare (Berg, Puusa, 
Pulkkinen, & Geschwind, 2017), this present study points to the role played by the 
school principals assigned by the local government to be responsible for school 
compliance with the emerging demand for inclusivity.  
The influencing role of the decision-making mechanism was also 
empirically found in the high resistance cases. In such cases, the persuasion 
mechanism enabled the more decisive influence of the internal disputants and, in 
turn, encouraged the adoption of high resistance strategies, particularly at the elite 
schools. This empirical finding is relevant to the expectation that the decision-
making mechanism is another critical attribute specifying organizations’ resistance 




framework of policy alienation, Tummers predicts that tactical powerlessness, i.e., 
a condition in which the workers’ perceived lack of influence on decisions 
concerning how a policy is implemented within their own organization, is one of 
the policy alienation dimensions that can lead to resistance or unwillingness to 
implement a policy. Tummers’ (2013) empirical work, however, found that 
tactical powerlessness had the lowest influence on resistance. The present study’s 
results indicate a similar condition: the decision-making mechanism, whether 
command (no opportunities for organization members to be involved in decision-
making) or persuasion (the opportunities exist), was found as a condition that 
insufficiently determined resistance levels. 
Furthermore, the findings contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding 
the role of organizational status or position in a field. Prior research points to a 
different tendency for central and peripheral organizations when responding to 
new demands. It was suggested that elite or central organizations (in contrast with 
peripheral organizations) are more resistant (e.g., Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Marquis et al., 2017). However, this thesis suggests that an organization’s position 
in a field is not a sufficient attribute per se and cannot solely promote either a high 
or low level of resistance to a controversial demand. As empirically found, high 
resistance was not exclusively exhibited by the favorite schools (central 
organizations). Also, low-level resistance strategies were not the monopoly of the 
non-favorite schools (peripheral organizations). Both the favorite and non-favorite 
schools that had a strong identity resistor, as mentioned, were found to adopt high-
level resistance, clearly indicating that the role of a strong identity resistor was 
more decisive than organizational status or position in the field. 
 
9.4 Perception Management as a Resistance Strategy 
This work has highlighted a novel type of response strategy intentionally adopted 
by public organizations in the face of an intra-institutional complexity. Although 
the government as the institutional actor embraced both institutional logics 
(selectivity and inclusivity) and managed how the schools should comply with the 
emerging demand for inclusivity without destroying their compliance to the 
existing demand for selectivity, the schools were still reluctant to comply with the 
new demand. Since the emerging demand with tight prescriptions was obligated 




controversial demand was highly risky for the schools. Under this circumstance, 
low to moderate level of resistance, such as compromise and avoidance strategies 
(Oliver, 1991), selective coupling (Pache & Santos, 2013), or balancing and 
integrating demands (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Kraatz & Block, 2017) could be 
relatively safer for the schools. 
An alternative resistance strategy was identified at the four schools, which 
had certain identity and image characteristics. By employing perception 
management, these schools could avoid direct rejection of the undesirable 
institutional demand by making it irrelevant. In practice, the schools’ actors never 
outright rejected the government’s demand for including particular children while 
taking steps to ensure that the target group would voluntarily wish to avoid these 
schools. 
This strategy was found to differ from the traditional avoidance strategies 
mentioned by Oliver (1991). Several tactics encompassing avoidance strategies, 
such as ceremonial acceptance (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Zott 
& Huy, 2007) or decoupling practices from its structures (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2017; Mercado et al., 2018; Moratis, 2016; Rasche & Gilbert, 2015), accentuate 
how organizations differentiate their real actions from those displayed to 
institutional actors. However, it was too risky for the observed schools, particularly 
favorite ones, to employ non-compliance strategies that were easy to be 
recognized, including avoidance strategies such as decoupling. This was because 
the implementation of the strict program (i.e., the Quota Program) was closely 
monitored by the government and non-governmental parties (e.g., mass media, 
NGOs, ombudsmen, and the parents of prospective students). As mentioned by 
Greenwood et al. (2011), such a central status could make the organization more 
visible (see Wry, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2011) and therefore attract public 
attention (see Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004).  
Minimizing the risk, the observed schools with a strong identity resistor 
alternatively resorted to resistance through a cognitive tactic, i.e., perception 
management. When specific school images caused the program’s target group to 
stay away from the schools, it would be hard for the government to blame the 
schools. When this tactic is successful, it can liberate the schools from the 




The perception management tactic can also be differentiated from 
“selective coupling” mentioned by Pache and Santos (2013). The schools 
employing a resistance strategy through perception management did not need to 
selectively adopt practices prescribed by the emerging, controversial demand. 
Moreover, they indicated their willingness to accept and fulfill the tight demand 
for inclusivity, i.e., no ceremonial acceptance or decoupling behaviors (for 
comparison, see Bromley & Powell, 2012; Hasse & Krücken, 2015; Mercado et 
al., 2018; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Rasche & Gilbert, 2015). By managing 
certain organizational images to cope with the controversial demand, 
organizational actors could influence outsiders’ perceptions of the organization.  
Although its perception about the school could also be influenced, the 
government as the dominant institutional actor in the observed cases was not the 
main target of image management strategies. Instead, how prospective students 
and their parents view the school was the critical target to manage. These efforts, 
however, were not only aimed to attract certain students to join the school, as 
highlighted by almost all studies on school marketing (e.g., Holm & Lundström, 
2011; Kotler & Fox, 1995; Lundahl & Olson, 2013; Oplatka, Hemsley-Brown, & 
Foskett, 2002; Oplatka & Hemsley‐Brown, 2004; Yemini, Oplatka, & Sagie, 
2018), but also to deter undesirable students, as found in this study.  
Moving beyond school (marketing) studies, the findings of this thesis make 
an essential contribution to perception management studies, which have so far 
assessed the critical role of organizational identity expressions in influencing the 
perceptions and behaviors of external stakeholders, i.e., potential investors, 
applicants, and customers (Halderen, 2008). Traditionally, this research stream 
investigates the positive effects of perception management on, for instance, 
attracting desired applicants (e.g., Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Dineen & Allen, 
2016; Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014; Turban & Cable, 2003), increasing 
consumers’ buying intentions towards products (e.g., Berens, Van Riel, & Van 
Bruggen, 2005; Brown & Dacin, 1997), protecting organizational legitimacy (e.g., 
Elsbach, 1994), or increasing the economic values of reputation (e.g., Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). Therefore, this study makes a significant 
contribution by providing empirical evidence reflecting not only a positive effect 
of perception management (i.e., attracting high-performing students) but also its 




of perception management, which has been insufficiently researched (for 
exceptions, see  Jabbar, 2016; Lubienski, 2007; Wilson & Carlsen, 2016).  
The observed schools’ attracting and blocking behaviors were considered 
as the function of organizational identity, supported by other relevant 
organizational attributes, in perceiving and responding to the intra-institutional 
contradiction. Whereas both the “old” and early “new” institutionalism frame 
organizational identity as the consequence of institutionalization (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Selznick, 1957), more recently, institutionalist scholars open up the 
possibility that identity is the antecedent to, consequence of, and mechanism for 
institutionalizations (Glynn, 2017).  
This present work advances the literature by providing an empirical 
example of such dynamics of identity-institution relationships. The schools’ 
resistance to the new institutional demand for inclusivity, as empirically found, 
was only one episode or season, preceded by the previous episodes or seasons of 
the institutionalization of the logics of selectivity. The predecessor episodes 
reflected the influence of institutional logics on establishing organizational identity 
through typification (i.e., public schools as competitive schools; selective in their 
admission) (K. Weber & Dacin, 2011), continued by the long seasons in which the 
merit-based admission system became a taken-for-granted, legitimized, and 
institutionalized practice (Scott, 2014). Glorifications of the long-held practice 
were then built, followed by the strengthening of skepticism towards the opposing 
logics or counter-normative practices and the stereotypes of those who would 
benefit from them. These latter episodes or sessions reflect how organizations with 
a preferred identity filtered and resisted a controversial demand. Thus, perception 
management (by expressing organizational identity and influencing outsiders’ 
perceptions of the organization) represents a symbolic action to serve 
organizational actors’ preferences that are influenced by dominant institutional 
logics (Ocasio et al., 2017; Thornton et al., 2012). 
These empirical findings offer insights into the connections between 
perception management, organizational identity, and organizational responses to 
conflicting institutional pressures. Whereas perception management and 




targeting matters of organizational identity influences,46 this thesis highlights 
perception management through organizational identity expressions as a strategy 
when responding to an institutional contradiction. This tactic is essentially 
intended to signal a preferred institutional logic or demand and what is expected, 
and is not, by the organization from targeted audiences primarily to support 
identity affirmation and avoid identity weakening. 
Despite its indirect rejection, this type of resistance strategy can be 
categorized as high-level because it preferred one institutional demand 
(mainstream demand for selectivity) over the other (the emerging demand for 
inclusivity). Based on the characteristics of the perception management tactic 
empirically found, this study suggests that the tactic can be added to Oliver’s 
(1991) list, particularly under the defiance strategy (see Table 9.2). More 
specifically, this additional tactic should be placed before ignoring, which was 
considered by Oliver (1991) as the softest tactic of defiance. In the empirical cases, 
the schools employing perception management tactics did not ignore the new 
institutional demand. Furthermore, they paid attention to the demand they 









46 While perception management researchers focus mainly on strategies expressing 
identity labels, informative signals, and their respective meanings to influence outsiders’ 
perceptions and behaviors towards organizations (Baldi et al., 2016; Halderen, 2008; 
Rindova et al., 2005; Schultz & Hatch, 2008; Wæraas, 2020), organizational identity 
scholars have focused on the internally strategic role of organizational identity in ensuring 
members’ positive identification with preferred collective identities within the 
organizations (Ashforth, 2016; Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Schinoff, Rogers, & 




Table 9.2 Resistance Strategies and Tactics Identified in the Study 
Levels of 
resistance 
Strategies Tactics  












The hardest resistant tactic 
Pacify* 
Bargain 
Moderate Avoidance Conceal* 
Decouple* 
Escape* 




Very high Manipulation Co-optation 
Influence* 
Control 
Source: Author’s, based on Oliver (1991). 
*) tactics empirically found in the current study (i.e., employed by the observed schools 
in responding to the three programs) 
**) the additional tactic based on the study’s empirical findings. 
 
As discovered, the schools using the perception management strategy did 
not need to resort to more extreme resistance strategies, such as ignoring or 
challenging the undesirable demand or influencing the government to adjust the 
demand. Moreover, those schools did not necessarily need to employ a double 
strategy, except School I. The blocking effect at Schools A, F, and G, which were 
widely recognized as the academically high-performing schools, effectively 
prevented low-performing children from choosing those schools. However, such 
an effect was weaker at School I. Despite its keen ambition to become a favorite 
school, School I was not considered as such by the public. School I repeatedly 
employed a decoupling tactic to deter students with particularly low academic 
scores, as mentioned earlier in Chapters 5 and 7.  
Those findings suggest that the use of perception management as a 
resistance strategy requires not only organizational identity expressions but also 
positive images (i.e., outsiders’ perceptions of the organization) and the 
congruence between the two kinds of organizational perceptions. The following 
subsection elaborates upon the interconnection between organizational identity 
and image, which played a significant role in the observed organizations that 





9.5 Identity-Image Interrelationship in Perception Management 
Previous works have studied the role of organizational identity in shaping how 
institutional demands and logics are perceived and responded to (e.g., Kodeih & 
Greenwood, 2014; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). Preferred and expressed identities 
and their meanings have also been examined as important in influencing 
perceptions and behaviors of both organizational members and external 
stakeholders (Ashforth, 2016; Halderen, 2008; Schinoff et al., 2016; Wæraas, 
2020). The present study expands upon these earlier inquiries by exploring how 
identity becomes a critical reference for organizational members in managing 
outsiders’ perceptions as a type of response strategy and unpacking the complex 
nature of organizational perceptions management. 
Following Brown et al. (2006) in differentiating concepts of organizational 
perception (i.e., identity, image, construed image, and reputation), this thesis 
provides empirical evidence of the interrelationship between these dimensions of 
organizational perceptions. The findings show that to attract desirable prospective 
students, insiders (i.e., school managers and teachers) influenced how particular 
outsiders (i.e., prospective students and their parents) think about the school by 
echoing its long-established identity, promoting its new identity, or advertising 
school history (i.e., identity in the past).  
Although each had carried unique aspects associated with the content and 
development status of identities, there were three primary stages of perception 
management involving identity-image relationships. The first stage is reflection, 
in which insiders identify construed images (“What do insiders think particular 
outsiders view their organization?”). The second stage can be referred to as 
establishment or development, in which insiders retain or (re-)build their 
organizational identity (the answer to “who are we as an organization, currently 
or in the future?”). Finally, the third stage is dissemination, where insiders express 
intended images (“What do insiders want outsiders to think about the 
organization?") which could, in turn, determine organizational reputation (“What 
do outsiders actually think about the organization?”). 
Based on the study’s findings, which are consistent with prior works (e.g., 
Brown et al., 2006; Ravasi, 2016), construed image is suggested as a source of 




indicate that outsiders’ perceptions of an organization could determine whether to 
keep or change the existing organization’s identity. By cognitively identifying 
external audiences’ perceptions, insiders (especially organization leaders) engage 
in a reflective process by positing construed image as a referent for organizational 
identity and questioning, “Is this our true self?” Based on the empirical cases, 
reflections were relevant for all organizations regardless of reputation and intended 
to evaluate organizations and their existing identities, particularly to identify 
whether they were attractive or not to outsiders. While reputation has been 
recognized as a determinant of whether an organization is attractive or not (Dineen 
& Allen, 2016; Jones et al., 2014), assessing the compatibility of construed image 
and reputation can be the door to unpacking how insiders recognize, learn, and 
utilize outsiders’ perceptions of an organization for maintaining or improving 
organization appeal.  
However, the decision to retain, develop, or change identity is determined 
not only by insiders’ beliefs about external perceptions but also by insiders’ current 
perceptions about their organization (Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Ravasi, 2016). 
At the same time, as highlighted by institutionalists and identity scholars (Gioia et 
al., 2013; Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Phillips, Tracey, & 
Kraatz, 2016; Thornton et al., 2012), institutional identities and expectations also 
affect organizational identities. In the face of conflicting institutional demands, the 
findings of this thesis support past studies highlighting that organization responses 
to such institutional pressures somewhat depend on the alignment between 
organizational identity and institutional expectation on the one hand (Besharov & 
Brickson, 2016; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014) and the 
strength of that identity on the other (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 
2008; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). When these two OI conditions are considered 
together, as done in the present study, this composite variable was found to 
determine perception management’s substance and orientation. The substance 
points to organizational images desired and developed by insiders to influence 
outsiders’ perception of the organization. The orientation of intended image 
dissemination can be meant either to attract desired prospective members as 
presented by most prior research, deter undesired ones, or both, as highlighted in 










This last chapter provides conclusions or the answers to research questions. 
Furthermore, the research implications are emphasized to highlight the theoretical 
contributions of this research study. By considering the study’s limitations, the 
chapter also presents suggestions for future studies. 
The research problems of this dissertation were: How do public sector 
organizations respond to an intra-institutional contradiction, and how can these 
responses be explained by both institution-level influences and organizational 
attributes? In order to address the research problems, the following six interrelated 
research questions directed the case study: 
1) What are the similarities and variations in the school responses to the intra-
institutional contradiction? 
2) Through what mechanisms do isomorphic influences, emerging in the specific 
circumstance, affect the variability of school responses in the organizational 
field? 
3) Why and to what extent do complexity levels determine the variability of 
school responses? 
4) What are the organizational attributes that individually influence school 
resistance to the emerging demand for inclusivity? 
5) How do specific organizational attributes play a joint role as necessary and/or 
sufficient condition to determine levels of resistance to the emerging demand 
for inclusivity? 
6) Why and how do organizational perceptions determine strategies adopted by 
schools in responding to the intra-institutional contradiction? 
In answering the above questions, this dissertation analyzed the persistent 
problems of educational inequality experienced by socio-economically 
disadvantaged children in Indonesia. In particular, this dissertation indirectly 
explains why the government’s efforts to increase the access of such children to 




theories of organization, the thesis highlights how public schools at the senior 
secondary level experience and respond to the intra-institutional contradiction 
related to school admission (competition vs. inclusivity) and the influences of 
institution and organization-levels on the schools’ responses.  
Based on the findings, it can be concluded that public sector organizations, 
particularly those facing conflicting institutional pressures imposed by the same, 
dominant institutional actor (i.e., government), tend to exhibit homogeneous 
strategy bundles in responding to each side of institutional contradictions. These 
response bundles indicate conformity to one institutional demand or logic, i.e., the 
long-institutionalized practice and resistance to the counter normative one. 
However, closer analysis reveals variations in organizational responses to a 
controversial institutional demand. The degree of variation in resistance strategies 
at the field level varies (between the programs or the manifestations of the 
controversial demand). It was empirically found that an institutional mechanism 
triggered the schools’ isomorphic responses to the institutional contradiction, that 
is, to both conflicting institutional logics. At the same time, the configuration of 
complexity levels and organizational attributes played an essential role in 
determining variation in resistance strategies adopted by the schools in responding 
to the emerging demand for inclusivity, which was perceived as controversial. 
It is, therefore, argued in this thesis that isomorphism could occur in a 
circumstance of institutional complexity. In interpreting isomorphism and 
identifying its characteristics (i.e., both conformity and convergence) under such 
widespread conditions, this study emphasizes the need to observe organizational 
responses on both sides of the conflicting demands. In the empirical cases, 
conformity to the long-standing institutional logic was expressed by the observed 
schools. Meanwhile, a convergent response (i.e., resistance) to the opposing logic 
was also seen, despite the variation in resistance strategies. Therefore, to identify 
the two features of isomorphism under conditions of institutional complexity, this 
study suggests observing each strategy adopted by organizations in responding to 
each side of conflicting institutional demands. These responses should be 
examined as a response bundle, e.g., conforming to one side of the conflicting 
demands while resisting the other side (cf. Ashworth et al., 2009). 
The thesis underscores the role of stereotypical isomorphic influence, a 




organizational actors’ perception of the contradicting demands. The study 
empirically found that it was the following mechanisms that shaped the school 
actors’ beliefs: (1) glorifying the long-existing demand, (2) doubting the new 
demand’s prescriptions, and (3) stereotyping people benefited by the new demand. 
As is typical with stereotypes (see Burn, 2011; Correll et al., 2010; Dovidio et al., 
2010; Stangor, 2016; Stevens & Görgöz, 2010), stereotypical isomorphism is 
characterized by organizational convergence and compliance caused by an over-
generalized belief or oversimplified image of a particular type of person or object. 
Stereotypes are socially constructed beliefs that shape individual cognition 
(Dovidio et al., 2010). Therefore, stereotypes can also influence organizational 
behaviors. This mechanism is distinct from but similar to other influencing 
mechanisms mentioned by Thornton and Ocasio (2008) and Scott (2014). 
The thesis also argues that the institutional contradiction’s level of 
complexity can enable a homogeneity or heterogeneity of organizational response 
strategies. The empirical cases have illustrated how complexity levels, identified 
from the specificity of the controversial demand, played a critical role in 
determining the variability of resistance strategies. The study empirically found 
that homogeneous resistance strategies occurred when the schools experienced low 
complexity, i.e., when facing the emerging demand with ambiguous or loose 
prescriptions. In contrast, heterogeneous resistance levels were identified when the 
schools responded to the emerging demand with strict or unambiguous 
prescriptions.  
The thesis argues that a new, controversial demand with tight prescriptions 
stimulates internal conflicts among organizational actors. This internal conflict 
activates the role of power balance structure and other relevant organizational 
attributes in specifying organizational responses, enabling heterogeneity in 
resistance levels across the organizational population. In contrast, homogenous 
resistance strategies occur when organizations face a new, controversial demand 
with ambiguous prescriptions, in which organizational actors can avoid internal 
conflicts stimulated by contradicting institutional demands. The absence of such 
an internal conflict makes the role of power structures and other organizational 
attributes less relevant in specifying response strategies. 
The thesis also highlights several organizational attributes that play an 




decision-making mechanism, organizational status or position in the field, and 
power balance structure. Although power structure is directly related to internal 
conflict, it was empirically found that organizational identity is the primary 
organization-level determinant. In particular, the study underscores the importance 
of considering both the strength and alignment of organizational identity with 
institutional expectations as a composite condition called the identity resistor. The 
configurational analysis results show that a strong identity resistor, characterized 
by an identity that does not align with an institutional expectation and insiders’ 
convergent perceptions of the organization’s identity, can be both the necessary 
and sufficient condition for high resistance to the institutional demand. However, 
a weak identity resistor is only the necessary condition for low resistance, meaning 
that a combination with other relevant attributes is required (i.e., either with 
command decision-making mechanism or peripheral organizational status). 
Furthermore, the thesis emphasizes the importance of approaching organizational 
attributes as configurations when assessing their role as the organization-level 
determinant of responses to institutional complexity. 
Among the organizational response strategies empirically identified, this 
study highlights the use of perception management as an identity-based response 
strategy. The findings show that the observed organizations developed or 
maintained certain organizational images to avoid outright rejection of a 
controversial demand while simultaneously making it irrelevant. As found, this 
strategy was adopted by organizations with a strong identity resistor. By linking 
institutional theory, organizational identity, and perception management, this 
thesis provides essential theoretical contributions regarding the identity-image 
interrelationship on the use of perception management as a high but imperceptible 
resistance strategy. 
Based on the above conclusions, the key contributions of this thesis to 
various streams of literature (i.e., organizational institutionalism, perception 
management, and organizational identity) need to be highlighted. As regards to 
organizational institutionalism, stereotypical isomorphic influence is suggested as 
an alternative mechanism through which isomorphism occurs. In this case, 
stereotype, skepticism (a symbolic system carrier), and glorification (an activity-
based carrier) function as the cultural-cognitive pillar of the institution. This study 
also dedicates its contributions to both the institutional theory of organization and 




expressions and management as a strategy in response to intra-institutional 
contradictions. Furthermore, this work sheds light on mechanisms through which 
organizational perception management functions as a response strategy, 
characterized by the interrelationship between organizational identity and image. 
Future studies might consider the limitations of this thesis and the potential 
areas not fully explored. First, more research is needed in examining the similarity 
and variation in organizational responses to intra-institutional contradictions in 
other fields. The thesis shows that, under this kind of institutional complexity, 
isomorphism or similarity in response strategies could occur. Future research 
should further investigate the nature of convergent response bundles as a form of 
isomorphism under institutional complexity, such as its organizational dimensions 
(structures, strategies, or outputs) and its continuity. Additional research could also 
explore the adopters’ motivations and the field characteristics where such 
isomorphism arises. 
Second, examining stereotypical isomorphism in different contexts would 
be particularly valuable to better understand its features and mechanism through 
which the isomorphism occurs. A stereotypical isomorphic influence is interpreted 
here as the mechanism that socially constructs organizational actors’ cognitive 
beliefs, i.e., the effect of a long-existing governmental policy as the manifestation 
of a mainstream institutional demand (cf. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). While this 
study highlights prevalent stereotypes as a policy consequence (i.e., shaped by an 
institutional logic derived from state order), future studies must approach such 
beliefs as the manifestation of institutional logics emanating from 
societal/community order. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to study the 
phenomena of an institutional logic takeover, i.e., when a logic that originally 
derived from and began change in an institutional order has been maintained in 
another institutional order (cf. Thornton et al., 2012). Future research could 
examine how organizations face contradicting institutional demands, or logics, 
resulting from such a logic takeover, which is different from other phenomena such 
as logic shifts (cf. Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; 
Russell, 2011; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), diffusion (see a review by Boxenbaum 
& Jonsson, 2017), or Scandinavian Institutionalism’s notion of translation 




Third, the role of institutional complexity levels in enabling, or disabling, 
the influence of organizational attributes in determining resistance strategies 
should be studied in more depth in different contexts. The conclusion regarding 
this specific issue may apply only to organizations controlled by government, in 
which organization managers (i.e., the school principals) are assigned and 
evaluated by the government. Qualitative research, or ones with mixed approaches, 
on independent organizations would likely arrive at different conclusions due to 
the smaller risk of resistance to controversial institutional demands. In such 
conditions, internal conflict stimulated by institutional contradiction can be 
avoided so that several organizational attributes, such as power balance structure, 
decision-making mechanism, and organization status, are less relevant in 
determining response strategies. 
Fourth, future research should delve deeper into the role of organizational 
attributes as the determinant of response strategies. This study made contributions 
by assessing the role of organizational attributes reviewed by Greenwood et al. 
(2011), despite the inevitable adaptation and enrichment following the empirical 
contexts and findings, i.e., field position (i.e., organizational status), identity (i.e., 
identity resistor), structure (i.e., power balance structure), and governance (i.e., the 
decision-making mechanism). This research indicates the central role of 
organizational identity in specifying resistance levels to a controversial 
institutional demand. Further quantitative research might consider examining the 
significance of organizational identities. Future qualitative studies could also 
explore additional organizational characteristics—such as ownership, size, social 
capital (network), culture, and performance—that may play essential roles in 
determining organization responses to institutional contradictions. Furthermore, it 
is essential to examine the relationship between influencing attributes. For 
example, as suggested in this study,  an organization’s decision-making 
mechanism must be considered together with the power balance structure to 
evaluate the internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting 
institutional demands (cf. Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Fifth, the thesis suggests the importance of considering organizational 
attributes as combinations rather than individual ones. Therefore, it is valuable to 
employ configurational analysis using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to 
further measure the role of organizational attributes as an organization-level 




and identifying necessary and sufficient combinations of the four observed 
attributes leading to high or low resistance. However, the use of csQCA as a 
method is limited by its binary variables. The conversion of the condition values, 
from the four original categories into two—high and low resistance levels—
consequently means losing information regarding moderate resistance. Further 
research with a more significant number of cases could use multi-value QCA 
(mvQCA), which extends the analysis beyond dichotomous conditions and 
outcomes. Based on the csQCA results with modest or limited generalization, this 
study offers theoretical insights highlighting the essential role of either a strong or 
weak identity-based resistor in promoting resistance levels, which should be 
considered as a basis for further theoretical development in future studies, as 
commonly expected from QCAs (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009, p. 16). 
Sixth, there is a need for more studies that identify variation in responses to 
a controversial demand, particularly in intra-institutional contradictions. This 
research study found perception management as a resistance strategy that can be 
added on Oliver’s (1991) list of strategic responses. By observing other contexts 
of intra-institutional contradiction, in which organizations face the coexistence of 
old and new institutional demands imposed by the same institutional actors, 
various resistance strategies might potentially be identified. This thesis stresses the 
importance of evaluating strategies adopted by organizations facing an intra-
institutional contradiction, which might have different or even unique 
characteristics compared to ones employed when dealing with inter-institutional 
contradictions. 
Finally, further qualitative explorations into how public organizations 
employ their soft resistance strategy are also needed. The use of identity-based 
resistance strategies, e.g., by managing outsiders’ perceptions of the organization, 
is also an interesting topic for more in-depth examination. While earlier studies 
(e.g., Dineen & Allen, 2016; Jones et al., 2014) highlight that reputation has been 
recognized as a determinant of whether an organization is attractive or not to 
outsiders, the findings of this thesis show that assessing the congruence between 
construed image and reputation is a key to unpacking how insiders recognize, 
learn, and utilize outsiders’ perceptions of the organization. It maintains the 
balance between organizational attractiveness (to entice people with characteristics 
suitable for the organization's identity and preferred institutional expectations) and 




response strategy effectively complies with an institutional demand while resisting 
the others. Finally, it is vital to study the effects of such an “inclusion-exclusion” 
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A. Informant: Local Government 
Topic: The institutional demands related to school admission 
1. To what extent do the central and the local governments assess and 
encourage school performance/efforts, especially in improving school 
quality and increasing vulnerable children’s access?  
2. What do you think about the relevance and urgency of the two demands, 
i.e., the long-existing demand for competition/selectivity and the emerging 
demand for inclusivity?  
3. Please provide concrete examples of the current systems, initiatives, or 
programs relevant to each of the two demands. 
4. Do you think that the two demands are contradictory? Why or why not?  
5. How does the government ensure that the public schools comply with the 
demands? 
6. What types of incentives are given to schools for complying with both 
demands? 
7. In your view, how do the different schools interpret and respond to these 
two demands? 
8. Why do the schools respond to these two demands differently? 
9. How does the government deal with schools that respond differently or 
fail to comply with these two demands? What are the consequences for 
schools (e.g., sanctions or penalties)? 
10. How have these two demands changed over the last six years?  
 
B. Informants: School principals, vice-principals, and teachers 
Topic: The school’s response to the demands 
1. What do you think about the importance of the two demands imposed by 
the government, meaning the long-existing demand for 
competition/selectivity and the emerging demand for inclusivity?  




3. What do you think about each program representing the emerging demand 
for inclusivity, i.e., the Quota Program, the Inclusion Program, and the 
Affirmative Action Program? 
4. What are the tradeoffs between accepting the programs’ beneficiaries (i.e., 
low-performing students from low-income families, students with 
disabilities, and Papuan students) and managing school performance? 
5. How does the school fulfill the two (conflicting) demands? What does the 
school do to respond to each demand (including each program 
representing the emerging demand for inclusivity)? 
6. What are the reasons for the school’s responses? 
 
Topic: School attributes 
Subtopic: Status/field position 
(Note: the researcher has already used statistical data of school admission 
[obtained from the District Office of Education] to identify the school’s position 
in the school population during 2010-2016, i.e., categorized as either favorite or 
non-favorite school) 
1. As a favorite school (or a non-favorite school), what are positive and 
negative consequences related to school performance when choosing to 
comply with either one or both of the demands? 
2. Are those consequences taken into account when making decisions about 
the school responses? Why or why not? 
3. What are the advantages (or disadvantages) when the school considers (or 
does not consider) the school status in specifying the response? 
 
Subtopic: School’s Identity 
1. What are the shared characteristics of public schools in the city? 
2. Does the school represent a high academic performance or an elite school? 
If not, is the school an inclusive school?  
3. What are the main characteristics differentiating the school from other 
public schools (in the city)? Are there differences in teachers’ perceptions 
of the school? If so, what are the variations? Why do differences occur? 
4. To what extent is the school’s identity aligned with the institutional 




5. To what extent is the school’s identity aligned with the emerging demand 
for inclusivity?  
6. Are there any references, such as government regulations, standards, 
common practices/traditions, or school models, considered by the school 
when developing its identity? 
7. Based on the school’s experience, is it possible to be both elite and 
inclusive? What are the advantages and challenges of being both? 
8. Does the school identity (or identity aspirations) determine the school's 
preferences in selecting students? If so, how and why? 
 
Subtopic: Internal representation and power structure 
1. How do internal stakeholders (principal, vice-principals, and teachers) 
perceive the two (conflicting) demands? 
2. Are there any disagreements between internal stakeholders on how the 
school should respond to the two demands?  
3. Who are the internal proponents of the long-existing demand for selectivity 
(and the emerging demand for inclusivity—each of the three programs)? 
4. How do the different parties react to the above tensions? How do they 
articulate their respective opinion?  
5. How do the school actors deal with such internal disagreements? 
6. Are there different levels of conflict when the school faces each of the three 
programs? Why or why not? 
7. Is there a balance of power in the school? If not, who is more dominant? 
 
Subtopic: Governance (decision-making mechanism) 
1. Did you participate in the school’s decision-making, especially in 
responding to the two demands – selectivity vs. inclusivity? 
2. How should the school respond to these demands—and why? 
3. Is there a consensus among school actors on how the school should 
respond to these demands? If not, please elaborate what the dominant 
perspectives or opinions are.  
4. How was the school’s decision made? Who were the dominant actors in 





5. To what extent does the lack of consensus among internal actors affect the 
school’s decision in responding to the two demands? 
 
C. Informant: Students 
For students who are NOT the programs’ beneficiaries 
1. When you were in junior secondary school or about to enroll at the senior 
secondary level, what did you think about the characteristics of this school 
that differentiated it from other public schools (in the city)? How did you 
know those characteristics? 
2. Did you choose the school because of the characteristics you just 
mentioned? If not, what were your primary considerations in choosing the 
school? 
3. What do you think about each of the three programs? How do you 
characterize the programs’ beneficiaries (i.e., low-performing students 
from low-income families, students with disabilities, and Papuan 
students)? Do you think that they should be accepted and attend the 
lessons in this school? 
 
For students who are the programs’ beneficiaries (including students with 
disabilities and Papuan students, if any) 
1. Could you please tell the story of how you became a student in this 
school? What was the school admission process like? 
2. Do you find any of the learning activities or social interactions challenging 
at this school? What are the causes? 
3. Does the school care about your difficulties? Please provide some 
examples. 
4. Please share keywords that describe the school’s unique characteristics. In 
other words, what distinguishes this school from other public schools? 
